Internet-Draft Protected Transaction Authority November 2026
Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Independent Submission
Internet-Draft:
draft-das-protected-transaction-authority-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
S. Das
Independent Inventor

Protected Delegated Transaction Authority: Exact-Effect Reconstruction, Non-Bearer Authorization, and Execution-Finality Enforcement

Abstract

A cryptographically valid signature, an authenticated request, a delegated credential or a previously approved operation does not necessarily establish authorization for the exact consequential operation about to take effect. This document describes an informational security architecture for delegated digital operations in which authority is bound at collection time in one protected enforcement domain, the actual execution-facing operation is reconstructed in a second, and a protected Finality Sink decides whether that exact effect may be released. It covers exclusive signing, non-bearer sink-bound execution handles, final native byte reconstruction, delegated-code and account-abstraction cases such as EIP-7702, atomic budget consumption, crash recovery with explicit unknown outcomes, effect-path coverage, and financial profiles for payments, cards, tokenized assets, stablecoins, offline money and cross-chain transfers. Enforcement claims are limited to effect paths actually under control.

Source and Patent Information

Technical source: a provisional specification, "Protected Transaction Authority and Execution-Finality Enforcement for Delegated Digital Operations" (technical description title: "Signed Is Not Authorized: Systems and Methods for Protected Transaction Authority and Execution-Finality Boundaries for Delegated Digital Operations"), supplied to the editor as an 795-page document dated 31 October 2026. The manuscript states that it is a drafting document and does not itself evidence submission to the Indian Patent Office. The applicant-reported filing is Indian Provisional eFiling reference 202631130246, corroborated only by a payment record showing CBR date 31/10/2026; the "App. Number" column in that record was blank and the official acknowledgment has not been seen. See Appendix J and Appendix K.

Foundational reference: PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026, published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2. Where to read the full PCT filing: search "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE; search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615); or read the PCT file directly in Technical Disclosure Commons at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/.

The IPR disclosure for this document will be made at the appropriate time through the official IETF process and in accordance with IETF guidelines.

AI-assisted drafting was used. Readers must verify patent numbers, dates, claims, product capabilities and standards references against primary sources. This is an individual proposal, not an IETF standard.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Delegated digital operations are assembled across a requester, an autonomous planner, a service identity, an approval tool, a transaction builder, a credential daemon, a signer, a network relay, an execution host and a downstream service or device. Each component can verify a different property. Authentication, signature validity, transport protection and logging are necessary, but none of them shows that the exact operation about to take effect is the one that was authorized.

This document describes how an independently protected authority and an execution-facing verification can control the actual effect before a usable signature, privileged command, transfer, transmission, disclosure or hardware operation is released. It is not limited to cryptocurrencies or smart accounts. It is an engineering description derived from a single source specification, not a claim-by-claim reproduction of it.

Central principle: PED-1 protects what was authorized. PED-2 determines what is actually about to happen. The Finality Sink decides whether that exact effect may be released.

2. Problem Statement

A single incorrect effect can arise even when every cryptographic check passes: a hostile builder substitutes a delegate; a payee address is swapped between approval and signing; a numeric scale differs; delegated code is replaced or upgraded; two workers spend the same remaining balance; a crash occurs after permission consumption but before the effect is observed; an acknowledgment is lost and a retry duplicates the effect; a backup key or fallback route signs outside the gateway. The source cites publicly reported incidents of legitimately signed but unauthorized delegation or transfer operations as motivation; the editor did not independently verify those incidents.

Conventional authentication and signatures are not defective. The point is narrower: they establish who signed what bytes, not that the consequence is within a current, scoped and unused authority.

3. Scope and Non-Goals

4. Terminology

BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] terms are used only where a requirement is intentionally stated.

Candidate Act

A proposed consequential operation held in a non-effective state.

PED-1

Protected Enforcement Domain 1: establishes collection-time authority.

PED-2

Protected Enforcement Domain 2: reconstructs the actual execution-facing operation.

Finality Sink

The protected boundary that verifies and then releases or withholds the exact effect.

Execution Handle (EH)

An operation-specific authorization whose bytes alone do not authorize arbitrary use.

Actual Effect Descriptor

Typed description of the final native operation obtained from the effect interface.

Protected Authority Record

The collection-time authority: scope, limits, epochs, usage.

Effect path

Any route by which the consequential effect can be produced.

Declared enforcement scope

The set of effect paths for which enforcement is claimed.

5. Trust and Authority Model

Components: requester, untrusted builder or delegate, PED-1, PED-2, Finality Sink, state repository (usage, policy generation, revocation), downstream effect target and outcome sources. PED-1 and PED-2 need not run on different machines; their independence depends on the protected control and trust assumptions (for example, that compromise of the requester does not modify both the authority record and the reconstructed pending effect).

 Human / agent / application: proposed delegated operation
                 |
                 v
 Candidate Act (held NON-EFFECTIVE)
                 |
                 v
 PED-1: collection-time authority and scope binding
                 |
                 v
 Protected Authority Record
 (operation, principal, policy, budget, epoch, usage)
                 |
                 v
 Untrusted builder / scheduler / delegate / API adapter
                 |
                 v
 PED-2: actual execution-time native reconstruction
                 |
                 v
 Exact-effect comparison
 (code, target, amount, route, fees, nested calls, epoch)
                 |
       current, scoped, valid, unused?
          NO |            | YES
             v            v
   DENY / HOLD /     Non-bearer Execution Handle
   INDETERMINATE            |
                            v
                  Protected Finality Sink
                            |
                            v
        atomic or bundled use consumption + effect gate
                            |
                            v
      signature / dispatch / native effect
                            |
                            v
        outcome evidence and reconciliation
Figure 1: Principal architecture: PED-1, PED-2 and the Finality Sink

Failure between transitions: a failure before PED-1 completes leaves no authority and the Candidate Act stays non-effective; between PED-1 and PED-2 the record persists but no handle is issued; between PED-2 and the sink a mismatch gives DENY or HOLD; between consumption and release the state is a recorded unresolved release; after release and before evidence the outcome is UNKNOWN. A consumed handle is never reusable merely because the system restarted.

 +------------------+          +------------------+
 | PED-1 island     |          | PED-2 island     |
 | what was        |          | what is about to |
 | authorized      |          | happen           |
 +--------+---------+          +---------+--------+
          |  authority record            | actual effect
          +------------+   +-------------+
                       v   v
                 +---------------+
                 | Finality Sink |--> release or withhold
                 +---------------+
 Islands may share hardware; independence is by control and
 trust assumptions, not by physical separation.
Figure 2: D-01: Two-instance authorization and effectuation islands

6. Candidate Acts and Non-Effective State

A Candidate Act holds an operation identifier, requested effect class, originating principal, proposed target and attributes, and a source-authority reference. It carries no effective credential. A requester, planner or builder may create or revise Candidate Acts but cannot release an effect. Compensation, refund and quota restoration are also Candidate Acts and need their own authority.

7. PED-1 Collection-Time Authorization

PED-1 verifies and binds, where applicable: originating principal; account or tenant; transaction class; exact or bounded operation attributes; destination or beneficiary; value and asset; purpose and restrictions; delegation scope; executable code identity; chain or settlement domain; policy and revocation epochs; validity period or protected event bounds; maximum uses; cumulative budget; source-authority provenance; required downstream evidence; and permitted variations.

The authorization is not modifiable by the untrusted builder or delegated agent. An approval log or user-interface summary is not an authority record.

 time ---------------------------------------------------->
 collection:  principal, scope, limits, epoch  -> record R
 (untrusted builder transforms intent into native bytes)
 execution:   native bytes B -> decode -> effect descriptor X
 compare X against R: equal-or-within? else DENY
 Required: B comes from the actual effect interface, not from
 the caller's self-description.
Figure 3: D-02: Collection-time authority vs execution-time reconstruction

8. PED-2 Execution-Time Reconstruction

PED-2 obtains the relevant final native representation from a trusted interface: serialized transaction data, resolved destination, signing preimage, effective code identity, asset and amount, nested operations, fee fields, device descriptors or other consequence-critical attributes. The implementation has to show how the operation comes from the actual effect interface rather than from a caller's self-description. A user-visible label does not replace binary or semantic effect verification.

9. Canonical Effect Descriptors

Where different serializations have equivalent authorized effects, a formally defined canonicalization profile is needed. The reference engines in the source use a version-prefixed binary form: four fixed ASCII bytes plus a version byte, then for each of eighteen fixed fields a 32-bit big-endian length and UTF-8 bytes, with SHA-256 over the result. This illustrates the need for a fixed field order that prevents delimiter ambiguity; it is a local test format, not a proposed standard.

 final tx bytes -> decode -> {chain, target, asset, amount,
 fees, nested calls, code hash, upgrade gen}
        |                                  |
 delegation install?  --> verify implementation identity,
                           scope, upgrade generation
 delegated call?      --> verify call graph, recipient,
                           asset, remaining allowance
 unknown critical field or ambiguous decode -> DENY
Figure 4: D-05: Final transaction and delegated-code verification
 format A -> adapter -> format B -> adapter -> native bytes
 each hop: preserve critical fields and canonical semantics
 final check at sink on native bytes, not on format A
 unknown critical extension -> reject; ambiguity -> DENY
Figure 5: D-15: Interoperability final-byte transformation checks

10. Non-Bearer Execution Handles

An Execution Handle is an operation-specific authorization whose bytes alone are insufficient to authorize arbitrary use. The essential property is that a copied handle does not independently authorize a different operation, tenant, sink, account, policy generation or use. The word non-bearer does not make a format secure; the property comes from enforceable context binding and protected state.

Table 1: Handle forms
Form Property Residual note
Ordinary bearer access token possession suffices copyable
Proof-of-possession authorization holder proves a key key theft remains
Signed authorization statement origin and integrity does not consume use
Locally protected one-use reference state-bound single use depends on protected state
Sink-bound authorization audience is one sink needs sink identity
Hardware authorization slot device-held slot hardware assumptions
Protected state-based permission record in protected store availability dependence
Distributed reservation or escrow disjoint shares coordination cost
 issued -> bound(sink, op, tenant, epoch, use) -> presented
    |                                                 |
 revoked/expired <-- cancel/deny burns --> verified at sink
                                              |
                       consume use record (durable) -> release
                                              |
                          consumed (copy cannot reuse)
 A copied handle fails: wrong sink / op / tenant / epoch / use.
Figure 6: D-03: Non-bearer Execution Handle lifecycle

11. Protected Finality Sinks

The Finality Sink verifies the protected authorization, its own identity, current policy state, revocation, replay protection, budget, use consumption and the reconstructed effect. If all hold, it conditionally admits the bounded effect; if not, it prevents the effect through the controlled boundary or retains a defined non-effective or unresolved state. It has to sit where the consequential effect can actually be controlled. A middleware policy log is not a substitute for control over a separate unrestricted signer, credential, hardware device or downstream endpoint.

12. Signing and Delegated-Code Profiles

A protected signer exposes only a verify-and-sign function. It computes the final digest internally, receives independently authenticated policy state, and consumes a protected use record before returning signed bytes. Implementation pathways in the source are: a non-exportable HSM key with a policy-enforcing wrapper; threshold key shares with independent final-transaction verification at the last share release; and a hardware-isolated enclave with an authenticated, measured verify-and-sign interface. Each is valid only if no other key, socket, process, legacy endpoint or hardware route can independently produce the same effect within the claimed scope.

 builder --> VerifyAndSign API only
               |
               v
       protected signer (HSM / enclave / threshold)
        - computes digest internally
        - checks policy + handle + record
        - consumes use, then releases signature
 Raw-digest signing, key export, backup keys: disabled or
 inside the same policy boundary. Otherwise the claim is
 limited to the keys actually controlled.
Figure 7: D-04: Exclusive protected signing and key-use boundary

12.1. EIP-7702, Programmable Accounts and Delegated Code

EIP-7702 ([EIP7702]) lets an externally owned account authorize delegation. The authorization tuple is [chain_id, address, nonce, y_parity, r, s]; the signature covers a hash of a magic byte 0x05 and the RLP of chain_id, address and nonce; a set-code transaction (type 0x04) carries the list; on a valid tuple the account's code is set to a delegation indicator, 0xef0100 followed by the delegate address; a chain_id of 0 means the authorization is valid on any chain. These are attributed to the specification and were checked against its published text as returned by search, not against a locally verified copy. Account-abstraction approaches such as ERC-4337 ([ERC4337]), EIP-712 ([EIP712]) and ERC-1271 ([ERC1271]) are separate established mechanisms.

This document does not say EIP-7702 implements the proposed architecture. The distinctions are:

  • A valid authorization tuple is not authorization to install or refer to a particular delegate.
  • Authorization to refer to delegated code is not authorization of that code's actual behavior.
  • Authority after deployment or upgrade is not covered by the original authorization; code identity and upgrade generation need current checks.
  • The exact asset transfer or privileged operation later performed needs separate protected authorization at a consequential effect interface.

Items to examine: chain ID; delegation address; nonce; account identity; code hash; implementation target; upgrade generation; allowed methods; nested calls; recipient and asset constraints; spending authority; contract state; on-chain policy; revocation; replay; persistence after other transaction failures; and independently issued signatures that bypass off-chain control.

An off-chain signer denial cannot invalidate a signature already created by an uncontrolled key. Where independent signatures remain possible, a genuine downstream mechanism is needed, such as an on-chain account guard or a controlled settlement gateway.

 EOA signs authorization (chain, address, nonce)
 set-code tx installs delegation designator
 later calls run delegate code in the EOA context
 valid authorization != approved delegate behavior
 gate: code identity + allowed calls + allowance, at the
 account effect interface or an on-chain guard
Figure 8: Delegated EIP-7702 account behavior
 off-chain signer denies  -> no signature from THIS signer
 an independent key still signs -> chain accepts it
 so: on-chain account guard / controlled settlement
 gateway is needed where independent keys exist
 off-chain denial cannot invalidate a signature that an
 uncontrolled key already produced
Figure 9: On-chain versus off-chain enforcement

13. Concurrency and Quota Models

Concurrency model: shared parent budgets and child-agent budgets; per-operation uses; serial ordering; atomic protected reservation; durable consumption; disjoint escrow; concurrent workers; multi-region operation; unavailable coordinators; partitions; stale snapshots; reconciliation; and refund or quota restoration. Two independently approved requests of 60 units must not consume 120 units against a total of 100 because each worker saw the same earlier balance.

 worker A (60) \
                >--> protected check-and-reserve (atomic)
 worker B (60) /       total budget 100, used 0
                        A: reserve 60 -> ok (used 60)
                        B: reserve 60 -> DENY (40 left)
 Stale snapshots are never trusted; decrement and handle
 consumption commit together.
Figure 10: D-06: Protected quota with concurrent workers

13.1. Check-and-Reserve Pseudocode

def check_and_reserve(sink, req):
    with sink.atomic():              # single critical section
        a = sink.authority(req.handle)
        if a is None or a.revoked:  return DENY
        if sink.generation() != a.generation: return DENY
        x = sink.reconstruct(req.native_bytes)
        if not within(x, a.scope):   return DENY
        if a.uses_left < 1:         return DENY
        if sink.budget(a.parent) < x.amount: return DENY
        sink.budget_dec(a.parent, x.amount)
        sink.consume(a.handle)       # durable before release
        return ADMIT

The atomicity applies to the sink's protected state. No distributed exactly-once execution is claimed; the assumptions are a linearizable local decrement or a quorum with fencing, and durable storage.

14. Distributed State and Revocation

Policy and revocation generations are monotonic and anchored. A sink that cannot establish fresh state within the bound denies the protected effect; availability is subordinate to denial correctness. Regions are fenced by generation; migration of an authorization requires fencing the originating sink first. Clock uncertainty is carried as an interval, not a point.

 region 1 (gen 7)  region 2 (gen 7)  region 3 (gen 6, stale)
        \               |                  /
         authoritative generation + revocation anchor
 revocation r -> anchored with monotonic serial
 stale region cannot admit: freshness bound exceeded -> DENY
 partition: safety over availability for the protected effect
Figure 11: D-07: Distributed region fencing and revocation

15. Crash Recovery and Outcome Uncertainty

Distinct states: candidate received; authority verified; permission reserved; permission consumed; native effect released; local effect committed; external submission acknowledged; actual external effect established; settlement or delivery established; outcome unknown; denied; revoked; compensating action separately authorized.

 RECEIVED -> VERIFIED -> RESERVED -> CONSUMED -> RELEASED
    |           |           |           |          |
  DENIED     REVOKED     (crash)     (crash)   SUBMITTED
                                                  |
                    ACTUAL_EFFECT_ESTABLISHED <- evidence
                    SETTLED / DELIVERED       <- evidence
                    OUTCOME_UNKNOWN (no ack, no evidence)
 restart never makes a consumed handle reusable
 compensation = new Candidate Act with new authority
Figure 12: D-08: Crash recovery and outcome-unknown state machine
 local decision receipt  (proves: local admission only)
 submission ack          (proves: handed to downstream)
 inclusion / acceptance  (domain-specific evidence)
 final settlement        (authoritative source, finality depth)
 Each level is a distinct state. Missing evidence = UNKNOWN.
Figure 13: D-12: Receipt versus external settlement evidence
 original effect E1 (committed or unknown)
 compensation proposed -> held NON-EFFECTIVE
 authority for compensation? (new record, own scope)
 YES -> new effect E2 with its own receipt
 quota restored only after verified non-effect or
 verified reversal; E1 stays in history.
Figure 14: D-13: Protected compensation and quota restoration
Table 2: Crash boundaries
Crash point Persisted Recovery
After verification, before reservation record re-verify; no consumption
After reservation, before consumption reservation release or expire reservation
After consumption, before release consumed handle mark release UNKNOWN; reconcile; no fresh signing
After release, before ack journal entry query status by operation identity
After ack, before evidence ack wait for authoritative evidence

16. Consequence-Path Coverage and Non-Bypassable Enforcement Conditions

The operator identifies all effect-capable paths and builds a protected reachability graph. Paths include: raw signing APIs; backup keys; threshold participants; emergency signers; legacy endpoints; fallback regions; alternate wallets; smart-account call paths; credential export; key import or recovery; direct cloud APIs; sandbox sockets; sidecars; message queues; device maintenance interfaces; hardware debug paths; firmware commands; offline channels; and separately privileged downstream services.

A route is not counted as enforced merely because a different route includes a gateway. If an independently capable path cannot be brought under control, that limitation is reported instead of claiming universal non-bypassability.

 vertices: signers, keys, APIs, regions, wallets, devices
 edges: credential use, call, route, fallback
 effect  <-- gateway G1 (enforced)
 effect  <-- backup key K2 (NOT enforced) -> report as gap
 completeness = every path to the effect is enforced
 or listed as an exception; a gateway on one route does
 not cover another route.
Figure 15: D-10: Consequence-path enumeration graph
 sandbox (untrusted agent code)
    | only path out
    v
 host mediator: proxy / kernel hook / network policy
    | credential swap at final request (agent never sees it)
    v
 Finality Sink -> external service
 Other sockets, sidecars, mounted creds: must be closed
 or counted as uncovered.
Figure 16: D-09: Privileged sandbox and host-mediated egress
 untrusted content (web page, tool output, supplier portal)
        -> tainted lineage tag
 planner may draft Candidate Acts; it holds no credentials
 tainted instruction cannot widen scope or beneficiary
 authority source must be an authenticated principal
Figure 17: D-14: Source-authority lineage and instruction taint

17. Device, Cloud and Network Profiles

Device, cloud and network profiles bind commands to descriptors: device identity, firmware version and reset epoch (E-19, E-35); radio resource and purpose (E-20); telecom routing and quotas (E-36); privileged cloud mutation (E-37); data export (E-22). The gate has to sit at the privileged API or command interface, not upstream.

 command C bound to (device id, firmware version, reset epoch)
 device reset -> epoch e -> e+1
 replay of C (epoch e) -> DENY at device gate
 firmware rollback -> descriptor mismatch -> DENY
Figure 18: D-11: Device reset epoch and descriptor continuity
 IAM / device command -> actual mutation descriptor
 compare to scope; reset epoch / firmware / resource id
 effect gate sits at the privileged API, not upstream
Figure 19: Privileged cloud or device effectuation

18. Financial and Programmable-Account Profiles

Financial profiles E-45 to E-63 follow a common frame: the authorized economic obligation; the actual economic operation; the enforceable boundary; current protected state; adversarial scenarios (substitution, duplication, changed fees or beneficiaries, delegated code changes, competing requests, uncertain settlement, partial completion, hostile retry); outcome and recovery; alternative implementations; and validation. They are listed in Appendix C. Local authorization is never described as settlement.

 AUTH(max, merchant, currency) -> CAPTURE(<= max) -> CLEAR
        -> SETTLE
 each transition has its own unique id and bound
 capture total > authorized max -> DENY
 AUTH ok != captured != cleared != settled
Figure 20: Card authorization, capture, clearing, settlement
 secure element: allowance, epoch, monotonic counter
 offline spend -> local bound check -> value transfer
 reconnect -> reconcile counter + consumed set
 rollback of device state -> epoch mismatch -> refuse
 assumptions: tamper-resistant element, scheme rules
Figure 21: Offline CBDC spending and later reconciliation
 mint / burn / redeem events from ledger (native evidence)
 issuer liability record <-> circulating supply check
 redemption release only if burn event verified and
 reserve liability reconciles; else HOLD / UNKNOWN
Figure 22: Stablecoin issuer-liability continuity
 source event e at depth d
 destination mint only when d >= finality depth for e
 reorg removes e -> mint blocked; if minted -> UNKNOWN +
 reconciliation; replay of e is single-use
Figure 23: Cross-chain reorganization handling
 leg A (currency X)    leg B (currency Y)
 both legs: obligation, party, commitment condition
 release B only if A committed (asymmetric finality aware)
 one leg unknown -> hold other; partial -> manifest
Figure 24: Cross-currency payment-versus-payment
 title + encumbrance verified at native register
 payment leg and delivery leg bound to one obligation
 title uncertainty -> HOLD (no payment release)
Figure 25: Tokenized-security delivery-versus-payment
 domain 1 committed, domain 2 denied -> PARTIAL_EFFECT
 compensation for domain 1: separate Candidate Act,
 owner consent, own receipt; no global atomicity claim
Figure 26: Multi-domain compensation
 alias / QR / name -> resolve to canonical beneficiary
 compare to mandate merchant identity at the sink
 changed resolution after approval -> DENY
Figure 27: Merchant identity resolution
 parent ceiling 100 -> child A 40, child B 40, reserve 20
 each spend: atomic reserve against child and parent
 child cannot re-delegate beyond its own allowance
Figure 28: Parent and child agent payment budgets
 strategy intent -> candidate order -> native order bytes
 compare symbol, side, size, price bound, venue
 fills accumulate against exposure journal; excess -> DENY
 order ack != fill != settlement
Figure 29: Trading strategy versus native order and fill
 invoice + PO + supplier identity store reconcile
 payment alias resolved at effect gate
 supplier-portal text is untrusted; account swap -> DENY
 duplicate invoice across rails -> business-key dedupe
Figure 30: Autonomous supplier invoice and payment
 message type 1 -> typed effect fields -> message type 2
 critical semantics preserved (amount, unit, party, purpose)
 lossy mapping of a critical field -> reject
Figure 31: Financial message semantic transformation

Offline money assumes a tamper-resistant device element and scheme rules; stablecoin, tokenized-deposit and CBDC mechanisms remain distinct; multi-domain effects are not described as globally atomic; compensation is a new authorized act.

19. Interoperability Considerations

No universal wire format is proposed. Candidate carriers: CBOR [RFC8949], JSON, COSE [RFC9052], JWT [RFC7519], CWT [RFC8392], OAuth [RFC6749], DPoP [RFC9449], token exchange [RFC8693], and RATS attestation [RFC9334]. Wherever one is used, a profile has to define critical-field processing, canonicalization, versioning and rejection of ambiguous encodings; unknown critical extensions are rejected. These carriers do not supply exact-effect reconstruction.

20. State Machines and Pseudocode

Sink decision pseudocode (illustrative, non-normative):

def sink_decide(req):
    x = reconstruct(req.native)          # PED-2 output
    a = authority(req.handle)            # PED-1 record
    if x is None or x.has_unknown_critical: return DENY
    if not authentic(a) or revoked(a):      return DENY
    if stale(a.policy_gen):                return DENY
    if not within(x, a.scope):              return DENY
    if not consume_atomically(a):           return DENY
    release(x)                              # signature/dispatch
    return RELEASED_UNKNOWN_OUTCOME          # not settled

The terminal outcome is always set from evidence, not from the release step. A formal safety state machine (E-29) states temporal invariants: no release without a consumed use; no reuse after consumption; no effect after revocation is observed at the sink; no SETTLED without authoritative evidence.

 vectors.json -> Python | Go | JavaScript engines
 compare decisions (parity, not security proof)
 effect-suppression test: instrument the real sink
 assert: denied => zero usable signature / dispatch /
 mutation / actuation (not just an API return code)
Figure 32: D-16: Cross-language tests and effect suppression
 positive case + adversarial negative per profile
 vary serialization, scheduling, replay, stale state
 instrument real sink; record reason code AND whether a
 usable effect occurred; report what was uncontrolled
Figure 33: Complete security testing

Established technology is listed first. The proposed contribution is a particular enforceable combination, not authorization itself.

21.1. Non-Normative Patent-Examination Methodology

  • Identify the objective technical problem and the specific claim features.
  • Identify closest prior-art combinations and the motivation to combine.
  • Assess reasonable expectation of success and functional interdependence.
  • Avoid hindsight.
  • Separate new terminology from actual technical differences.

This is not a legal conclusion on patentability and is kept out of normative requirements.

22. Worked Examples

Each example states authorized state, effective operation, attacker capability, protected comparison, sink action, uncertainty behavior and the negative-effect test.

22.1. Example 1: A valid EIP-7702 authorization leading to an unauthorized delegated-code effect

Authorized state

The account owner signed a delegation to implementation X for a payments feature.

Effective operation

Calls through delegated code X attempt to move an asset to a new recipient and call a nested sweep function.

Attacker capability

Attacker controls the call data and, later, an upgraded implementation target.

Protected comparison

Compare code identity, upgrade generation, call graph, recipient and asset allowance with the delegation authority record.

Sink action

DENY any call outside the allowance or on a changed implementation identity; HOLD if identity cannot be established.

Uncertainty behavior

If the effect interface cannot be reached at execution time, outcome is not asserted as prevented; an on-chain guard is needed for independent keys.

Negative-effect test

Instrument the account effect interface: replaced code and nested sweep produce zero asset movement.

22.2. Example 2: A protected signer refusing altered transaction bytes

Authorized state

Authority record fixes destination D, amount 10, chain C.

Effective operation

Builder submits bytes with destination D2 and amount 10.

Attacker capability

Compromised builder.

Protected comparison

Signer derives the digest from the final bytes and compares to the record.

Sink action

DENY; no signature released; typed denial recorded.

Uncertainty behavior

Cannot stop a separately controlled key.

Negative-effect test

Intercept the signer output: no usable signature for the altered bytes.

22.3. Example 3: Two workers racing to consume a shared payment budget

Authorized state

Budget 100, two requests of 60.

Effective operation

Both observe balance 100.

Attacker capability

Parallel workers with stale snapshots.

Protected comparison

Atomic check-and-reserve with handle consumption.

Sink action

One request admitted, other DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

If the coordinator is unavailable, no admission; availability yields to safety.

Negative-effect test

Real sink shows total released at most 100 under stress ordering.

22.4. Example 4: A transaction dispatch followed by lost acknowledgment

Authorized state

Handle consumed, dispatch sent.

Effective operation

Response lost; process restarts.

Attacker capability

Network fault.

Protected comparison

Query by durable operation identity; no new signing.

Sink action

OUTCOME_UNKNOWN until authenticated evidence.

Uncertainty behavior

Source may stay unreachable.

Negative-effect test

After restart no second effective command is emitted.

22.5. Example 5: A malicious backup signer bypassing the main policy gateway

Authorized state

Main gateway enforces policy.

Effective operation

Backup key signs an equivalent transfer.

Attacker capability

Holder of backup key.

Protected comparison

Path enumeration shows backup key as an effect path.

Sink action

If outside enforcement, report as uncovered exception; if in scope, same gate.

Uncertainty behavior

The claim is limited to controlled keys.

Negative-effect test

Attempt to sign with backup key: either blocked by the gate or listed as an exception.

22.6. Example 6: A payment agent receiving prompt-injected merchant instructions

Authorized state

Mandate: merchant M, max 20.

Effective operation

Page text says pay merchant M2 50.

Attacker capability

Untrusted page content.

Protected comparison

Lineage marks content tainted; authority source must be an authenticated principal.

Sink action

DENY widening.

Uncertainty behavior

Agent may still draft a bad candidate.

Negative-effect test

No payment instruction released to M2.

22.7. Example 7: A card capture exceeding a previously approved authorization envelope

Authorized state

Authorization max 100, merchant and currency bound.

Effective operation

Capture 130.

Attacker capability

Merchant-side or intermediary.

Protected comparison

Transition ids and cumulative total check.

Sink action

DENY the excess capture.

Uncertainty behavior

Clearing and settlement remain separate evidence.

Negative-effect test

Capture interface emits nothing above 100.

22.8. Example 8: A payment routed through an unapproved alternate settlement rail

Authorized state

Mandate permits rail R1.

Effective operation

Route changed to R2 after approval.

Attacker capability

Route mutation.

Protected comparison

Reconstruct actual route at the release interface.

Sink action

DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

Rail-level finality is external.

Negative-effect test

No instruction leaves on R2.

22.9. Example 9: Offline CBDC spending under a disconnected secure-element profile

Authorized state

Allowance, epoch and counter in the element.

Effective operation

Device rolled back to earlier state.

Attacker capability

Holder of the device.

Protected comparison

Epoch and monotonic counter check at the element and at reconciliation.

Sink action

Refuse spend after rollback; flag on reconnect.

Uncertainty behavior

Depends on tamper resistance assumptions of the scheme.

Negative-effect test

Rollback attempt yields no accepted value transfer.

22.10. Example 10: Cross-currency payment-versus-payment with asymmetric finality

Authorized state

Two legs with commitment conditions.

Effective operation

Leg A commits quickly; leg B is slow.

Attacker capability

Timing.

Protected comparison

Hold B release until A evidence.

Sink action

HOLD; PARTIAL manifest if one leg fails.

Uncertainty behavior

No global atomicity assumed.

Negative-effect test

Leg B never released without leg A evidence.

22.11. Example 11: Tokenized security delivery-versus-payment with title uncertainty

Authorized state

Title and encumbrance must verify.

Effective operation

Register shows pending encumbrance.

Attacker capability

Counterparty.

Protected comparison

Verify at native register.

Sink action

HOLD; no payment release.

Uncertainty behavior

Register data may lag.

Negative-effect test

No payment release while title unresolved.

22.12. Example 12: Stablecoin redemption and reserve-liability reconciliation

Authorized state

Burn event and issuer liability must reconcile.

Effective operation

Redemption requested with unconfirmed burn.

Attacker capability

Requester.

Protected comparison

Verify burn from the ledger and reconcile liability.

Sink action

HOLD or UNKNOWN.

Uncertainty behavior

Issuer-side reserves are outside the gate.

Negative-effect test

No redemption release before verified burn.

22.13. Example 13: A bridge source-chain reorganization before destination mint

Authorized state

Mint needs finality depth.

Effective operation

Reorg removes source event.

Attacker capability

Chain reorg.

Protected comparison

Check finality depth; single-use event.

Sink action

Block mint; UNKNOWN with reconciliation if minted.

Uncertainty behavior

Finality assumptions are chain-specific.

Negative-effect test

No mint for an unfinal event.

22.14. Example 14: A crypto treasury withdrawal with changed destination or signing roster

Authorized state

Destination registry and roster fixed.

Effective operation

Destination and roster change.

Attacker capability

Insider.

Protected comparison

Registry and roster identity compared at release.

Sink action

DENY; multi-party governance for change.

Uncertainty behavior

Custody providers are separate.

Negative-effect test

No withdrawal to the new destination.

22.15. Example 15: A merchant QR or alias redirection

Authorized state

Mandate merchant identity.

Effective operation

QR resolves to another beneficiary.

Attacker capability

Merchant impostor.

Protected comparison

Re-resolve at the release interface.

Sink action

DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

Display-only checks are insufficient.

Negative-effect test

No instruction to the substituted beneficiary.

22.16. Example 16: Agentic metered compute or API payments

Authorized state

Interval budget and usage records.

Effective operation

Usage inflated.

Attacker capability

Provider.

Protected comparison

Authenticated measurement and interval identity.

Sink action

DENY above bound; UNKNOWN if measurement unavailable.

Uncertainty behavior

Provider honesty remains a limit.

Negative-effect test

No payment above interval budget.

22.17. Example 17: Recurring subscription payments after mandate revocation

Authorized state

Mandate revoked.

Effective operation

Scheduler tries next period.

Attacker capability

Scheduler.

Protected comparison

Check revocation generation at each period.

Sink action

DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

Revocation delay under partition.

Negative-effect test

No charge after revocation.

22.18. Example 18: Autonomous exchange trading with a changed final order

Authorized state

Strategy bounds.

Effective operation

Final order has larger size.

Attacker capability

Strategy bug or attacker.

Protected comparison

Compare native order with bounds and exposure journal.

Sink action

DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

Venue behavior external.

Negative-effect test

No order beyond bound reaches the venue adapter.

22.19. Example 19: A delegated financial agent exceeding parent treasury authority

Authorized state

Parent ceiling 100.

Effective operation

Child asks for 70 after others spent 40.

Attacker capability

Child agent.

Protected comparison

Atomic parent and child reservation.

Sink action

DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

Coordinator availability.

Negative-effect test

Total released never exceeds ceiling.

22.20. Example 20: An accounts-payable agent acting on a manipulated supplier portal

Authorized state

Supplier identity store.

Effective operation

Portal shows new bank account.

Attacker capability

Portal manipulator.

Protected comparison

Resolve supplier account from authoritative store.

Sink action

DENY; HOLD for verification.

Uncertainty behavior

Store accuracy.

Negative-effect test

No payment to the portal-supplied account.

22.21. Example 21: A cloud or telecommunications configuration change crossing an unauthorized effect boundary

Authorized state

Scope names resources and purpose.

Effective operation

Change touches extra resources.

Attacker capability

Operator tool.

Protected comparison

Reconstruct actual mutation set.

Sink action

DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

Unmediated admin paths.

Negative-effect test

No unauthorized mutation committed.

22.22. Example 22: A device reset followed by replay of an old hardware command

Authorized state

Command bound to reset epoch.

Effective operation

Replay after reset.

Attacker capability

Replayer.

Protected comparison

Epoch check at device gate.

Sink action

DENY.

Uncertainty behavior

Physical access.

Negative-effect test

No actuation from the replayed command.

23. Security Considerations

See Appendix G for 70 threat categories with concrete negative tests. Enforcement depends on control of the relevant effect paths, current protected state, correct reconstruction and independently verified implementation. A denial from an access-control layer does not prove that an uncontrolled resource could not perform the same operation. All conclusions are conditional on the stated trust and enforcement assumptions.

24. Privacy Considerations

Audit evidence is minimized and committed rather than copied; sensitive attributes are disclosed to a verifier only for a stated purpose (E-14, E-57; M-39, M-55). Metadata in denial reasons, journals and traces can leak and is reviewed.

25. Performance and Evaluation

No production latency, throughput or settlement acceleration is claimed. The source reports local timing observations taken on 31 October 2026 on different storage models: Python 3 with SQLite in write-ahead mode on a temporary local file, 500 accepted one-unit operations, about 250.49 microseconds p50 and 678.92 microseconds p95 around the verify-and-effect call; a Go in-memory example, 5,000 operations, about 80 nanoseconds p50 and 110 nanoseconds p95; a Node.js in-memory example, 5,000 operations, about 861 nanoseconds p50 and 1,973 nanoseconds p95. These are not comparable with each other, include no external signing, and are not production benchmarks.

Required independent tests: protected gate latency at p50, p95, p99 and p99.9; durable-storage overhead; HSM signing overhead; distributed quorum cost; native signing time; external submission; payment acceptance; settlement or blockchain finality; recovery latency; multi-worker contention; revocation under load; denial correctness; actual unauthorized effect count. Authorization-gate latency, signing latency, transport latency, ledger finality and economic settlement are different quantities.

26. IANA Considerations

This document requests no IANA actions.

27. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", RFC 8174, BCP 14, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

28. Informative References

[EIP712]
Ethereum EIP authors, "EIP-712: Typed Structured Data Hashing and Signing", , <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712>.
[EIP7702]
Ethereum EIP authors, "EIP-7702: Set Code for EOAs", , <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7702>.
[ERC1271]
Ethereum EIP authors, "ERC-1271: Standard Signature Validation Method for Contracts", , <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271>.
[ERC4337]
Ethereum EIP authors, "ERC-4337: Account Abstraction Using Alt Mempool", , <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337>.
[IN-130246]
Das, S., "Indian Provisional eFiling reference 202631130246", Date as reported by the applicant; not a certified registry record., , <https://ipindia.gov.in/>.
[PCT-055615]
Das, S., "PCT/IB2026/055615 (WO 2026/150382 A2)", Filed 4 June 2026; published 16 July 2026. Verify on PATENTSCOPE., , <https://patentscope.wipo.int/>.
[REL-AGENT]
Das, S., "Agent Execution Finality (title as supplied; verify)", Identifier as supplied by the author; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-agent-execution-finality, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[REL-CBEA]
Das, S., "Consequence-Bound Execution Authority", Identifier as supplied by the author; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[REL-FOUND]
Das, S., "Execution Finality Foundations", Identifier as supplied by the author; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-execution-finality-foundations, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[REL-IEV]
Das, S., "Receipt-Gated Independent Effect Verification (title as supplied; verify)", Identifier as supplied by the author; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-receipt-gated-iev, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8392]
Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.
[RFC8949]
Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 8949, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC9052]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", RFC 9052, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
[TDC-12542]
Das, S., "Technical Disclosure Commons record 12542 (PCT file; title not verified)", Not fetched; verify., , <https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/>.

Appendix A. Appendix A: E-01 to E-44

Profiles for E-01 to E-44 use the fields available from the source. Fields not stated in the source for an embodiment are not invented. Not all 44 are mandatory components of one implementation. Embodiment boundaries come from the source text; excerpts are condensed.

A.1. E-01: Protected cryptographic signer with exclusive key-use authority

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in custodial signing and privileged token issuance. The operation first becomes consequential at first externally usable signature byte.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A key is generated or imported into a protected signer that exposes only VerifyAndSign; the signer computes the final digest internally, receives independently authenticated policy state, and consumes a protected use record before returning signed bytes.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

non-exportable HSM key with a fixed-function policy-enforcing signing wrapper. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in ... ; threshold key shares with independent final- transaction policy verification at the last share-release threshold. This path may distribute the ... ; hardware-isolated signing enclave with an authenticated, measured verify-and-sign interface. This route offers a different enforcement location or ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

If local durable consumption succeeds but signature release is interrupted, mark SIGNATURE_STATUS_UNKNOWN, reconcile signing- service logs, and never sign fresh bytes under the same authority until safe reconciliation.

Negative-effect test oracle

For every denied request, intercept all signer invocations and assert that no usable signature was emitted; enumerate maintenance and key-recovery routes.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.2. E-02: Split signing authority across independent administrative trust domains

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in multi-party cryptographic custody. The operation first becomes consequential at release of the final signing share.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Each independent participant receives the same canonical final-operation digest and an authenticated policy generation; shares are bound to a common session, and any participant declines a session whose actual operation diverges from its independently loaded ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

t-of-n threshold signature with independent policy checks at each share generator. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check ... ; dual-controlled signing with separately controlled protected approval evidence. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; offline approval device commits to exact bytes and an online protected signer checks that commitment. This route offers a different enforcement ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Share-generator restart must fence abandoned signing sessions and prevent nonce/share reuse; compromised quorum assumptions are excluded explicitly. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Inject a malicious coordinator, inconsistent preimages, restarted nonce generations and one unavailable participant; assert no threshold signing result emerges.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.3. E-03: Separation of protected collection and execution instances

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in two-instance authority architecture. The operation first becomes consequential at protected effectuation gateway.

Trust boundary and authority representation

PED-1 binds approved constraints to an immutable record while PED-2 reads the actual pending command independently from an execution-facing adapter. The FS compares two independently controlled records using an authenticated authorization reference and ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

separate protected processes on one host with independently administered access controls. In a representative deployment this path places the ... ; remote policy authority and sink-local reconstructing enclave. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; hardware command controller implementing the effect comparison without a general-purpose local authority service. This route offers a different ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

If either side is unavailable, preserve the Candidate Act as non-effective; require explicit new authorization for changed intent. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Tamper with every intermediary representation and assert only the independently authorized final byte sequence may reach the sink. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.4. E-04: Non-bearer Execution Handle issuance and consumption

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in one-use and bounded-use authorization. The operation first becomes consequential at protected sink acceptance.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The EH is issued from approved intent but is not self-sufficient; the sink checks contextual binding to its own identity, verifies a fresh local state generation, consumes its usage nonce under protected lock, and refuses copied handles exercised at a ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

opaque handle stored only inside sink-local protected key-value state. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; authenticated statement with proof-of-possession and sink-local replay ledger. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; per-operation authority identifier resolved through a mutually authenticated remote verification service. This route offers a different enforcement ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

On denial burn only an authentically allocated local authorization identifier and do not let arbitrary malformed requests consume external account nonce space. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Transfer handle bytes between tenants and sink instances; attempt simultaneous replay and inspect the protected used set. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.5. E-05: Authorization-to-final-bytes reconstruction

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in serialized operations with mutable builders. The operation first becomes consequential at signing input assembly boundary.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A sink adapter pulls final bytes after serialization and fee selection, parses with a strict recognized schema and checks each effect- critical field, including optional and nested fields, against canonical authorized attributes.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: a builder changes payee after the ...

Alternative implementations

sink parses binary transaction structure and re-derives destination. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; instrumented device descriptor parser observes DMA-consumed command fields. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; trusted application adapter canonicalizes final API request semantics and binds critical options. This route offers a different enforcement location ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unrecognized critical extensions and undecidable encodings cause denial, not field omission. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Switch encoding, decimal scale, target, gas, forwarded call and operation kind after approval; verify the exact field responsible for denial. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.6. E-06: Canonical representation across encodings and programming languages

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in heterogeneous interoperating protected validators. The operation first becomes consequential at protected comparison at last-hop adapter.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A versioned canonical format includes protocol- domain separation, byte lengths, declared field types and normalized values. The protected verifier rejects ambiguous Unicode normalization, invalid numeric scales and unknown critical tags rather than relying ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

fixed-width binary TLV records with a schema registry. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to ... ; deterministic CBOR serialization under a strict application profile. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; canonical protocol buffers with forbidden unknown critical fields and version handshake. This route offers a different enforcement location or ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Parser disagreement produces INDETERMINATE and blocks execution until negotiated a compatible profile. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Supply cross-language golden vectors, confusable identifiers, malformed lengths and reordered maps to independent decoders. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.7. E-07: Protected delegation establishment and code identity

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in programmable digital accounts and delegated execution. The operation first becomes consequential at delegation authorization signing.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The system distinguishes the cryptographic delegation tuple from an additional protected policy binding to the implementation code and upgrade state; it refuses a cryptographically valid delegation if the implementation target or allowed behavior diverges.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

pre-sign codehash validation pinned to a deployment generation. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; on-chain smart account module that independently evaluates delegation scope. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; immutable delegation registry with revocable allowlisted implementation commitments. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

If code changes between observation and delegation execution, reject and require a fresh authorization generation; do not falsely claim chain signature semantics contain a codehash. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from ...

Negative-effect test oracle

Use a valid cryptographic tuple, change deployed implementation and assert denial despite signature validity. A negative- effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.8. E-08: Downstream execution restriction after delegation

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in programmable account subsequent calls. The operation first becomes consequential at execution inside delegated account logic.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Delegation approval and authority to perform downstream transfers are separate; each call passes a protected policy guard or constrained on-chain account module that enforces allowlisted call paths and bounded effect values.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

on-chain transaction validator checks all downstream call effects. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; restricted bytecode or contract capability module controlling permissible calls. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; protected off-chain signer only issues specially scoped authorized calls while independent on-chain controls limit residual authority. This route ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

When dynamic call graph coverage cannot be proven, require runtime checks or narrow declared coverage to reachable enforced branches. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Construct malicious downstream multicall and newly upgraded functions and measure actual effect, not only signature policy output. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.9. E-09: Transactional quota with concurrent workers

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in shared spending ceilings and message-send quotas. The operation first becomes consequential at atomic reserve/consume event.

Trust boundary and authority representation

For each resource, an authoritative storage transaction compares remaining capacity, authorization validity and unique use identity, then atomically decrements capacity while recording a durable effect- intent record.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: two workers simultaneously read the ...

Alternative implementations

single-row serializable database transaction with uniqueness constraint. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; linearizable compare-and-swap on a versioned resource state. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; escrow partitions pre-allocate nonoverlapping rights to different sinks. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

After a storage crash, replay the committed journal instead of repeating a potentially external effect. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Use two competing tasks at the last available unit, inject serialization failures and verify at most one authorization succeeds. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.10. E-10: Multi-region quorum authority and revocation continuity

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in globally replicated signers. The operation first becomes consequential at regional signer before effect release.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Regions validate authenticated current state from an authority quorum or hold disjoint escrow rights. A leader term fences previously active sink leases and prevents two partitions from both issuing consumption for a shared quota.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

quorum-linearizable replicated ledger with majority authority. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; leased single leader with fencing token checked at every sink. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; partitioned escrow quotas with cryptographically committed ownership and unmergeable spend allocation. This route offers a different enforcement ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

When quorum or freshness is unavailable, deny or hold rather than permitting fallback to older state. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Partition both halves, force leader changes, delay revocation propagation and assert that the same spend cannot be authorized twice. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.11. E-11: Crash window between consumption and external dispatch

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in non-transactional downstream interfaces. The operation first becomes consequential at first release to a remote system.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The state machine distinguishes before-prepare, prepared, consumed-before-release, released-before-ack, and acknowledged- before-settlement. Uncertain release becomes OUTCOME_UNKNOWN, while retries only query state or use downstream idempotency that is proven ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

write-ahead intent journal and transactional outbox worker using immutable operation ID. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive ... ; non-exportable signer generates signature once and persistently records a release commitment. This path may distribute the verification task but must ... ; remote idempotent effect API with durable deduplication keyed to the original authorization identity. This route offers a different enforcement ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

No local atomic commit is described as an atomic transaction with an independently operated ledger; recovery constraints are stated explicitly. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Crash at each instruction boundary around journal, consume, sign, dispatch, ack and recovery; ensure effect count never exceeds authorizations. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.12. E-12: Compensation and verified quota restoration

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in reversal, canceled payment and resource remediation. The operation first becomes consequential at restoration of consumed budget.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A compensation workflow requires proof of the first effect status and a distinct approved inverse action. The refund or reversal has a new immutable identifier and a journal relationship to the original, and it never edits away consumption history.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

settlement-oracle-signed status with nonce and expiry. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to ... ; double-entry adjustment under independent compensating approval. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; verified on-chain reversal evidence with finality- depth policy and reorg handling. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

If outcome cannot be established or reversal is only partial, keep reserved amounts unavailable and report reconciliation pending. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Present duplicate cancellation receipts, reorged transaction proof and two simultaneous compensation jobs; verify no unauthorized restoration. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.13. E-13: Protected receipts and external-outcome distinction

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in evidence and audit chains. The operation first becomes consequential at production of protected precommit receipt.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Precommit evidence proves a protected authorization decision only; separate signed events assert dispatch, downstream acceptance, inclusion, service delivery and final settlement, each with origin and proof type.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: auditor misreads a signer-ALLOW ...

Alternative implementations

hash-chained durable journal with independently verified checkpoint. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; COSE signed receipt over canonical event structure. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent participant to the ... ; append-only audit store with consistency proofs and selective disclosure. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unseen external outcomes remain unknown and may not be upgraded to settled by the presence of a local receipt. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Alter journal sequence, substitute external receipt and submit mismatched request IDs; verifier must reject false completion. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.14. E-14: Privacy-minimizing protected audit

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in sensitive resource and payment metadata. The operation first becomes consequential at audit record release.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Record a purpose-separated commitment to private operation fields rather than raw values; grant authenticated auditors the minimum fields needed to test authorization and linkage, with salts protected against dictionary attacks.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

salted keyed HMAC commitments with auditor-held verification key. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; zero-knowledge proof of a bounded amount or membership condition. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; encrypted append-only log with selective field- release keys. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; its ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Key rotation preserves verification lineage while preventing unrelated audiences from correlating entries. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Attempt low-entropy recipient brute force, compare duplicate pseudonyms across tenants, and verify scoped disclosure. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.15. E-15: Autonomous agent and sandbox outbound action control

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in tool-using model and isolated runtime. The operation first becomes consequential at privileged API gateway and outbound socket creation.

Trust boundary and authority representation

An agent may plan and produce content, but outbound authority resides in a separate protected gateway. The gateway reconstructs the final request after URL resolution, credential substitution and serialization, then validates source authority and exact effect ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

isolated connector worker that holds credentials and verifies exact request. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; kernel LSM/eBPF mediation of privileged egress combined with L7 semantics. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; micro-VM with exclusive host-mediated outbound proxy and protected policy authority. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

An unmediated direct socket or local credential path invalidates a broad conformance claim; scope is narrowed or the path is blocked. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Inject untrusted tool responses, redirect DNS, bypass sidecar, create direct socket, and verify no unauthorized external send. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.16. E-16: Protected credential swapping at the final request

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in agent tool connector with delegated credentials. The operation first becomes consequential at credential use immediately before external call.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The planner supplies a request without secrets; a trusted connector validates the final request and applies an operation-scoped credential only after authorization, without ever exposing the unrestricted token to the planner.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

token exchange issuing a constrained downscoped credential. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next ... ; protected signer applying a per-request signature at egress. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; credential daemon that injects short-lived credentials into independently verified privileged worker. This route offers a different enforcement ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Credential rotation, refresh and fallback cannot enlarge the original authorized effect; failure leaves the request blocked. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Substitute path, host, method and payload at token insertion time; ensure the credential is not released on denial. A negative- effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.17. E-17: Complete mediation-path inventory and graph traversal

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in multiple signing APIs and shadow administrative routes. The operation first becomes consequential at every edge reaching an effective capability.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Build a directed authority graph from deployed routing tables, IAM policies, socket connectivity, service configs, available key operations, worker privileges and device access paths. Compute reachable paths from compromised requesters to effectuation ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: an undocumented maintenance signer ...

Alternative implementations

static privilege-reachability analysis over deployment manifests. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; runtime syscall and network-flow tracing joined to IAM/key-use logs. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; hardware root architecture that makes all exposed signing endpoints invoke a common policy gate. This route offers a different enforcement location ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

A newly discovered unmediated edge invalidates the complete-mediation assurance until blocked or included in protected enforcement. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Add a hidden maintenance API, local socket, backup credential and delayed job queue; assert detection and denied effect. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.18. E-18: Runtime capability-path mediation

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in kernel, hypervisor and hardware bus command routes. The operation first becomes consequential at kernel syscall or device command admission.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A privilege gate intercepts final kernel/device side effects, evaluates an externally supplied effect-bound authorization and consumes protected monotonic state before permitting the operation.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

kernel security module intercepts relevant syscall family. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next ... ; device firmware verifies descriptor digest and reset generation at consumption. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; hypervisor-mediated virtual device uses protected command queues. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; its ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

For any effect not visible at the selected layer, combine enforcement layers or narrow effect coverage; avoid treating network-level metadata as full semantic reconstruction. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction ...

Negative-effect test oracle

Try alternate syscall families, helper processes, reset/remap and direct device access; observe actual emitted command count. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.19. E-19: Trusted hardware effects and reset-epoch binding

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in accelerators, actuators and descriptor queues. The operation first becomes consequential at hardware device consuming the command descriptor.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A protected descriptor gate validates the bytes the device consumes, not a pre-translation pointer; hardware or firmware binds permission to translation generation and reset epoch.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: an attacker modifies a DMA ...

Alternative implementations

device-firmware validation of command plus reset epoch. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to ... ; IOMMU mediated queue with restricted doorbell and protected descriptor memory. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; hypervisor-assisted device command monitor with generation fences. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Reset or remap invalidates old permission even when an identical command identifier is reused. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Modify the descriptor after approval, remap buffer, reset device, and test that stale handles do not actuate. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.20. E-20: Radio resource and transmission finality

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in RF transmitters and network-control plane. The operation first becomes consequential at RF-enable gate or baseband transmission queue.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The protected gate reconstructs actual PHY scheduling/transmit fields and compares power, destination, frequency and time authorization immediately before transmit enable. The protected record contains an operation identifier, authority principal, generation, ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

baseband firmware guard on transmit descriptor. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to the ... ; FPGA/hardware RF gate with protected authorization counter. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; radio controller with authenticated last-hop scheduler binding. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; its ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Emergency shutdown revokes transmit permits while queued work remains non-effective; unsensed RF paths excluded. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Inject frequency swap, scheduler race, firmware reset and direct RF enable; measure emitted control or RF energy only in authorized cases. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.21. E-21: Payment and settlement boundary separation

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in payment initiation, clearing and reconciliation. The operation first becomes consequential at final payment instruction release.

Trust boundary and authority representation

At the payment gateway the final instruction is reconstructed and compared against the approved mandate; a protected initiation receipt is distinguished from clearing, posting and settlement evidence.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

bank gateway authorizes final message at queue consumption. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next ... ; smart-account payment policy with contract guarded transfer. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; terminal/hardware device signs exact payment instruction with protected policy. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unknown clearing or settlement cannot automatically restore spending capacity; refund requires separate evidence and authority. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Change minor units, payee identifier, fee, retry id and settlement proof; validate authorization and separate status states. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.22. E-22: Data-export boundary and destination confidentiality

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in enterprise file export and message send. The operation first becomes consequential at socket send / remote object publication.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Protected egress reconstructs the exact data artifact and receiving identity; if content changes after approval it must be reauthorized. The outgoing stream is bound to an approved manifest or verified per-chunk commitments.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

atomic immutable snapshot and content-addressed export object. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; per-chunk authenticated manifest with final-stream verification. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; data-loss prevention engine at protected gateway with cryptographic authorization binding. This route offers a different enforcement location or ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

If streaming output cannot be fully known, authorize bounded per-chunk predicates or keep chunks buffered pending approval. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Mutate file after approval, add last chunk, change DNS and upload to alternate endpoint; verify denied bytes never leave. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.23. E-23: External-state drift after simulated approval

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in transaction simulation and contract calls. The operation first becomes consequential at signer or on-chain pre-execution check.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Simulation forms advisory evidence until the sink binds it to an admissible state interval; altered code or external state causes re- simulation or denial. The protected record contains an operation identifier, authority principal, generation, authorized ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

on-chain protected account validates execution predicates. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next ... ; protected signer checks authenticated state root before signing. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; execution proxy enforces post-simulation invariant guard on effect variables. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Some state changes are unavoidable; predicates may be conservative but must not silently grant broader authority. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Change observed allowance/state root between simulation and signing; reject stale proof and detect state-sensitive call divergence. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.24. E-24: Bounded time and clock rollback protection

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in offline devices and partitioned signer services. The operation first becomes consequential at final authorization consumption.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The sink evaluates time intervals using trusted bounds and protects its last observed time or generation against rollback; an interval spanning a forbidden expiry is treated as uncertain and non-effective.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

secure monotonic device counter with time beacon. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to the ... ; quorum signed time attestations and bounded drift. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent participant to the ... ; short-lived leases combined with protected epoch and offline maximum duration. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unknown clock bounds or reboot without continuity yields denial pending re-synchronization. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition. Any externally visible effect that could have occurred before a crash is ...

Negative-effect test oracle

Rollback wall clock, pause VM, delay packets, disconnect time service and verify expired authority never becomes valid. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.25. E-25: Denial burning without nonce-exhaustion attacks

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in high-traffic signer and adversarial malformed input. The operation first becomes consequential at replay ledger consumption.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Separate local execution-handle nonces from external chain/account nonces. Burn only an authenticated allocation belonging to the requester and scope; reject malformed unauthenticated packets before claiming a protected nonce.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

authenticated nonce allocation in protected state before use. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; stateless anti-DoS admission ticket followed by stateful authorization consumption. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind ... ; per-tenant quota-limited handle issuance with expiry- based reclamation. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Failure to persist a burn conservatively retains denied operations as pending with no effect until state is reconciled. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Fuzz malformed handle IDs, flood cross- tenant burns, repeat valid rejected handles and inspect resource consumption. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.26. E-26: Migration from legacy signing and token systems

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in incremental deployment across existing API ecosystems. The operation first becomes consequential at existing key-use and dispatch endpoints.

Trust boundary and authority representation

New protected effectuation capability is deployed alongside legacy endpoints; legacy unrestricted credentials are revoked, rotated or firewalled before asserting that all effective paths are mediated.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

network service shim that blocks raw sign and routes all requests to guard. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; key rotation into a newly provisioned exclusively accessible HSM. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; account policy requiring protected on-chain approvals before effective transfer. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

A dual-run period is labeled partial coverage until uncovered paths are eliminated, not declared full enforcement. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Downgrade client protocol, use retired key, call backup region endpoint and audit that none bypass protected checks. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.27. E-27: Protected source-authority lineage for agent-generated actions

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in agent reading untrusted retrieved content. The operation first becomes consequential at protected final decision.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The planner may incorporate untrusted documents but trusted authorization is obtained from a separate authenticated source and recorded as a lineage graph. A missing or forged parent edge leaves the consequential action without authority.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: a web page instructs the planner to ...

Alternative implementations

explicit trusted approval service with signed scoped intent. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; provenance labels propagated across workflow DAG into the sink. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; separate policy graph verifying delegation chain of principals. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; its ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unknown lineage is not silently promoted to verified by repeated model reasoning or content quotation. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Inject malicious retrieved instructions and tool outputs; corrupt lineage edges and verify no transfer/egress occurs. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.28. E-28: Constrained delegation upgrade and code rollback

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in upgradeable smart accounts and service plugins. The operation first becomes consequential at upgrade permission and first effect after upgrade.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Every code upgrade is itself a consequential operation, and prior execution authorizations identify an implementation generation; a rollback to an old vulnerable implementation is rejected if not separately approved.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

immutable per-version code allowlist with monotonic upgrade generation. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; runtime delegation guard checks code hash and privilege set for each call. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; on-chain module governs upgrades and code-bound downstream authorization. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Fallback code must not silently inherit future privileges; missing code identity pauses effectuation. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Upgrade after approval, rollback to a vulnerable version, call newly exposed method and show protected denial. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.29. E-29: Formal safety state machine and temporal invariants

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in security review and model checking. The operation first becomes consequential at verified transition to initiated effect.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Model the protected machine with transitions PREPARE, VALIDATE, CONSUME, INITIATE, OBSERVE, DENY, RECONCILE; assert that only committed authorization transitions can permit effects and a consumed handle never authorizes a second effect.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

TLA+/PlusCal model over shared states and crash steps. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to ... ; state machine embedded as guarded database stored procedure. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; hardware monotonic finite state controller with formally checked transition predicates. This route offers a different enforcement location or ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Liveness is conditional upon available policy, durable storage and downstream cooperation; safety persists under faults by denying rather than guessing. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Explore interleavings, duplicate commit, simultaneous revocation, delayed ACK and restart using a state-space checker. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.30. E-30: Strict unknown extension and protocol downgrade rules

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in interoperable policy gateways. The operation first becomes consequential at protected protocol decision at sink.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A sink rejects unknown critical fields, unknown conversion semantics and attempts to downgrade into a format that omits policy- critical constraints. The protected record contains an operation identifier, authority principal, generation, authorized scope and ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

schema registry with critical extension bitmap. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to the ... ; versioned COSE-authenticated policy envelope with mandatory recognized claims. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; application-specific deterministic binary codec with reject-on-unknown semantics. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

A transition to a legacy endpoint with weaker semantics requires new independent authorization and explicit scope narrowing. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Supply versions with stripped fields, duplicate keys, mismatched codehash, reordered map encodings and invalid critical flags. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.31. E-31: Controlled emergency and recovery operator pathways

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in fallback operator and break-glass access. The operation first becomes consequential at privileged signer emergency invocation.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Break-glass authority is itself subject to a protected gate; an emergency profile can relax selected policy conditions only when an authenticated emergency authorizer explicitly grants them under expiry, scope and consumption controls.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: a recovery operator uses a ...

Alternative implementations

dual-person emergency approval with hardware enforced operation limits. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; separate emergency key protected by an independently configured finality sink. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; short-lived hardware token bound to a listed resource and destination. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

A missing quorum fails closed; emergency bypass cannot be treated as normal conformance. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition. Any externally visible effect that could have occurred before a crash is ...

Negative-effect test oracle

Attempt single-operator approval, expired emergency grant, raw-sign request and log suppression. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.32. E-32: High-volume partitioned escrow capabilities

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in throughput-optimized distributed gateways. The operation first becomes consequential at local sink effect authority.

Trust boundary and authority representation

An authority service subdivides a global bounded budget into cryptographically or transactionally exclusive shares. Each sink spends only its assigned share, and an unreturned share is not reclaimed until its spend status is proven.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

bounded-counter CRDT with escrow invariant and fenced reallocation. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; preissued HSM-protected disjoint nonce ranges and fixed budget allotment. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; per-resource shard with one linearizable authority leader. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; its ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Loss of partition ownership forces that sink to stop; compensation cannot reallocate spent or uncertain capacity. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Partition nodes, race escrow transfers, crash owner, and prove sum of remaining and consumed capacity never exceeds initial budget. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.33. E-33: Receipt-before-authority release with durable witness

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in audit-dependent protected effectuation. The operation first becomes consequential at release of effect authority.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Before exposing any usable signature, the sink obtains proof that a protected journal recorded the exact authorization outcome. A witness encodes current state generation and candidate digest; partial journal failure prevents release rather than fabricating a ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: signer emits output and the ...

Alternative implementations

synchronous local protected journal with acknowledgment before signer returns. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in ... ; quorum append-only journal with signed inclusion receipt. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent participant ... ; HSM audit counter coupled to exclusive key-use primitive. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; its ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

When witness storage is uncertain, no additional signature is produced; the output state is classified based on whether bytes escaped. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Cut journal connectivity, corrupt witness, replay old index, and verify no effect escapes in receipt-required deployments. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.34. E-34: Transaction-fee and multi-asset normalization

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in cross-chain and cross-rail financial operation. The operation first becomes consequential at protected final transaction serialization.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The source-approved human-scale amount is converted into exact base units using a defined exponent and rounding rule; fee and gas allowances are explicit separate caps validated after transaction building.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component. In this embodiment, the attacker attempts the following deviation: transaction builder increases gas ...

Alternative implementations

integer-only arithmetic with canonical decimal parser. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to ... ; big-integer typed fixed-point codec and canonical CBOR fields. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; hardware signer displays and independently parses exact base-unit amounts. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unknown scale or overflow denies operation; changed fee requires fresh bounded approval. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition. Any externally visible effect that could have occurred before a crash is ...

Negative-effect test oracle

Test overflow, exponent mismatch, duplicate decimal separators, modified fee and equivalent display strings with different base units. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.35. E-35: Device and firmware version continuity

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in microcontroller execution and embedded controllers. The operation first becomes consequential at hardware device effect queue.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Protected device firmware accepts commands only if authorization binds current firmware state, physical resource identity, reset generation and final command bytes. The protected record contains an operation identifier, authority principal, generation, ...

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

secure boot measurement + protected monotonic command counter. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; isolated peripheral guard with descriptor integrity and boot epoch. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent ... ; host HSM and independently authenticated firmware agent validate same command commitment. This route offers a different enforcement location or ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unauthenticated firmware transitions invalidate queued authorizations; re-enrollment establishes fresh policy identity. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Cold reset device, rollback firmware, remap queue and issue stale command; verify no effect. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.36. E-36: Telecom routing and purpose-bound communications quota

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in voice, messaging and telecom service control. The operation first becomes consequential at last-hop switch/network dispatch.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A switch or service edge reconstructs the actual communication to be initiated and binds it to permitted identity, purpose and remaining protected multichannel quota, without relying on upstream campaign approval alone.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

switch-local transaction gate with monotonic quota state. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next ... ; network edge quota escrow partitioned by channel. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every independent participant to the ... ; inter-domain authenticated execution witness verified at terminator. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

External delivery remains distinct from acceptance by the initiating network node; unknown route state fails closed. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Race SMS/voice/app channels at the quota boundary, substitute route identity and verify aggregate protected use. A negative- effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.37. E-37: Cloud resource mutation at privileged IAM boundary

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in cloud administrative agents and deployment jobs. The operation first becomes consequential at privileged resource mutation endpoint.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The protected IAM-adjacent gateway authorizes the final mutation including resolved account, resource and role; temporary credentials cannot independently bypass it via another privileged path.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

proxy-enforced privileged API with exclusive role credentials. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; resource-provider side authorization plug-in operating on native request bytes. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; isolated automation worker that holds only one- operation downscoped credentials. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Out-of-band control-plane mutation routes must be included in effect coverage or excluded explicitly. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Mutate account/region, swap role, call direct CLI credential and attempt rollback to stale policy. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.38. E-38: Authorized content stream with chunk-level continuous verification

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in streaming data export and autonomous communication. The operation first becomes consequential at protected outgoing byte stream.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A bounded stream authority includes per-chunk verification and a final stream terminator; every released chunk consumes bounded capacity and is cryptographically committed to the authorized stream sequence.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

content-addressed immutable blob snapshot signed before release. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; streaming Merkle commitment with per-chunk membership and protected byte budget. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; application-layer gateway that validates schema predicate for each chunk under protected constraints. This route offers a different enforcement ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

If future bytes cannot be predicted, allow only policy- constrained bounded streaming or require reauthorization at next chunk. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Append unauthorized last chunk, reorder chunks, exceed volume, change receiver after first send; verify first and subsequent emissions. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.39. E-39: Multi-sink transaction with partial failure states

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in composite transfer-and-command workflow. The operation first becomes consequential at each independently effective sink.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A coordinator cannot claim global atomicity across unrelated sinks; it issues separately bounded authorizations, records each actual initiation and establishes dependency and compensating rules for partial completion.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

saga orchestration with independently authorized compensators. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; atomic all-or-nothing only for sinks within one transactional authority. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; two-phase prepare with bounded leases where each sink supports durable prepared state. This route offers a different enforcement location or ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Partial success remains explicit and may require human resolution rather than unauthorized reversal. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Crash and partition at each sink boundary; assert composite receipt distinguishes all partial outcomes. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.40. E-40: Performance and denial-of-service bounded verification

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in high-rate action gateways. The operation first becomes consequential at authorization ingress and final effect queue.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Cheap syntactic screening precedes expensive protected checks, but neither screening nor overload fallback grants authority. Maintain bounded queue capacity and authenticated resource allocation to prevent one requester burning unrelated nonce state.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

per-tenant rate limiting and authenticated capability minting. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately ... ; asynchronous verification queues with protected expiry and per-operation budgets. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; hardware accelerated fixed-cost canonical validation with explicit decline semantics. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

During overload, fail closed or remain pending, never unlock unrestricted signer to preserve availability. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Saturate CPU, memory, disk and witness quorum while submitting one malicious candidate; prove no effect leak. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return code.

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.41. E-41: Machine-checkable conformance and negative-effect instrumentation

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in laboratory and production verification. The operation first becomes consequential at observability of real effectuation capability.

Trust boundary and authority representation

A test probe wraps the effective signer/send/actuate interface; an expected DENY passes only if neither usable signing output nor prohibited device/network effect appears on any declared reachable path.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

instrumented HSM key-usage attestation logs. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to the ... ; kernel-level effect probes plus signer hooks and network sink captures. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; hardware counter on protected device effect queue with signed readout. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Tests document coverage limits and the distinction between Python-model agreement and independent security proof. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Insert hidden bypass, parallel request, crash, state rollback and code mutation while recording actual sink calls. A negative- effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API return ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.42. E-42: Source-driven interoperability bridge and profile adapter

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in mixed JSON/CBOR/native ledger and device commands. The operation first becomes consequential at last-hop native command parser.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Bridge adapters translate external formats into a canonical effect without discarding security-critical attributes, then reconstruct final native bytes again at the sink after transformations.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

bidirectional canonical CBOR conversion with exact schema verification. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or ... ; protocol-specific native verifier compiled into protected finality sink. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; outboard independent witness checking both input and final native output digests. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

Unsupported semantic conversion produces INDETERMINATE, not approval; adapters record versions and trust assumptions. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Translate with optional field dropped, byte- order swap, Unicode equivalent and unknown critical extension; assert rejection. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.43. E-43: State-root, quota and authorization generation proofs

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in ledger-connected signer and account-execution components. The operation first becomes consequential at signing or programmable account verification boundary.

Trust boundary and authority representation

The system distinguishes protected local authorization state from mutable external chain state; it binds each decision to a sufficient state proof or bounded validity assumption and rejects drift affecting delegated code or permissions.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

state-proof verifier with explicit block/finality depth. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to ... ; on-chain predicate guard evaluated by smart-account logic at execution. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; restricted off-chain signer with bounded lifetime and independent re-check before broadcast. This route offers a different enforcement location or ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

A locally valid authorization cannot guarantee on-chain state at inclusion unless enforced on-chain or through a proven constraint. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Cause chain reorganization, code change and delayed transaction inclusion; ensure conformance does not claim unknown final settlement. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

A.44. E-44: Independent authorization for resource purpose changes

Objective, application and boundary

A representative implementation operates in cross-purpose agent operations. The operation first becomes consequential at resource release or privileged actuation.

Trust boundary and authority representation

Execution authority encodes the permitted purpose separately from general principal identity; the sink checks whether the exact effect remains within the approved purpose and can be performed under current privacy/resource rules.

Adversarial change

Consider a requester with legitimate access to an upstream approval artifact but control over an intermediary conversion, scheduling or transport component.

Alternative implementations

purpose-bound policy in protected consent registry. In a representative deployment this path places the decisive check in or immediately next to the ... ; signed purpose constraints with sink-local attribute- based evaluation. This path may distribute the verification task but must bind every ... ; per-purpose capability partitions and independent budget accounting. This route offers a different enforcement location or authority representation; ...

Failure, crash and retry; DENY/HOLD/UNKNOWN

When recipient or processing purpose is unknown, hold pending until authenticated consent or policy proof is available. Recovery queries or cryptographic proofs are separately scoped from transaction repetition.

Negative-effect test oracle

Reuse valid identity with changed stated purpose, reclassify data between approval and export, and verify rejection. A negative-effect test instruments the actual signing, transmitting, mutation, or actuation interface rather than relying only on an API ...

Relation to other embodiments and mechanisms

The foregoing technical means may be combined with a PED-1 collection-time binder, a PED-2 execution-time reconstruction interface, sink-bound non-bearer handles, policy/revocation state continuity and a protected outcome journal.

Relation to earlier mothership disclosure

Builds on the general Candidate Act and Finality Sink separation of the earlier DAS programme; not claimed here as new.

What the effect receipt proves

Local admission only; terminal outcome is separate and needs external evidence.

Legacy compatibility

Adapters keep critical fields; narrow the claim to effects fully controlled by the protected boundary.

Appendix B. Appendix B: M-01 to M-59

The 59 mechanism profiles are distinct from the numbered embodiments. Closest known technology is given at category level only and was not verified per profile.

B.1. M-01: Canonical Account and Tenant Binding

Security invariant / hostile condition

a signed operation prepared under one tenant is reused under another tenant with a shared signing service. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses tenant identifier, originating account and local account-generation counter. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a signed operation prepared under one tenant is reused under another tenant with a shared signing service. A compromised planner, ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode tenant identifier, originating account and local account-generation counter, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a cross-tenant replay must be DENY_CONTEXT even with a ...

Failure outcome

rotate the account-specific generation after migration and prevent old tokens from crossing. M-01 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a cross-tenant replay must be 25 DENY_CONTEXT even with a cryptographically valid request. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.2. M-02: Destination and Payee Substitution

Security invariant / hostile condition

a display label remains identical but the binary payee address changes during transaction construction. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses resolved recipient identifier, destination network and ownership attestation. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a display label remains identical but the binary payee address changes during transaction construction. A compromised planner, API ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode resolved recipient identifier, destination network and ownership attestation, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that the same name paired with a new address is denied and ...

Failure outcome

re-run approval only after the new destination is explicitly adopted. M-02 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

the same name paired with a new address is denied and logged as a distinct attempted effect. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.3. M-03: Delegation Code Hash Rotation

Security invariant / hostile condition

a proxy implementation is upgraded while a formerly approved delegation address is retained. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses delegate address, measured implementation hash and upgrade epoch. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a proxy implementation is upgraded while a formerly approved delegation address is retained. A compromised planner, API caller, ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode delegate address, measured implementation hash and upgrade epoch, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a matching delegate address with a changed implementation ...

Failure outcome

suspend approval until the new implementation is measured and accepted. M-03 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a matching delegate address with a changed implementation hash is rejected. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.4. M-04: Chain Identifier and Consensus Domain

Security invariant / hostile condition

a broadly scoped signature is replayed on an unintended network or fork. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses chain identifier, genesis commitment or fork-specific network identity. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a broadly scoped signature is replayed on an unintended network or fork. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode chain identifier, genesis commitment or fork-specific network identity, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that cross-chain reuse is denied even if recipient, payload ...

Failure outcome

require a fresh chain-bound approval and re-check external account nonce. M-04 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

cross-chain reuse is denied even if recipient, 30 payload and nonce text appear identical. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.5. M-05: Signer-Service Impersonation

Security invariant / hostile condition

an attacker redirects a trusted request to an unprotected signer with the same public interface. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses signer service identity, protected key alias and generation. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an attacker redirects a trusted request to an unprotected signer with the same public interface. A compromised planner, API ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode signer service identity, protected key alias and generation, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that attempted invocation through any non-designated signing ...

Failure outcome

rotate key aliases and invalidate stale signer discovery information. M-05 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

attempted invocation through any non- designated signing service cannot create a usable signature. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.6. M-06: Pre-Signature Delegation Screening

Security invariant / hostile condition

a valid authorization tuple is used to install unapproved delegated behavior. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses account delegation tuple and the exact eventual transaction envelope. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a valid authorization tuple is used to install unapproved delegated behavior. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode account delegation tuple and the exact eventual transaction envelope, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that one matching external nonce does not turn a disallowed ...

Failure outcome

record the denied tuple fingerprint without submitting a partial transaction. M-06 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

one matching external nonce does not turn a disallowed delegate into an authorized act. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.7. M-07: Account Nonce Versus Local One-Shot Capability

Security invariant / hostile condition

an external nonce is valid even though the business approval is expired or consumed. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses independent local handle nonce and external account nonce. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an external nonce is valid even though the business approval is expired or consumed. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode independent local handle nonce and external account nonce, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that changing only the external nonce cannot restore an ...

Failure outcome

disambiguate the two nonce namespaces in every audit record. M-07 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

changing only the external nonce cannot 30 restore an already burned local handle. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.8. M-08: Receipt-Before-Authority Release

Security invariant / hostile condition

the signer acts before protected validation has been committed to a durable audit ledger. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses authenticated precommit witness bound to candidate and sink generation. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which the signer acts before protected validation has been committed to a durable audit ledger. A compromised planner, API caller, ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode authenticated precommit witness bound to candidate and sink generation, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that an absent or incorrect precommit witness causes denial ...

Failure outcome

reconcile missing receipts using protected transaction IDs, not a new approval. M-08 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

an absent or incorrect precommit witness causes denial with no signing side effect. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.9. M-09: Receipt Versus Final Settlement

Security invariant / hostile condition

an initiation receipt is incorrectly interpreted as irreversible completion. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses precommit decision, downstream acceptance and final settled outcome. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an initiation receipt is incorrectly interpreted as irreversible completion. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode precommit decision, downstream acceptance and final settled outcome, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that an approved operation can remain outcome UNKNOWN without ...

Failure outcome

poll the authoritative downstream ledger and reconcile idempotently. M-09 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

an approved operation can remain outcome UNKNOWN without fabricating success. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.10. M-10: Policy Revocation Under In-Flight Load

Security invariant / hostile condition

a handle generated before an emergency revocation races with a delayed commit. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses revocation epoch and application-specific revocation evidence. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a handle generated before an emergency revocation races with a delayed commit. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode revocation epoch and application-specific revocation evidence, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a stale handle is denied regardless of a valid historical ...

Failure outcome

apply a protected revocation barrier before resuming new work. M-10 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a stale handle is denied regardless of a valid historical signature. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.11. M-11: Concurrent Quota Reservation

Security invariant / hostile condition

two workers independently see the same remaining balance and both spend it. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses remaining account quota and reservation identity. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first gives the ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which two workers independently see the same remaining balance and both spend it. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode remaining account quota and reservation identity, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, bounded ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that only one contending operation may consume the final unit ...

Failure outcome

use durable retry reconciliation without creating new 10 authority. M-11 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

only one contending operation may consume the final unit of quota. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.12. M-12: Multi-Currency and Decimal Normalization

Security invariant / hostile condition

different unit scales turn an approved human- 15 readable amount into a larger binary quantity. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses asset identifier, units and canonical decimal precision. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which different unit scales turn an approved human-readable amount into a larger binary quantity. A compromised planner, API caller, ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode asset identifier, units and canonical decimal precision, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that an input with noncanonical decimals or a changed unit ...

Failure outcome

require a fresh approval after any rounding or fee conversion. M-12 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

an input with noncanonical decimals or a changed unit exponent fails authorization. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.13. M-13: Fee and Gas-Budget Bounding

Security invariant / hostile condition

the transaction builder inflates fee fields after 25 approval. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses maximum fee, fee payer, resource limit and external fee schedule. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which the transaction builder inflates fee fields after approval. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache may ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode maximum fee, fee payer, resource limit and external fee schedule, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a fee outside approved bounds cannot be signed even if ...

Failure outcome

allow bounded repricing only through a verifiable delegated fee policy. M-13 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a fee outside approved bounds cannot be signed even if principal amount is unchanged. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.14. M-14: Cross-Service Credential Substitution

Security invariant / hostile condition

a workflow exchanges user approval for a broader backend credential. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses credential audience, origin role and protected signer identity. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a workflow exchanges user approval for a broader backend credential. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode credential audience, origin role and protected signer identity, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a credential with broad scope cannot authorize an ...

Failure outcome

revoke the substituted credential and invalidate any queued candidate. M-14 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a credential with broad scope cannot authorize an out-of-scope command. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.15. M-15: Non-Bearer Execution Handle

Security invariant / hostile condition

a stolen handle string is replayed against another compatible API endpoint. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses handle identity, sink-specific binding and local protected storage handle. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a stolen handle string is replayed against another compatible API endpoint. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode handle identity, sink-specific binding and local protected storage handle, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that mere byte possession without protected context is ...

Failure outcome

retire captured handle and rotate sink capability binding. M-15 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

mere byte possession without protected context is insufficient to execute. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

identity, delegation, signing and quota practice (OAuth, HSM/KMS, ERC-4337/EIP-7702)

B.16. M-16: Untrusted Planner and Tool Injection

Security invariant / hostile condition

a retrieved page or tool output changes transaction amount or destination. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses tainted instruction origin and provenance of proposed act fields. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a retrieved page or tool output changes transaction amount or destination. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode tainted instruction origin and provenance of proposed act fields, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that unauthorized fields inferred from tool text fail intent ...

Failure outcome

retain taint lineage and request explicit authorizer confirmation. M-16 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

unauthorized fields inferred from tool text fail intent equality. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.17. M-17: Code-Execution Sandbox Egress

Security invariant / hostile condition

an isolated worker invokes a privileged helper to escape ordinary egress rules. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses process identity, destination API and sandbox egress operation. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an isolated worker invokes a privileged helper to escape ordinary egress rules. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode process identity, destination API and sandbox egress operation, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a valid internal workflow token never authorizes ...

Failure outcome

disable the privileged helper or enforce mandatory mediation at its entry. M-17 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a valid internal workflow token never 30 authorizes unapproved external egress. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.18. M-18: Cloud Resource Mutation

Security invariant / hostile condition

an authorized deployment command is redirected to a different cloud account. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses resource ID, account, region, role and expected state generation. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an authorized deployment command is redirected to a different cloud account. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode resource ID, account, region, role and expected state generation, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a changed account, role or target produces exact-effect ...

Failure outcome

require re-observation after infrastructure drift. M-18 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a changed account, role or target produces exact-effect denial. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.19. M-19: Device Actuation and Reset Epoch

Security invariant / hostile condition

a stale motor or actuator command is replayed after device restart. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses device identity, firmware measurement, actuation bounds and reset counter. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a stale motor or actuator command is replayed after device restart. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode device identity, firmware measurement, actuation bounds and reset counter, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that post-reset replay is denied even when the command bytes ...

Failure outcome

re-enroll device generation and resynchronize monotonic counters. M-19 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

post-reset replay is denied even when the command bytes match a prior approval. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.20. M-20: Radio Transmission Finality

Security invariant / hostile condition

an approved configuration is reused for an out-of- bounds transmission. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses radio endpoint, licensed band, location, power and time slot. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an approved configuration is reused for an out-of-bounds transmission. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode radio endpoint, licensed band, location, power and time slot, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a command prepared for one band cannot effectuate on ...

Failure outcome

on loss of current policy force transmitter disable and 25 require reauthorization. M-20 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a command prepared for one band cannot effectuate on another. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.21. M-21: Payment Initiation and Clearing

Security invariant / hostile condition

submission success is mistaken for accepted 30 clearing or completed settlement. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses payer, payee, currency, amount and payment-rail reference. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which submission success is mistaken for accepted clearing or completed settlement. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode payer, payee, currency, amount and payment-rail reference, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that initiated and settled states cannot be represented by the ...

Failure outcome

reconcile pending transfers through rail idempotency identifiers. M-21 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

initiated and settled states cannot be represented by the same receipt type. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.22. M-22: Multi-Channel Communications Quota

Security invariant / hostile condition

an authorization for one channel is laundered through another delivery path. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses virtual identity, communication purpose, channel and usage allowance. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an authorization for one channel is laundered through another delivery path. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode virtual identity, communication purpose, channel and usage allowance, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that parallel attempts cannot exceed cross-channel purpose or ...

Failure outcome

deny further delivery after exhaustion while preserving audit continuity. M-22 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

parallel attempts cannot exceed cross-channel purpose or count limits. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.23. M-23: Data Export and Privacy Boundary

Security invariant / hostile condition

a valid API credential is used to export a larger or different dataset. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses data classification, intended recipient and exact export bytes. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a valid API credential is used to export a larger or different dataset. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode data classification, intended recipient and exact export bytes, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that replacing a file after upstream approval is detected at ...

Failure outcome

quarantine the changed export and start a new approval. M-23 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

replacing a file after upstream approval is detected at egress. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.24. M-24: Cryptographic Key-Usage Separation

Security invariant / hostile condition

a key intended for transfer signing is used to authorize account delegation. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses protected key object, allowed operation type and algorithm suite. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a key intended for transfer signing is used to authorize account delegation. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode protected key object, allowed operation type and algorithm suite, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that using one valid key across two unauthorized purposes ...

Failure outcome

rotate or split key usage and invalidate ambiguous historical grants. M-24 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

using one valid key across two unauthorized purposes fails policy checks. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.25. M-25: Hardware Security Module Integration

Security invariant / hostile condition

a normal signing API exposes unrestricted raw- message signing. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses hardware key alias, command template and exclusive invocation path. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a normal signing API exposes unrestricted raw-message signing. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode hardware key alias, command template and exclusive invocation path, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that raw-digest signing bypass attempts must be blocked or ...

Failure outcome

disable raw-sign operations and revoke previous unrestricted grants. M-25 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

raw-digest signing bypass attempts must be blocked or excluded from conformance. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.26. M-26: Cross-Region Policy Continuity

Security invariant / hostile condition

a regional failover restores an older permissive snapshot. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses policy epoch, region, authority lineage and policy synchronization proof. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a regional failover restores an older permissive snapshot. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache may ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode policy epoch, region, authority lineage and policy synchronization proof, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that stale-region approval cannot be resurrected by ...

Failure outcome

quarantine region until it receives a sufficiently current state snapshot. M-26 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

stale-region approval cannot be resurrected by availability routing. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.27. M-27: Offline Signing and Air-Gapped Approval

Security invariant / hostile condition

an offline signer signs bytes that changed after display. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses detached request artifact, approval conditions and signing-session identity. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an offline signer signs bytes that changed after display. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache may ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode detached request artifact, approval conditions and signing-session identity, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a changed QR or removable-media payload triggers explicit ...

Failure outcome

reconstruct a new approval with independent visual 25 verification. M-27 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a changed QR or removable-media payload triggers explicit denial. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.28. M-28: Distributed Ledger Non-Inclusion

Security invariant / hostile condition

a precommit receipt is logged despite network 30 failure or chain reorganization. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses external submission ID, transaction hash and chain finality depth. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a precommit receipt is logged despite network failure or chain reorganization. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode external submission ID, transaction hash and chain finality depth, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that local ALLOW never appears as ledger SETTLED without ...

Failure outcome

resubmit only using safe idempotent procedures and existing consumed authority. M-28 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

local ALLOW never appears as ledger SETTLED without independent proof. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.29. M-29: External State-Root Drift

Security invariant / hostile condition

a balance, allowance or delegate implementation changes between simulation and commit. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses authorized state commitment and current external observation generation. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a balance, allowance or delegate implementation changes between simulation and commit. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode authorized state commitment and current external observation generation, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that stale simulation hash cannot establish current state ...

Failure outcome

obtain fresh external proof and rerun policy before effectuation. M-29 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

stale simulation hash cannot establish current 10 state equality. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.30. M-30: Fallback Path and Emergency Operator

Security invariant / hostile condition

an emergency path bypasses mandatory runtime authorization under routine conditions. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses break-glass route identity, emergency rationale and scoped authority. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an emergency path bypasses mandatory runtime authorization under routine conditions. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode break-glass route identity, emergency rationale and scoped authority, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that no unlogged arbitrary signing operation can be attributed ...

Failure outcome

require explicit emergency epoch, alerting, expiry and post-incident review. M-30 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

no unlogged arbitrary signing operation can be attributed to normal conformance. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

agent sandboxing, cloud IAM, device and payment controls

B.31. M-31: Service-Mesh and Sidecar Bypass

Security invariant / hostile condition

an attacker bypasses a proxy with local sockets or direct service addresses. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses workload identity, network boundary and privileged node control. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an attacker bypasses a proxy with local sockets or direct service addresses. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode workload identity, network boundary and privileged node control, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a direct route lacking finality evidence cannot trigger ...

Failure outcome

close the direct path or document an unsupported deployment mode. M-31 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a direct route lacking finality evidence cannot trigger the sink. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.32. M-32: Versioned Policy Rollback Protection

Security invariant / hostile condition

an old permissive policy is restored from backup to authorize previously denied work. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses policy version, approved migration path and protected rollback counter. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an old permissive policy is restored from backup to authorize previously denied work. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode policy version, approved migration path and protected rollback counter, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a valid but obsolete approval does not survive policy ...

Failure outcome

maintain an append-only protected rollback log. M-32 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a valid but obsolete approval does not 10 survive policy rollback. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.33. M-33: Unknown Critical Extension

Security invariant / hostile condition

a bridge silently drops a security-critical condition it cannot parse. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses critical extension names and profile registry version. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first gives ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a bridge silently drops a security-critical condition it cannot parse. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode critical extension names and profile registry version, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that dropping a critical delegate constraint causes denial.

Failure outcome

negotiate supported profile version before issuing a new approval. M-33 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

dropping a critical delegate constraint causes denial. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.34. M-34: Canonical Unicode and Binary Addresses

Security invariant / hostile condition

two visually identical identifiers encode different recipients. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses canonical string normalization and binary address bytes. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which two visually identical identifiers encode different recipients. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode canonical string normalization and binary address bytes, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that homoglyph or alternate hexadecimal representation cannot ...

Failure outcome

require stable profile-specific canonicalization before reauthorization. M-34 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

homoglyph or alternate hexadecimal representation cannot change the final receiver. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.35. M-35: Delegation Persistence Across Failures

Security invariant / hostile condition

an implementation assumes a transaction revert 30 undoes every delegation side effect. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses delegation state after reverted outer transaction and external status. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an implementation assumes a transaction revert undoes every delegation side effect. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode delegation state after reverted outer transaction and external status, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that post-failure code changes are represented and checked ...

Failure outcome

revoke, clear or replace delegation through separately authorized recovery. M-35 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

post-failure code changes are represented and checked before new operations. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.36. M-36: Signer Threshold and Dual Control

Security invariant / hostile condition

one compromised signing service can manufacture a single administrative approval. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses approval quorum, signer identities and attested collective decision. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which one compromised signing service can manufacture a single administrative approval. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode approval quorum, signer identities and attested collective decision, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that one forged signer share cannot satisfy a two-party quorum.

Failure outcome

rekey threshold membership and replay historical transcript checks. M-36 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

one forged signer share cannot satisfy a two- 10 party quorum. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.37. M-37: Remote Attestation and Runtime Measurement

Security invariant / hostile condition

a genuine enclave measurement is replayed for a different candidate action. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses attestation nonce, measurement, signer identity and binding to CA. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a genuine enclave measurement is replayed for a different candidate action. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode attestation nonce, measurement, signer identity and binding to CA, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that valid attestation without the right candidate digest ...

Failure outcome

re-attest after code update, migration or compromised 20 endorsement. M-37 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

valid attestation without the right candidate digest grants no effect. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.38. M-38: Source Authority and Instruction Lineage

Security invariant / hostile condition

untrusted generated text is accidentally elevated into policy authority. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses originator evidence and immutable ancestry of approval-relevant fields. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which untrusted generated text is accidentally elevated into policy authority. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode originator evidence and immutable ancestry of approval-relevant fields, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a missing provenance edge is a denial rather than ...

Failure outcome

collect new verified approval evidence without mutating old lineage. M-38 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a missing provenance edge is a denial rather 25 than permission. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.39. M-39: Protected Audit Chain and Redaction

Security invariant / hostile condition

a compromised application edits audit events to hide an unauthorized attempt. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses decision sequence, hash- chained records and scoped disclosure keys. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a compromised application edits audit events to hide an unauthorized attempt. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode decision sequence, hash-chained records and scoped disclosure keys, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a missing journal sequence or altered record is ...

Failure outcome

reconstruct from protected checkpoint and notify of gaps. M-39 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a missing journal sequence or altered record is independently detectable. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.40. M-40: Crash-Safe Idempotent Commit

Security invariant / hostile condition

the process crashes after sending an effect but before recording its outcome. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses durable prepare journal and external idempotency key. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first gives ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which the process crashes after sending an effect but before recording its outcome. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode durable prepare journal and external idempotency key, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that restart cannot issue a second effective command for a ...

Failure outcome

mark outcome UNKNOWN and query downstream 15 evidence. M-40 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

restart cannot issue a second effective command for a prior handle. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.41. M-41: Multi-Sink Atomicity and Partial Failure

Security invariant / hostile condition

one of several remote effects succeeds while another is rejected. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses participating sink list, bounded group authority and explicit partial outcomes. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which one of several remote effects succeeds while another is rejected. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode participating sink list, bounded group authority and explicit partial outcomes, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that partial results never masquerade as full completion.

Failure outcome

initiate compensating actions only under separately authorized policies. M-41 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

partial results never masquerade as full completion. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.42. M-42: Bounded Clock Uncertainty

Security invariant / hostile condition

an attacker exploits clock rollback to reuse expired authority. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses trusted time source, tolerance and monotonic time epoch. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an attacker exploits clock rollback to reuse expired authority. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode trusted time source, tolerance and monotonic time epoch, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that time rollback cannot expand authorization lifetime.

Failure outcome

enter a safe mode until time trust is restored. M-42 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

time rollback cannot expand authorization lifetime. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.43. M-43: Revocation Cache and Partition Semantics

Security invariant / hostile condition

a network partition leaves a signer with obsolete authorization state. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses minimum acceptable epoch and local revocation freshness deadline. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a network partition leaves a signer with obsolete authorization state. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode minimum acceptable epoch and local revocation freshness deadline, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that partition never silently converts expired cached approval ...

Failure outcome

restore authenticated epoch continuity before accepting commits. M-43 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

partition never silently converts expired cached approval to valid. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.44. M-44: Request Cancellation and Nonce Burn

Security invariant / hostile condition

a canceled operation is restarted from a queued stale candidate. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses cancellation sequence and protected nonce state. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first gives the ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a canceled operation is restarted from a queued stale candidate. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state cache ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode cancellation sequence and protected nonce state, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, bounded ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that cancel/restart with same handle cannot create an effect.

Failure outcome

issue a new candidate ID only after fresh approval. M-44 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

cancel/restart with same handle cannot create an effect. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.45. M-45: Quorum Witness Availability

Security invariant / hostile condition

a single witness failure forces an unsafe fallback to unsigned authorization. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses witness quorum generation and failure domain separation. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a single witness failure forces an unsafe fallback to unsigned authorization. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode witness quorum generation and failure domain separation, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a missing quorum produces no signer output.

Failure outcome

degrade availability explicitly without changing safety 20 semantics. M-45 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a missing quorum produces no signer output. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

service-mesh policy, attestation, consensus, fencing tokens, idempotent commit

B.46. M-46: Semantic Transaction Simulation

Security invariant / hostile condition

a dry-run reports harmless output while the real 25 transaction touches other contracts. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses simulation environment, pre- state and interpreted effect fields. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a dry-run reports harmless output while the real transaction touches other contracts. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode simulation environment, pre-state and interpreted effect fields, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that simulation drift triggers a new policy decision, not ...

Failure outcome

mark simulation as advisory when exact replay equivalence is unavailable. M-46 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

simulation drift triggers a new policy decision, not silent approval. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.47. M-47: Account Abstraction and User Operation

Security invariant / hostile condition

a sponsor or bundler mutates fee or call data between approval and execution. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses paymaster identity, bundler, sponsor and operation calldata. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a sponsor or bundler mutates fee or call data between approval and execution. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode paymaster identity, bundler, sponsor and operation calldata, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that mutation of sponsor-sensitive fields is rejected at ...

Failure outcome

resubmit a newly approved user operation with updated fee constraints. M-47 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

mutation of sponsor-sensitive fields is rejected at finalization. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.48. M-48: Delegation Scope and Call-Graph Closure

Security invariant / hostile condition

a delegate remains approved but invokes unreviewed downstream transfer code. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses reachable methods, nested calls and downstream token allowances. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a delegate remains approved but invokes unreviewed downstream transfer code. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode reachable methods, nested calls and downstream token allowances, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a newly reachable withdrawal method is not implicitly ...

Failure outcome

pause or constrain delegated calls until measured scope is updated. M-48 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a newly reachable withdrawal method is not implicitly authorized. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.49. M-49: Constrained Upgrades and Rollback

Security invariant / hostile condition

an upgrade endpoint changes delegation functionality through hidden administrative routes. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses upgrade path, approved old and new code hashes and activation epoch. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an upgrade endpoint changes delegation functionality through hidden administrative routes. A compromised planner, API caller, ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode upgrade path, approved old and new code hashes and activation epoch, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that an unauthorized upgrade can neither execute nor inherit ...

Failure outcome

restore only a separately approved implementation and invalidate stale handles. M-49 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

an unauthorized upgrade can neither execute nor inherit old transfer permissions. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.50. M-50: External Withdrawal Destination Registry

Security invariant / hostile condition

an attacker updates a destination registry after 30 signer policy was checked. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses destination registry digest, beneficiary proof and freshness. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an attacker updates a destination registry after signer policy was checked. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode destination registry digest, beneficiary proof and freshness, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a changed registry causes denial despite a historically ...

Failure outcome

require protected approval for registry update and withdrawal. M-50 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a changed registry causes denial despite a historically approved alias. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.51. M-51: Protocol Downgrade and Legacy Credentials

Security invariant / hostile condition

a client negotiates away critical finality fields using an older endpoint. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses profile version, credential class and minimum local enforcement version. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a client negotiates away critical finality fields using an older endpoint. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode profile version, credential class and minimum local enforcement version, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that legacy-format request cannot bypass requirements for a ...

Failure outcome

serve only read-only legacy calls or add protected adapters. M-51 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

legacy-format request cannot bypass requirements for a protected effect. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.52. M-52: Overload and Resource Exhaustion

Security invariant / hostile condition

attacker-generated requests consume nonce space, witness capacity and signing slots. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses admission quota, challenge allocation and bounded state. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that first ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which attacker-generated requests consume nonce space, witness capacity and signing slots. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode admission quota, challenge allocation and bounded state, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry interval, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that overload produces deterministic reject/pending states, ...

Failure outcome

replay durable requests after resources recover without duplicate side effects. M-52 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

overload produces deterministic reject/pending states, never unguarded execution. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.53. M-53: Formal Mediation-Path Enumeration

Security invariant / hostile condition

an undocumented maintenance interface produces signatures without protected checks. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses complete list of APIs, hardware routes and credential exercise methods. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an undocumented maintenance interface produces signatures without protected checks. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode complete list of APIs, hardware routes and credential exercise methods, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a newly discovered route blocks complete-mediation ...

Failure outcome

disable the route or upgrade it with sink-local verification. M-53 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a newly discovered route blocks complete- 30 mediation conformance claims. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.54. M-54: Multi-Party Administrative Governance

Security invariant / hostile condition

one actor changes both the rule and its audit approval in a single action. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses policy author, approver, deployment signer and independent revoker. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which one actor changes both the rule and its audit approval in a single action. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode policy author, approver, deployment signer and independent revoker, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a unilateral unauthorized policy change cannot make a ...

Failure outcome

restore governance quorum and quarantine decisions made during compromise. M-54 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

a unilateral unauthorized policy change cannot make a rejected candidate valid. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.55. M-55: Sensitive Metadata Minimization

Security invariant / hostile condition

a valid receipt leaks private recipient or account data to unrelated observers. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses audit field classification, disclosed digest and protected access policy. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a valid receipt leaks private recipient or account data to unrelated observers. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode audit field classification, disclosed digest and protected access policy, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that external receipts reveal no unnecessary source data for ...

Failure outcome

rotate audit access grants and apply bounded retention schedules. M-55 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

external receipts reveal no unnecessary source data for audit correlation. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.56. M-56: On-Device Firmware and Silicon Continuity

Security invariant / hostile condition

an approved DMA or accelerator descriptor is 25 modified before hardware consumption. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses device descriptor hash, memory-translation generation and reset epoch. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which an approved DMA or accelerator descriptor is modified before hardware consumption. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode device descriptor hash, memory-translation generation and reset epoch, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that stale descriptor approval cannot survive remap or reset.

Failure outcome

reconstruct device-local state at the hardware effect gate. M-56 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

stale descriptor approval cannot survive remap or reset. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.57. M-57: Non-Repudiable Audit Without False Finality

Security invariant / hostile condition

auditors assume the existence of a signed ALLOW record proves real-world delivery. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses signed decision record and separately verified consequence acknowledgment. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which auditors assume the existence of a signed ALLOW record proves real-world delivery. A compromised planner, API caller, helper ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode signed decision record and separately verified consequence acknowledgment, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that no settlement claim is produced without a qualifying ...

Failure outcome

record evidence gaps and schedule independent 10 reconciliation. M-57 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

no settlement claim is produced without a qualifying external proof. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.58. M-58: Independent Verification of Prior Approval

Security invariant / hostile condition

the same compromised process issues and verifies its own approval. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses approved resource pattern and verifier-independent policy state. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which the same compromised process issues and verifies its own approval. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process or state ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode approved resource pattern and verifier-independent policy state, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that self-asserted approval cannot pass in absence of trusted ...

Failure outcome

reprovision witness authority and rotate its key material. M-58 decision flow

Required negative-effect test

self-asserted approval cannot pass in absence of trusted policy lineage. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

B.59. M-59: Post-Authorization Route Mutation

Security invariant / hostile condition

a route changes after acceptance and redirects an otherwise authorized message. 

Effect boundary

This profile addresses route ID, recipient address and protected egress network state. The relevant consequential boundary is the final privileged API invocation, signing operation, hardware command acceptance, or network dispatch that ...

Attacker-controlled component

Per the attack text: Consider a sequence in which a route changes after acceptance and redirects an otherwise authorized message. A compromised planner, API caller, helper process ...

Protected state

The minimal policy object MUST encode route ID, recipient address and protected egress network state, together with a tenant, sink instance, policy version, revocation generation, nonce, expiry ...

Validation procedure

An implementation MUST exercise at least one positive case and one adversarial negative case for this profile. The decisive assertion is that a route substitution before egress is detected by ...

Failure outcome

repeat protected route validation after each network 25 failover. M-59 decision flow Algorithm: Two-Instance Intent-to-Effect Protocol PED-1 captures a candidate before it has effect, binds its ...

Required negative-effect test

a route substitution before egress is detected by execution-time reconstruction. 

Related claim passages

See Appendix D; editor mapping in the independent-claim table.

Closest relevant known technology

transaction simulation, account abstraction, formal verification, protocol compatibility

Appendix C. Appendix C: E-45 to E-63

The 19 additional financial embodiments, with the source's text condensed under the A-H frame. Status of reference code for this part: an additional Python/SQLite model reported to pass 19 local educational assertions; it does not model every native interface or prove atomicity with an external payment.

C.1. E-45: Autonomous Resource-Payment and Delivery Entitlement Boundary

A. Authorized economic obligation

Agent-completed API, travel, data, compute and digital-service purchases where payment no longer waits for a human confirmation.

B. Actual economic operation

A typed payment challenge, resource identifier, merchant or service public identity, price and denomination, requested usage quantity, facilitator endpoint, fee schedule, purchase expiry, and the deliverable identifier or service ...

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is the protected release of payment authority to a facilitator, signer or settlement adapter; a distinct protected check governs any resulting data access or service entitlement.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 accepts an authority manifest specifying an eligible service class and an independently verifiable merchant identity; it constrains maximum price, payer account, denomination, quantity, expiry, permitted rails and price drift. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Change an API payment challenge from 0.02 to 2.00 after authority collection. • Replace an allowed merchant wallet with a visually similar address while retaining the resource label. • Replay an already consumed payment handle through a ...

F. Outcome and recovery

If an external payment may have occurred and confirmation is lost, retain PAYMENT_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN, query the transaction identifier and prohibit a fresh payment under the same mandate. Entitlement reconciliation may continue without payment replay.

G. Alternative implementations

• Hardware or enclave signer constrained by resource-bound payment metadata. • Payment-switch or merchant-acquirer gateway with exclusive release of settlement credentials. • Programmable account with on-ledger operation-specific ...

H. Validation

changed_quoted_amount, merchant_key_substitution, facilitator_replay, expired_service_quote, fee_unit_rounding, paid_but_no_service. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.2. E-46: Card Authorization-Capture-Clearing Continuity with Concurrent Bounds

A. Authorized economic obligation

Virtual card, embedded payments and agent-driven merchant payment lifecycles.

B. Actual economic operation

Original authorization reference, card token binding, merchant identity and category, authorized total and currency, incremental authorization records, capture messages, refund and reversal identifiers, settlement amounts and original ...

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is authorization release at the issuer or network adapter; each capture and settlement release is independently consequential and must be separately mediated.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 stores merchant, purpose, card-token generation, authorized aggregate, capture window, capture count and expiry as a protected spending state. 2. PED-2 independently reconstructs each incoming capture from the final acquiring or issuer-facing native ...

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Two captures both see the full remaining amount in a stale cache. • A merchant changes from partial capture to a larger final capture. • A captured transaction is retried with a different request reference after a timeout.

F. Outcome and recovery

Unknown capture status fences the original reservation and triggers an idempotent status inquiry rather than an automatic retry. Release of a hold is conditional on reliable non-capture evidence or expiry conditions defined by the relevant network.

G. Alternative implementations

• Issuer HSM/processing host with protected capture ledger. • Network-level token-control or transaction-management service. • Merchant-acquirer adapter with exclusive capture dispatch plus issuer acknowledgments.

H. Validation

dual_partial_capture, over_capture, merchant_changed_after_auth, increment_without_authority, capture_ack_lost, refund_as_new_spend. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.3. E-47: Cross-Rail Financial Obligation Equivalence and FX Boundary

A. Authorized economic obligation

Payment routing among bank transfers, card rails, stablecoins, tokenized deposits and alternative payout providers.

B. Actual economic operation

Payer, intended economic beneficiary, source and destination amounts, both units, authorized exchange-rate range, decimal scale, quote provenance, slippage, route fees, intermediary fees, settlement destination and expiry.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is the last controllable payment instruction for each rail, and any conversion or asset-transfer interface that independently reduces customer funds.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 commits to an obligation expressed as typed financial constraints rather than an unchecked display string or an unrestricted payment-route identifier. 2. A candidate route graph contains typed edges for debit, swap, bridge, payout and settlement;

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Reroute after approval from bank transfer to a stablecoin chain with different recipient. • Move the fee into a third-currency transfer not displayed to the approver. • Use a stale exchange rate and change decimal precision.

F. Outcome and recovery

On a partially completed graph, identify every effective edge and block compensating transfers until separately authorized. Preserve unknown outcomes and distinguish a protocol timeout from proof of nonexecution.

G. Alternative implementations

• Payment orchestrator controlling bank and card dispatch. • Multi-chain wallet plus contract-based swap and route validator. • Treasury ledger plus regulated payout connector with separately enforced sub- reservations.

H. Validation

fee_third_asset, fx_quote_stale, switch_rail_unapproved, recipient_alias_changed, swap_slippage_above_bound, partial_rail_commit. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.4. E-48: Tokenized Commercial Deposit and Central-Reserve Obligation Continuity

A. Authorized economic obligation

Bank shared-ledger tokenized-deposit pilots and wholesale multi- currency settlement.

B. Actual economic operation

Deposit bank and legal issuer identities, customer liability reference, token claim identifier, reserve account, deposit issuance and redemption amounts, ledger commitment, interbank obligations and the evidence type of each external bank ...

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is each protected token mint, deposit liability update, interbank settlement instruction and redemption release capable of creating an independent economic effect.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 creates a bank-obligation manifest binding an account-liability identifier, permitted token amount, identified issuer, eligible receiving bank and authorized settlement asset. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Redeem twice after a bank-core acknowledgment is lost. • Claim interbank settlement when only a shared-ledger token move is observed. • Substitute a token issued by a different institution with the same ticker symbol.

F. Outcome and recovery

The ledger and bank core may diverge during asynchronous updates; mark OUTCOME_UNCONFIRMED and suspend renewed issuance or redemption associated with the affected obligation until reconciled. No universal atomicity is asserted absent shared commitment control.

G. Alternative implementations

• Deposit bank transaction processor and protected ledger adapter. • Shared programmable ledger with bank-signed obligation proofs. • Permissioned settlement system with separate reserve-operator interfaces.

H. Validation

issuer_substitution, liability_not_posted, double_redemption, ledger_only_receipt, stale_reserve_state, interbank_partial_failure. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.5. E-49: Offline Central-Bank Digital Currency Device-Local Spending Bounds

A. Authorized economic obligation

Offline retail digital-money device and payment-terminal prototypes under secure-element or similar trusted hardware.

B. Actual economic operation

Device identity and credential generation, authenticated offline value allocation, local monotonic counter, token or value identifiers, permitted terminal class, expiry, device reset epoch and reconnect reconciliation state.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is irreversible local transfer of a spend authorization or value token from the device secure element to the accepting offline terminal.

D. Current state

1. An online issuer or authorized wallet loads a signed bounded offline allocation, device epoch, expiry and device-specific policy into protected device storage. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Replay an offline transfer after reverting an application snapshot. • Reset a handset and reuse a pre-reset spend counter. • Relay a terminal challenge to an unauthorized merchant.

F. Outcome and recovery

If protected state is unavailable, the device does not issue a new spendable proof. Reconnection resolves conflicts and may trigger issuer-defined liability processes; prevention claims explicitly exclude compromised secure hardware unless covered by the ...

G. Alternative implementations

• Embedded Secure Element with monotonic protected counter. • eSIM-class secure applet with signed spending allocation. • Dedicated hardware wallet or offline acceptance token appliance.

H. Validation

snapshot_rollback, same_token_twice, epoch_reuse, terminal_challenge_relay, offline_budget_exceeded, conflicting_reconnect_history. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.6. E-50: Cross-Currency Payment-versus-Payment Conditional Release

A. Authorized economic obligation

Wholesale FX settlement between institutions, including shared ledgers and heterogeneous payment systems.

B. Actual economic operation

Two or more currency legs, payer/payee institutions, net obligations, maturity interval, matching identifier, settlement-system instance, conditional- release proof, authorized FX quote and timeout rules.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is each independently irrevocable debit, reserve movement or settlement-admission act at a participating institution or protected settlement system.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a matched obligation set containing exact leg identities, final recipient institutions, currencies, amounts and eligibility conditions. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• One bank changes the counterparty during final message generation. • A commitment expires after one currency leg is admitted. • A coordinator replays an old matched-deal identifier.

F. Outcome and recovery

Quorum loss, clock disagreement and external finality uncertainty preserve a non-success state. Coordinated abort is possible only for legs that have not independently become irrevocable; otherwise use compensated recovery with a new authority.

G. Alternative implementations

• Single shared-ledger conditional transfer. • Coordinated reserve/debit holds across bank cores. • Hash/secret or timelock conditional flows with explicit non-atomic failure exposure.

H. Validation

leg_beneficiary_substitution, quote_mismatch, coordinator_replay, first_leg_only, commit_timeout, missing_final_settlement_proof. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.7. E-51: Tokenized-Security Delivery-versus-Payment with Title and Encumbrance Checks

A. Authorized economic obligation

Tokenized equities, bonds and real-world asset settlement alongside cash or regulated digital money.

B. Actual economic operation

Asset identifier, series, legal issuer, share count or face value, registry domain, holding account, encumbrance and freeze state, buyer, seller, price, settlement asset and custody/transfer instruction.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is a protected asset ownership change and a distinct protected cash-transfer act, with commit coordination according to the available ledger models.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a specific security or asset claim to an authorized buyer, seller, settlement account, number of units and payment price. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Use a similar token representing a different legal security. • Transfer units already pledged or frozen. • Claim cash settlement as proof of asset-title delivery.

F. Outcome and recovery

A change in registry control, asset freeze or settlement delay before protected commit invalidates the affected reservation; a partially completed DvP requires an independently authorized reversal or remedy.

G. Alternative implementations

• Shared custody-money ledger atomic contract. • Separate transfer-agent and bank gateway pair. • Broker/depository control plane with authenticated escrow commitments.

H. Validation

wrong_asset_series, encumbered_units, seller_not_owner, cash_asset_partial, issuer_freeze_change, fake_registry_receipt. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not merely a ...

C.8. E-52: Stablecoin Mint-Burn-Redemption and Issuer-Liability Continuity

A. Authorized economic obligation

Regulated stablecoin issuance and payout integrations within merchant, settlement and treasury stacks.

B. Actual economic operation

Issuer program and contract identity, mint or burn amount, reserve evidence reference, liability account, authorized institution, redemption beneficiary, chain and token decimals, token epoch and treasury reconciliation status.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is mint-authority signature or contract call, irreversible burn and external redemption payout are separate protected effects.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 registers the permitted issuer, reserve or bank-liability policy, eligible asset contract, supply cap and authorized mint/burn principals. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Reuse stale reserve evidence for several simultaneous mints. • Substitute a look-alike stablecoin contract on a different chain. • Replay the same burn proof through a second redemption connector.

F. Outcome and recovery

Unverifiable reserve evidence yields INDETERMINATE rather than mint permission. Unknown payout outcomes prevent a renewed redeem instruction until reconciliation, with separate fraud and issuer solvency assumptions.

G. Alternative implementations

• Non-exportable issuing signer. • Contract-controlled mint gate with authenticated reserve oracle. • Bank-integrated liability controller enforcing both token and cash activity.

H. Validation

mint_cap_race, stale_reserve_attestation, wrong_token_contract, burn_proof_replay, payout_unknown, decimal_scale_change. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not merely a ...

C.9. E-53: Cross-Chain Bridge, Rollup and Reorganization-Aware Finality

A. Authorized economic obligation

Multi-chain agent wallets, rollups, bridges and token distribution across different consensus models.

B. Actual economic operation

Source chain and finalized block reference, source bridge contract, message nonce and hash, token identity, lock/burn proof, target chain, mint/release contract, final beneficiary and source finality rule.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is source-chain lock or burn and independent destination-chain mint or release authorization, each at its own effective boundary.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a transfer obligation to exact source asset and chain, destination asset mapping, destination beneficiary and allowed finality assumptions. 2. PED-2 on the source side reconstructs the actual lock or burn, message digest, nonce and ...

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Mint on destination against a source log removed by reorganization. • Replay bridge proof through two different relayers. • Upgrade destination bridge implementation between approval and execute.

F. Outcome and recovery

Unfinalized, disputed or unverifiable source evidence causes a protected hold. If a destination release has occurred, record an uncorrected external effect and use separately approved recovery; the mechanism cannot reverse independent chains by assertion.

G. Alternative implementations

• On-chain light-client proof verifier. • Threshold attestation with independent finality policy at the destination sink. • Optimistic proof and bounded challenge period plus an enforced release hold.

H. Validation

source_reorg, bridge_message_replay, recipient_replaced, contract_upgrade, insufficient_confirmations, asset_mapping_substitution. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.10. E-54: Exchange Treasury Withdrawal and Multi-Venue Custody Continuity

A. Authorized economic obligation

Crypto exchange wallets, autonomous asset movement, portfolio rebalancing and treasury operations.

B. Actual economic operation

Account mandate, asset contract, chain, beneficiary address plus address-book generation, withdrawal amount, total position exposure, custody wallet identity, signer quorum, fee, nonce and network status.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is the first externally usable custody signature or effective withdrawal instruction, and any on-chain contract-controlled transfer that can bypass the off-chain signer.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a permitted withdrawal to account ownership, asset, destination identity, whitelist generation, authorized signer roster, aggregate exposure and time windows. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• A signer-approved transfer changes to a different destination after gas estimation. • A delegated wallet is upgraded while retaining its authorization label. • Two autonomous treasury agents concurrently withdraw against the same daily ...

F. Outcome and recovery

On custody service interruption, retain nonce- reservation and signature status. Never produce a fresh signature solely because the sending API timed out; reconciliation uses native transaction identifiers and signer logs.

G. Alternative implementations

• Fixed-function HSM with final transaction parsing. • MPC shares independently checking the same policy generation. • Smart-account validation hook with protected on-chain spend accounting.

H. Validation

withdrawal_destination_swap, mpc_quorum_conflict, hot_wallet_bypass, daily_limit_race, chain_id_change, signature_status_unknown. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.11. E-55: Merchant Alias, QR and Beneficiary Resolution Continuity

A. Authorized economic obligation

QR payments, dynamically resolved payment aliases, merchant paylinks, bank account aliases and interoperable wallets.

B. Actual economic operation

Displayed merchant name, authoritative merchant ID, alias or QR payload, resolved account/contract, merchant-register generation, amount, currency, terminal identity and resolution validity.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is release of the exact payment instruction after final alias resolution at the controlled payment-switch, wallet or bank connector.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a merchant identity and allowable payment scope independently of its user- facing label or mutable alias. 2. PED-2 requests fresh authenticated alias resolution from the designated resolver or obtains a verifiable signed resolution record. 3.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Substitute a QR code on a merchant display. • Change an account alias between user approval and bank submission. • Reuse a signed old alias result after a merchant migration.

F. Outcome and recovery

If merchant identity cannot be established or resolution races with re-registration, refuse release and request new authorization or authenticated resolution; no optimistic payment based only on cached labels.

G. Alternative implementations

• Wallet-side protected resolver. • Bank/UPI-like switch with merchant registry generation binding. • Merchant terminal secure element signing the actual account and amount.

H. Validation

qr_payee_swap, alias_resolution_race, merchant_registry_rollback, terminal_swap, old_resolution_replay, merchant_label_confusable. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.12. E-56: Machine-Speed Metered Payments and Batched Settlement Accounting

A. Authorized economic obligation

API metering, compute/data pay-per-use, machine-to-machine micropayments and sub-cent service charging.

B. Actual economic operation

Metered service ID, usage quantity and unit, interval, independently measured consumption, rate plan version, amount in smallest units, payer budget, provider beneficiary and batch membership.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is deduction or transfer of funds, release of a paid-usage entitlement, or emission of a settlement batch that becomes irrevocable.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a maximum cost-per-unit, total campaign budget, service identity and acceptable metering authority for an agent or connected device. 2. Untrusted meter reports are collected into a non-effective event stream;

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Meter doubles reported GPU-seconds while retaining a legitimate signed invoice. • Two batch workers each include the same micro-obligation. • Tiny per-unit fee rounding exceeds the protected aggregate ceiling.

F. Outcome and recovery

Inconsistent meter or unsettled batch state freezes further debits for the affected interval; disputed measurements require a new authenticated adjustment event, not edits to committed historical usage.

G. Alternative implementations

• HSM-guarded payment switch plus signed meter. • State-channel or payment-channel settlement with protected sequence number. • Smart contract aggregate batch verifier with off-chain usage attestations.

H. Validation

duplicate_meter_interval, batch_duplicate_membership, rounding_overcharge, meter_identity_swap, stale_rate_plan, batch_unknown_settlement. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, ...

C.13. E-57: Privacy-Preserving Financial Compliance Proof at Execution Boundary

A. Authorized economic obligation

Conditional compliance controls for fintech and wholesale cross- border payments with data-minimizing attestations.

B. Actual economic operation

Regulatory policy version, transaction amount class, counterparty-jurisdiction attributes, proof issuer, allowed proof statement, expiry, revocation epoch, transaction commitment and selective-disclosure policy.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is the actual protected release of payment signing, ledger transfer or settlement admission following policy-scope verification.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 fixes what class of transaction is permissible and which verifiable compliance predicates must be satisfied at final execution. 2. The applicant supplies a signature, attribute credential or zero-knowledge proof bound to the exact transaction ...

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Reuse a compliance proof on a different recipient. • Change proof policy-version input while retaining original ZK statement. • Submit valid privacy proof after credential revocation.

F. Outcome and recovery

When fresh revocation or required policy evidence cannot be verified, keep the financial candidate non-effective; unsupported privacy systems may use explicit authenticated disclosure under applicable rules.

G. Alternative implementations

• TEE verifier with attested public inputs. • ZK verifier module in a smart-account contract. • Bank settlement gateway with selective-disclosure credential support.

H. Validation

proof_rebinding, jurisdiction_swap, revoked_credential, wrong_public_inputs, proof_schema_downgrade, missing_compliance_predicate. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not ...

C.14. E-58: Financial Message Semantic Continuity Across Interoperability Adapters

A. Authorized economic obligation

ISO 20022 messages, proprietary bank APIs, merchant payment events and tokenized-settlement adapters.

B. Actual economic operation

Initiating-party and beneficiary identity, account aliases, instructed/settlement amounts, currency and scale, charges, value date, purpose, payment identification, return references, message standard version and native critical fields.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is native interbank message release, payment switch submission, account debit or outgoing ledger transfer after the last data- format transformation.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a versioned canonical financial obligation schema with explicit mandatory and critical extension fields. 2. A payment message may be transformed across API, queue, batch-file and ISO 20022-like representations only while preserving ...

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Map a beneficial owner to the wrong final creditor account. • Drop a fee or purpose restriction during protocol downgrade. • Change minor-unit interpretation between APIs.

F. Outcome and recovery

If two decoders disagree on a critical effect attribute, mark PARSER_DISAGREEMENT and block release pending a schema upgrade or new authenticated mandate.

G. Alternative implementations

• Bank core message-release hook. • Payment orchestration adapter with exclusive settlement dispatch. • Protocol-safe HSM signer over typed native message semantics.

H. Validation

critical_field_dropped, debit_credit_reversal, minor_unit_truncation, beneficiary_mapping_error, schema_downgrade, unrecognized_proprietary_field. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named ...

C.15. E-59: Recurring Conditional Mandate and Autonomous Subscription Control

A. Authorized economic obligation

Agent-managed recurring payments, renewals, streaming billing and conditional service procurement.

B. Actual economic operation

Mandate ID and generation, billing cadence, service identity, cycle maximum, aggregate limit, price/rate changes, minimum service condition, renewal eligibility, grace period and revocation time.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is each cycle-specific debit instruction or settlement release, not the original acceptance of a recurring mandate.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a bounded recurring authority with a finite number of periods or upper spend cap, permitted provider identity and price-change rule. 2. Each billing cycle produces a new Candidate Act identified by a protected cycle index;

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Provider secretly doubles next billing cycle price. • Two AI scheduler instances charge the same renewal. • Old provider alias is reused after ownership transfer.

F. Outcome and recovery

A cycle with unknown external payment outcome remains reserved during inquiry; correction requires a separately authorized adjustment or proven non-execution.

G. Alternative implementations

• Card-on-file token processor with protected cycle ledger. • Smart contract recurring mandate and monotonic cycle state. • Bank direct-debit adapter with bounded debit generation.

H. Validation

duplicate_cycle, renewal_after_revocation, price_increase, service_identity_changed, cycle_time_shift, refund_replay. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not merely a denied ...

C.16. E-60: Financial Dispute, Chargeback and Compensating-Transfer Authority

A. Authorized economic obligation

Card, fintech wallet, merchant and regulated digital-asset refund, reversal and dispute systems.

B. Actual economic operation

Original transaction ID and settlement evidence, dispute case, allowed dispute type, refund reason, payer and payee identity, amount already reversed, chargeback window, authorized adjustment source and destination.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is each refund, reversal, chargeback posting, merchant reserve debit or independent clawback release that changes economic position.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 registers an adjustment policy specifying the original obligation, eligible dispute authority, maximum reversal amount and recipient-inheritance rules. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Replay the same refund through a second processor. • Move a legitimate refund to a newly substituted beneficiary. • Issue simultaneous refund and chargeback beyond original charge.

F. Outcome and recovery

An adjustment with unknown outcome remains pending and does not replenish refund capacity. Separate legal entitlements and scheme obligations may require additional manual authorization, but the last effective instruction remains protected.

G. Alternative implementations

• Issuer/merchant acquiring core with protected disputes register. • Payment-service provider refund API guarded by a settlement-gate ledger. • Smart-contract escrow and separate authenticated arbitration interface.

H. Validation

refund_duplicate, refund_new_beneficiary, chargeback_refund_race, excess_reversal, wrong_original_reference, dispute_pending_not_final. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, ...

C.17. E-61: Autonomous Trading Strategy-to-Order-to-Fill Continuity

A. Authorized economic obligation

Agentic spot, derivative and tokenized-instrument trading with prompt-to-execution strategies and exchange order APIs.

B. Actual economic operation

Strategy approval digest, instrument/venue identity, order side, order type, limit and stop conditions, maximum price/slippage, notional/position limits, margin mode, leverage, account, order validity and cancel/replace generation.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is exchange-matching-engine order admission or the last exclusive API/signing boundary capable of placing or modifying an effective order.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a human-authorized strategy into measurable constraints: eligible markets, instrument, maximum exposure, trade frequency, order types, risk boundaries and account generation. 2. A planning agent emits a candidate order;

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Switch an approved limit buy to an unbounded market buy. • Two agents simultaneously open exposures that individually fit but collectively exceed a limit. • Cancel and replace with a larger notional before old order cancellation ...

F. Outcome and recovery

When a cancel or order outcome is unknown, retain exposure reservation and reconcile exchange order IDs and fills. Model confidence, market predictions or approval logs never substitute for current protected exposure.

G. Alternative implementations

• Exchange-side risk gateway with atomic account exposure ledger. • HSM-signed order-entry adapter plus authenticated live-order state. • Smart-account/DEX contract validator limiting aggregate position and slippage.

H. Validation

limit_to_market_change, dual_agent_exposure, cancel_replace_race, stale_account_margin, venue_substitution, unknown_fill_state. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, not merely ...

C.18. E-62: Delegated Financial-Agent Treasury and Subagent Budget Partitioning

A. Authorized economic obligation

Agent-controlled treasury accounts, subagent purchasing, vendor payouts and cross-application money management.

B. Actual economic operation

Treasury owner and account, subagent identity chain, delegated purpose, permitted counterparties and currencies, parent/child budgets, grant generation, authorized payout task, expiry and revocation state.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is effective treasury debit, transfer, payment authorization or issuance of a child capability that enables another actor to initiate the effect.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a protected root treasury mandate that enumerates authorized activities and grants only bounded children through a non-bearer delegation record. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• A subagent recursively delegates to gain a higher aggregate limit. • Two independent child agents spend against a copied allocation. • A revoked parent leaves an offline child token incorrectly reusable.

F. Outcome and recovery

Unknown transfer outcomes retain the corresponding sub-budget reservation. Child allocations cannot be reclaimed for reuse merely because a worker disconnected or stopped responding.

G. Alternative implementations

• Treasury HSM policy engine with quota escrow. • Bank subaccount and spending-control API. • Account-abstraction wallet with nontransferable session authority and protected nested limits.

H. Validation

child_budget_amplification, delegation_cycle, dual_child_spend, revoked_ancestor, purpose_privilege_escalation, reclaim_unknown_child_budget. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected ...

C.19. E-63: Autonomous Accounts-Payable Invoice and Supplier-Portal Finality

A. Authorized economic obligation

Buyer-to-supplier AI-initiated invoice payments through portals, virtual cards, bank APIs and supplier network intermediaries.

B. Actual economic operation

Buyer approval identity, supplier legal identity, invoice number/ line items, purchase order, bank account or virtual-card payee, payable amount, taxes, discounts, due date, ERP payment status and supplier-portal correlation.

C. Enforceable boundary

The first protected boundary is effective bank debit, virtual-card capture or payment instruction issued by a buyer-side privileged adapter after interacting with an independent supplier portal.

D. Current state

1. PED-1 binds a payment obligation to a verified invoice instance, authorized supplier, payable maximum and ERP approval generation. 2.

E. Risk and adversarial scenarios

• Portal injects a different bank account in a valid invoice view. • Two agents process the same payable using different rails. • A supplier modifies tax and fees after the enterprise approver signed off.

F. Outcome and recovery

Unknown payment status causes invoice-level spend fencing across all routes. Reconciliation uses authoritative buyer-bank/card and supplier evidence; manual dispute creates a distinct authorized correction.

G. Alternative implementations

• ERP-integrated payment execution adapter. • Virtual-card issuance/capture service with invoice-bound token. • Bank payment gateway with verified supplier-master and exclusive transfer credentials.

H. Validation

supplier_account_swap, invoice_duplicate_rails, tax_amount_change, portal_confirmation_spoof, po_line_item_mismatch, payment_ack_unknown. Each vector should assert the absence of any unauthorized actual effect at the named protected sink, ...

Appendix D. Appendix D: Claim Crosswalk 1-333

The source contains claims 1 to 333. Independent claims were identified from the claim text (a claim that does not refer to an earlier claim): 34 were found. Claims 47 to 189 depend on earlier claims; claim 46 is a storage-medium claim that is the parent of claims 47 to 50 and of 186 to 189. Mapping to embodiments and mechanisms is by the editor from claim wording and must be verified. The count of claims does not establish grant, novelty or priority.

Table 3: Claim crosswalk 1-333
Claims Group Opening of independent claim Embodiments Mechanisms
1-5 1-189 (general) A computer-implemented system for controlling a consequential operation, comprising a processor; memory; an interface receiving a Candidate Act maintained in a ... E-03, E-04, E-05, E-17 M-15, M-53
6-10 1-189 (general) A computer-implemented method comprising receiving a requested consequential operation, storing an independently protected approval scope, withholding an effective ... E-05, E-06, E-23 M-01, M-34, M-46
11-15 1-189 (general) A protected signing system comprising a transaction construction interface, a protected signing authority, an independently maintained policy source, a delegation ... E-01, E-07, E-08, E-28 M-03, M-06, M-24, M-25
16-20 1-189 (general) An execution authorization system comprising a protected issuer, a state repository and an effectuation sink configured to exercise an Execution Handle conditionally ... E-04, E-43 M-15, M-14
21-25 1-189 (general) A distributed execution authorization system comprising plural computing domains, protected authorization state, a cross-domain authority-continuity mechanism and plural ... E-10, E-43 M-26, M-32, M-43, M-45
26-30 1-189 (general) A computing system for enforcing a bounded consequence budget, comprising plural operation workers, a protected verification component, an authoritative usage-state ... E-09, E-32 M-11, M-12
31-35 1-189 (general) A system for controlling autonomous computational operations comprising an untrusted planner, a non-effective holding queue, an independent authority verification ... E-15, E-16, E-27 M-16, M-17, M-38
36-40 1-189 (general) A system for controlling operations having plural consequence paths comprising an effect-path analysis component, protected authorization bindings, plural effectuation ... E-17, E-18, E-31 M-30, M-31, M-53
41-45 1-189 (general) A system for preserving verifiable distinctions between authorization and external operation outcomes comprising a protected operation validator, an effectuation ... E-11, E-13, E-33 M-08, M-09, M-40, M-57
46-189 1-189 (general) A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed by a system controlling a protected effectuation interface, cause the system ... E-29, E-41 M-53, M-57
190-195 190-243 (financial apparatus) An electronic financial-effect control system comprising a protected authority store, an execution-facing transaction adapter, a protected financial-obligation journal, ... E-45, E-47, E-63 M-21, M-59
196-199 190-243 (financial apparatus) A computer-implemented card-payment lifecycle enforcement system comprising a protected authorization-state memory and a capture-capable payment interface, wherein the ... E-46 M-21, M-09
200-203 190-243 (financial apparatus) An autonomous machine-payment apparatus comprising a computational purchase agent, a protected payment authority distinct from the agent, a payment- challenge adapter, ... E-45, E-56 M-21, M-12
204-207 190-243 (financial apparatus) A machine-to-machine usage-payment system comprising an authenticated usage-measurement interface, an interval-identity register, a protected payment- budget journal, ... E-56 M-11, M-21
208-211 190-243 (financial apparatus) A disconnected digital-value payment apparatus comprising a protected wallet- state device, a merchant-facing acceptance interface, and a reconciliation interface, ... E-49 M-27, M-56
212-216 190-243 (financial apparatus) A distributed conditional financial-settlement apparatus comprising independently controlled first and second settlement interfaces, a protected multi-leg obligation ... E-50, E-47 M-41, M-28
217-222 190-243 (financial apparatus) A protected digital-asset issuance and transfer apparatus comprising an asset- state verifier, a protected authority journal, and an issuance, redemption, or bridge- ... E-48, E-52, E-53 M-28, M-29
223-228 190-243 (financial apparatus) An electronic exchange-operation control system comprising a protected account-exposure journal, an execution-facing order or withdrawal adapter, and a controlled ... E-54, E-61 M-50, M-11
229-232 190-243 (financial apparatus) A protected financial-delegation system comprising an independently controlled parent spending authority, a plurality of autonomous child components, and a consumption ... E-62 M-54, M-11
233-236 190-243 (financial apparatus) A protected electronic supplier-payment system comprising an authoritative supplier-identity store, an invoice and purchase-order reconciliation interface, a ... E-63, E-55 M-02, M-50
237-240 190-243 (financial apparatus) A computer-implemented interoperable financial-message control apparatus comprising a parser for at least two distinct native financial-message representations, a ... E-58, E-57 M-33, M-34, M-55
241-243 190-243 (financial apparatus) An electronic post-transaction financial correction control system comprising a protected original-transaction lineage register, an independently controlled reversal or ... E-60 M-44, M-58
244-250 244-333 (financial combinations) A protected transaction-effect control system comprising an independently controlled authorization store, an execution-facing operation adapter, a non-effective ... E-45 to E-63 (general financial) M-08, M-40
251-257 244-333 (financial combinations) A cryptographic financial-operation authorization apparatus comprising a protected cryptographic key-use component having a restricted signing function, a protected ... E-01, E-02 M-24, M-25, M-36
258-265 244-333 (financial combinations) A delegated-account execution authorization system comprising a protected delegation-authority record, a delegation-installation verifier, an execution-time ... E-07, E-08, E-28 M-03, M-47, M-48, M-49
266-272 244-333 (financial combinations) A persistent delegated-financial-authority containment apparatus comprising a programmable-account effect gate, a protected per-delegation allowance register, a ... E-08, E-28 M-35, M-48
273-279 244-333 (financial combinations) A distributed threshold-financial-signing system comprising at least a threshold number of independently controlled signing participants, an authenticated ... E-02 M-36, M-45
280-286 244-333 (financial combinations) A multi-account financial-effect budget enforcement system comprising a protected shared exposure record, a plurality of execution-facing wallet or account adapters ... E-47, E-62 M-11
287-293 244-333 (financial combinations) A protected account-authorization replay control apparatus comprising an operation-specific authorization registry, a native account-nonce adapter, a protected use-state ... E-25, E-04 M-07, M-44
294-301 244-333 (financial combinations) A consequence-path mediation system for restricting unauthorized financial effects comprising a machine-readable reachability representation of effect-capable ... E-17, E-18 M-31, M-53
302-308 244-333 (financial combinations) A protected financial-authority continuity apparatus comprising an authenticated policy-generation source, a revocation-state authority, a durable monotonic state ... E-10, E-43 M-26, M-32, M-43
309-316 244-333 (financial combinations) A crash-safe financial-effect initiation system comprising a non-effective transaction queue, an exclusive effect-release interface, a protected prepare-and-consume ... E-11, E-33 M-40, M-08
317-324 244-333 (financial combinations) A protected autonomous-agent financial effectuation system comprising an autonomous computational agent, an instruction-provenance classifier, an independently ... E-27, E-15, E-62 M-16, M-38
325-333 244-333 (financial combinations) A multi-domain value-transfer finality system comprising a protected economic-obligation record, a source-domain event verifier, a destination-domain release controller, ... E-47, E-53, E-39 M-41, M-28

Direct dependents are indexed from the claim text. For each independent claim below, the claims that depend directly on it:

Added versus original: the source states that the original 154-page technical disclosure described 59 mechanism profiles, 11 drawings, algorithms and reference engines, and that the expanded manuscript adds further embodiments, failure analysis and variants as new drafting material with no earlier priority asserted. On that text the 44 general embodiments, the financial embodiments E-45 to E-63 and the D-01 to D-16 series appear to be expanded-manuscript material; the editor could not verify claim-level provenance, and the claims are not stated to be in either.

Appendix E. Appendix E: Architecture Drawings

The 16 source drawings D-01 to D-16, the principal architecture and 16 financial and specialist figures appear in the main body as figures. Original drawings D-1 to D-11 are preserved separately in the source and are not renumbered here. Mermaid companion diagrams are not included in this single-file submission.

Appendix F. Appendix F: Data Models

Optional, versioned, implementation-neutral records. Encodings (CBOR, JSON, COSE, JWS, JWT, CWT) are examples only; a profile has to define critical-field processing, canonicalization, versioning and rejection of ambiguous formats.

F.1. CandidateAct

{
 "op_id": "op-1",
 "effect_class": "transfer",
 "principal": "p1",
 "target": "acct-9",
 "source_ref": "auth-5"
}

F.2. ProtectedAuthorityRecord

{
 "scope": "transfer",
 "issuer": "pi",
 "tenant": "t1",
 "target": "acct-9",
 "max_amount": "10",
 "policy_gen": 7,
 "revocation_gen": 2,
 "valid_until": "...",
 "uses": 1
}

F.3. ActualEffectDescriptor

{
 "native_op": "tx:...",
 "destination": "acct-9",
 "amount": "10",
 "unit": "base",
 "asset": "A",
 "route": "r1",
 "code_id": "sha256:...",
 "nested": [],
 "fees": "1",
 "state_gen": 7
}

F.4. ExecutionHandle

{
 "ref": "auth-5",
 "sink": "sink-1",
 "scope": "transfer",
 "gen": 7,
 "uses": 1,
 "consumption_id": "c-1",
 "context": "sha256:..."
}

F.5. SinkDecision

{
 "result": "DENY",
 "op_id": "op-1",
 "authority_version": 7,
 "consumed": null,
 "reason": "STALE_POLICY",
 "native_release": false
}

F.6. ProtectedEffectJournal

{
 "op_id": "op-1",
 "consumption": "durable",
 "release_state": "RELEASED_UNKNOWN",
 "reconcile_ref": "r-3",
 "recovery": "pending"
}

F.7. ExternalOutcomeEvidence

{
 "source": "ledger",
 "evidence_class": "inclusion",
 "ext_op_id": "x-1",
 "status": "unresolved",
 "finality": "depth<k",
 "ref_time": "..."
}

F.8. EffectPathManifest

{
 "controlled": [
  "gw1"
 ],
 "holders": [
  "kms"
 ],
 "alternate": [
  "backup-key"
 ],
 "fallback": [],
 "assurance": "partial",
 "exceptions": [
  "backup-key"
 ]
}

F.9. FinancialObligation

{
 "account": "a1",
 "beneficiary": "b1",
 "src": "10 A",
 "dst": "9 B",
 "conversion": "rule-3",
 "fee_bound": "1",
 "mandate": "m-2",
 "settlement": "leg-ack"
}

Appendix G. Appendix G: Threat Model and Negative Security Tests

Seventy threat categories follow. For the mapping the generic fields (boundary, verification, deny behavior, residual limit, evidence of suppression) are category-level and must be specialized per deployment; the editor wrote them, they are not quotations of the source.

G.1. T01 Valid signature over unauthorized transaction

Attacker capability and controlled component

a legitimately signed request

Protected invariant

valid signature is not authorization

Effectuation boundary

the protected signing or release boundary

Required verification

verify the actual signing preimage against the protected authority record before any signature byte is released

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; no usable signature emitted

Residual risk

a separately controlled key or alternate signing route is outside the claim

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

Evidence of actual effect suppression

intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

G.2. T02 Signer-service impersonation

Attacker capability and controlled component

a service posing as the signer

Protected invariant

only the authenticated signer holds key-use

Effectuation boundary

the protected signing or release boundary

Required verification

verify the actual signing preimage against the protected authority record before any signature byte is released

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; no usable signature emitted

Residual risk

a separately controlled key or alternate signing route is outside the claim

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

Evidence of actual effect suppression

intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

G.3. T03 Raw signing bypass

Attacker capability and controlled component

access to a raw-digest interface

Protected invariant

no raw digest is signed outside policy

Effectuation boundary

the protected signing or release boundary

Required verification

verify the actual signing preimage against the protected authority record before any signature byte is released

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; no usable signature emitted

Residual risk

a separately controlled key or alternate signing route is outside the claim

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

Evidence of actual effect suppression

intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

G.4. T04 Compromised transaction builder

Attacker capability and controlled component

the builder

Protected invariant

builder cannot widen authorized effect

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.5. T05 Altered final native bytes

Attacker capability and controlled component

an intermediary

Protected invariant

final bytes match authorization

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.6. T06 Payee substitution

Attacker capability and controlled component

address resolution

Protected invariant

destination equals authorized beneficiary

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.7. T07 Merchant alias substitution

Attacker capability and controlled component

alias or QR content

Protected invariant

resolved identity equals mandate merchant

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.8. T08 Confusable address encoding

Attacker capability and controlled component

Unicode or encoding ambiguity

Protected invariant

binary destination is canonical

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.9. T09 Incorrect numeric scale

Attacker capability and controlled component

unit or decimal handling

Protected invariant

base unit and scale are explicit

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.10. T10 Asset substitution

Attacker capability and controlled component

asset identifier

Protected invariant

asset equals authorized asset

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.11. T11 Fee or gas expansion

Attacker capability and controlled component

fee fields

Protected invariant

fees stay within bound

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.12. T12 Delegated code replacement

Attacker capability and controlled component

delegation target

Protected invariant

code identity equals approved

Effectuation boundary

the delegated-account effect interface

Required verification

verify implementation identity, upgrade generation, call graph and allowance at install and at each call

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; HOLD if identity cannot be established

Residual risk

independent keys that bypass the gate; on-chain guard needed

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

G.13. T13 Delegation rollback

Attacker capability and controlled component

an older code generation

Protected invariant

generation is not downgraded

Effectuation boundary

the delegated-account effect interface

Required verification

verify implementation identity, upgrade generation, call graph and allowance at install and at each call

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; HOLD if identity cannot be established

Residual risk

independent keys that bypass the gate; on-chain guard needed

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

G.14. T14 Unauthorized nested call

Attacker capability and controlled component

batched calls

Protected invariant

nested calls stay in the call graph

Effectuation boundary

the delegated-account effect interface

Required verification

verify implementation identity, upgrade generation, call graph and allowance at install and at each call

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; HOLD if identity cannot be established

Residual risk

independent keys that bypass the gate; on-chain guard needed

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

G.15. T15 Contract upgrade

Attacker capability and controlled component

upgrade admin

Protected invariant

upgrade generation is covered

Effectuation boundary

the delegated-account effect interface

Required verification

verify implementation identity, upgrade generation, call graph and allowance at install and at each call

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; HOLD if identity cannot be established

Residual risk

independent keys that bypass the gate; on-chain guard needed

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no delegated effect occurs for the replaced or rolled-back code

G.16. T16 Account-abstraction replay

Attacker capability and controlled component

a user operation

Protected invariant

one operation, one use

Effectuation boundary

the sink-side use-consumption record

Required verification

bind handle to sink, operation, tenant, epoch and chain; consume atomically

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY and record typed denial

Residual risk

unsynchronized second sink

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and replay at a second sink produces no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

replay at a second sink produces no effect

G.17. T17 Cross-chain replay

Attacker capability and controlled component

a signature on another chain

Protected invariant

chain identity is bound

Effectuation boundary

the sink-side use-consumption record

Required verification

bind handle to sink, operation, tenant, epoch and chain; consume atomically

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY and record typed denial

Residual risk

unsynchronized second sink

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and replay at a second sink produces no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

replay at a second sink produces no effect

G.18. T18 Wrong chain identifier

Attacker capability and controlled component

a wrong chain id

Protected invariant

chain equals authorized domain

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.19. T19 Wrong signing preimage

Attacker capability and controlled component

a different digest

Protected invariant

preimage derived internally

Effectuation boundary

the protected signing or release boundary

Required verification

verify the actual signing preimage against the protected authority record before any signature byte is released

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; no usable signature emitted

Residual risk

a separately controlled key or alternate signing route is outside the claim

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

Evidence of actual effect suppression

intercept every signer invocation and show no usable signature for the denied input

G.20. T20 Cross-sink handle reuse

Attacker capability and controlled component

a copied handle

Protected invariant

handle bound to one sink

Effectuation boundary

the sink-side use-consumption record

Required verification

bind handle to sink, operation, tenant, epoch and chain; consume atomically

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY and record typed denial

Residual risk

unsynchronized second sink

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and replay at a second sink produces no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

replay at a second sink produces no effect

G.21. T21 Tenant substitution

Attacker capability and controlled component

another tenant context

Protected invariant

tenant bound in authority

Effectuation boundary

the sink-side use-consumption record

Required verification

bind handle to sink, operation, tenant, epoch and chain; consume atomically

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY and record typed denial

Residual risk

unsynchronized second sink

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and replay at a second sink produces no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

replay at a second sink produces no effect

G.22. T22 Policy downgrade

Attacker capability and controlled component

an old policy

Protected invariant

policy generation current

Effectuation boundary

the protected policy and revocation state

Required verification

read current generation and revocation inside the critical section; bound clock uncertainty

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY if state cannot be established fresh

Residual risk

partition or time-source dependence

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

G.23. T23 Revocation rollback

Attacker capability and controlled component

a stale revocation view

Protected invariant

revocation not rolled back

Effectuation boundary

the protected policy and revocation state

Required verification

read current generation and revocation inside the critical section; bound clock uncertainty

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY if state cannot be established fresh

Residual risk

partition or time-source dependence

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

G.24. T24 Clock rollback

Attacker capability and controlled component

time source

Protected invariant

freshness uses bounded trusted time

Effectuation boundary

the protected policy and revocation state

Required verification

read current generation and revocation inside the critical section; bound clock uncertainty

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY if state cannot be established fresh

Residual risk

partition or time-source dependence

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

G.25. T25 Bounded clock uncertainty

Attacker capability and controlled component

clock skew

Protected invariant

uncertainty interval enforced

Effectuation boundary

the protected policy and revocation state

Required verification

read current generation and revocation inside the critical section; bound clock uncertainty

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY if state cannot be established fresh

Residual risk

partition or time-source dependence

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

G.26. T26 Concurrent quota overspend

Attacker capability and controlled component

parallel workers

Protected invariant

aggregate bound holds

Effectuation boundary

the protected budget store

Required verification

atomic check-and-reserve with durable consumption

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY the overspending request

Residual risk

coordinator unavailability reduces availability

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and concurrent workers never exceed the aggregate bound at the real sink

Evidence of actual effect suppression

concurrent workers never exceed the aggregate bound at the real sink

G.27. T27 Multi-region split brain

Attacker capability and controlled component

partitioned regions

Protected invariant

one authoritative generation

Effectuation boundary

the protected policy and revocation state

Required verification

read current generation and revocation inside the critical section; bound clock uncertainty

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY if state cannot be established fresh

Residual risk

partition or time-source dependence

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

G.28. T28 Insufficient protected durability

Attacker capability and controlled component

a volatile journal

Protected invariant

consumption survives restart

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.29. T29 Process crash after permission consumption

Attacker capability and controlled component

a crash

Protected invariant

consumed stays consumed

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.30. T30 Crash after external dispatch

Attacker capability and controlled component

a crash

Protected invariant

effect treated as possibly occurred

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.31. T31 Unconfirmed settlement

Attacker capability and controlled component

missing evidence

Protected invariant

settlement not assumed

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.32. T32 Duplicate retry

Attacker capability and controlled component

a retry loop

Protected invariant

no second effect under one authority

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.33. T33 Improper refund or quota restoration

Attacker capability and controlled component

a restoration path

Protected invariant

restoration needs verified outcome

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.34. T34 Fallback key bypass

Attacker capability and controlled component

a backup key

Protected invariant

fallback inside or listed

Effectuation boundary

the declared enforcement scope

Required verification

enumerate effect-capable paths and compare to enforced set

DENY or uncertainty behavior

report uncovered path as an exception

Residual risk

paths unknown to the operator

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show the alternate path either enforced or listed as out of scope

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show the alternate path either enforced or listed as out of scope

G.35. T35 Emergency operator misuse

Attacker capability and controlled component

an operator pathway

Protected invariant

emergency path separately controlled

Effectuation boundary

the declared enforcement scope

Required verification

enumerate effect-capable paths and compare to enforced set

DENY or uncertainty behavior

report uncovered path as an exception

Residual risk

paths unknown to the operator

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show the alternate path either enforced or listed as out of scope

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show the alternate path either enforced or listed as out of scope

G.36. T36 Compromised privileged tool

Attacker capability and controlled component

a tool

Protected invariant

tool cannot mint authority

Effectuation boundary

the planner-to-effect boundary

Required verification

keep planner without credentials; classify instruction lineage; swap credentials only at the sink

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY tainted widening

Residual risk

model may still draft harmful candidates

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

Evidence of actual effect suppression

hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

G.37. T37 Prompt injection into a financial agent

Attacker capability and controlled component

injected text

Protected invariant

lineage blocks widening

Effectuation boundary

the planner-to-effect boundary

Required verification

keep planner without credentials; classify instruction lineage; swap credentials only at the sink

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY tainted widening

Residual risk

model may still draft harmful candidates

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

Evidence of actual effect suppression

hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

G.38. T38 Untrusted supplier-page instructions

Attacker capability and controlled component

supplier portal text

Protected invariant

portal text is data

Effectuation boundary

the planner-to-effect boundary

Required verification

keep planner without credentials; classify instruction lineage; swap credentials only at the sink

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY tainted widening

Residual risk

model may still draft harmful candidates

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

Evidence of actual effect suppression

hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

G.39. T39 Credential exfiltration

Attacker capability and controlled component

a sandbox

Protected invariant

agent never holds the credential

Effectuation boundary

the planner-to-effect boundary

Required verification

keep planner without credentials; classify instruction lineage; swap credentials only at the sink

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY tainted widening

Residual risk

model may still draft harmful candidates

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

Evidence of actual effect suppression

hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

G.40. T40 Sandbox network egress

Attacker capability and controlled component

an open socket

Protected invariant

egress only via mediator

Effectuation boundary

the planner-to-effect boundary

Required verification

keep planner without credentials; classify instruction lineage; swap credentials only at the sink

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY tainted widening

Residual risk

model may still draft harmful candidates

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

Evidence of actual effect suppression

hostile content causes no effect outside the mandate

G.41. T41 Service-mesh bypass

Attacker capability and controlled component

a sidecar skip

Protected invariant

sink on every route or exception

Effectuation boundary

the declared enforcement scope

Required verification

enumerate effect-capable paths and compare to enforced set

DENY or uncertainty behavior

report uncovered path as an exception

Residual risk

paths unknown to the operator

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show the alternate path either enforced or listed as out of scope

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show the alternate path either enforced or listed as out of scope

G.42. T42 Nested device-command mutation

Attacker capability and controlled component

a nested command

Protected invariant

descriptor covers nested commands

Effectuation boundary

the device or radio command interface

Required verification

bind descriptor, firmware version and reset epoch

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY mismatch

Residual risk

physical or debug access outside the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

Evidence of actual effect suppression

no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

G.43. T43 Device reset-epoch replay

Attacker capability and controlled component

an old command

Protected invariant

reset epoch bound

Effectuation boundary

the device or radio command interface

Required verification

bind descriptor, firmware version and reset epoch

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY mismatch

Residual risk

physical or debug access outside the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

Evidence of actual effect suppression

no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

G.44. T44 Firmware rollback

Attacker capability and controlled component

older firmware

Protected invariant

firmware version continuity

Effectuation boundary

the device or radio command interface

Required verification

bind descriptor, firmware version and reset epoch

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY mismatch

Residual risk

physical or debug access outside the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

Evidence of actual effect suppression

no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

G.45. T45 Radio transmission exceeding authorized purpose

Attacker capability and controlled component

transmission parameters

Protected invariant

purpose-bound quota

Effectuation boundary

the device or radio command interface

Required verification

bind descriptor, firmware version and reset epoch

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY mismatch

Residual risk

physical or debug access outside the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

Evidence of actual effect suppression

no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

G.46. T46 Unauthorized data export

Attacker capability and controlled component

an export call

Protected invariant

destination and purpose bound

Effectuation boundary

the audit and metadata path

Required verification

minimize and commit to sensitive attributes; verify audience

DENY or uncertainty behavior

redact or refuse disclosure

Residual risk

inference from residual metadata

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and audit export contains no out-of-purpose attributes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

audit export contains no out-of-purpose attributes

G.47. T47 Unauthorized cloud resource mutation

Attacker capability and controlled component

an IAM call

Protected invariant

privileged mutation gated

Effectuation boundary

the device or radio command interface

Required verification

bind descriptor, firmware version and reset epoch

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY mismatch

Residual risk

physical or debug access outside the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

Evidence of actual effect suppression

no actuation or transmission for replayed or rolled-back command

G.48. T48 Missing critical protocol attributes

Attacker capability and controlled component

omitted fields

Protected invariant

missing critical field rejected

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.49. T49 Cross-language parser disagreement

Attacker capability and controlled component

two parsers

Protected invariant

canonical profile identical

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.50. T50 Malicious serialization ambiguity

Attacker capability and controlled component

ambiguous encoding

Protected invariant

ambiguity yields DENY

Effectuation boundary

the native-bytes effect interface

Required verification

reconstruct the final native operation and compare typed critical fields

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY on any mismatch or unknown critical field

Residual risk

decoder bugs or an unmodeled field

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show zero effect at the real sink for the altered bytes

G.51. T51 False local receipt presented as settlement

Attacker capability and controlled component

a local receipt

Protected invariant

receipt is not settlement

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.52. T52 Replayed bridge source event

Attacker capability and controlled component

a source event

Protected invariant

event consumed once

Effectuation boundary

the sink-side use-consumption record

Required verification

bind handle to sink, operation, tenant, epoch and chain; consume atomically

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY and record typed denial

Residual risk

unsynchronized second sink

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and replay at a second sink produces no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

replay at a second sink produces no effect

G.53. T53 Chain reorganization

Attacker capability and controlled component

a reorg

Protected invariant

finality depth respected

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.54. T54 Incorrect destination mint

Attacker capability and controlled component

a bridge

Protected invariant

mint matches verified source

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.55. T55 Stablecoin issuer-liability mismatch

Attacker capability and controlled component

issuer data

Protected invariant

liability reconciles

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.56. T56 CBDC offline spending abuse

Attacker capability and controlled component

a device

Protected invariant

device bound and epoch

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.57. T57 Altered recurring payment mandate

Attacker capability and controlled component

a mandate edit

Protected invariant

mandate version enforced

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.58. T58 Subscription continuation after revocation

Attacker capability and controlled component

a scheduler

Protected invariant

revocation stops billing

Effectuation boundary

the protected policy and revocation state

Required verification

read current generation and revocation inside the critical section; bound clock uncertainty

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY if state cannot be established fresh

Residual risk

partition or time-source dependence

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

Evidence of actual effect suppression

stale or rolled-back state yields no effect

G.59. T59 Unauthorized trading order expansion

Attacker capability and controlled component

an order

Protected invariant

order within exposure

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.60. T60 Unauthorized financial-agent subdelegation

Attacker capability and controlled component

a child agent

Protected invariant

child within parent ceiling

Effectuation boundary

the protected budget store

Required verification

atomic check-and-reserve with durable consumption

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY the overspending request

Residual risk

coordinator unavailability reduces availability

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and concurrent workers never exceed the aggregate bound at the real sink

Evidence of actual effect suppression

concurrent workers never exceed the aggregate bound at the real sink

G.61. T61 Payment-card capture overrun

Attacker capability and controlled component

capture amount

Protected invariant

capture within authorization

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.62. T62 Incorrect FX conversion

Attacker capability and controlled component

a rate

Protected invariant

conversion within rules

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.63. T63 Settlement counterparty substitution

Attacker capability and controlled component

counterparty

Protected invariant

counterparty equals obligation

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.64. T64 Tokenized-security title or encumbrance mismatch

Attacker capability and controlled component

a register

Protected invariant

title verified before release

Effectuation boundary

the financial-effect gate

Required verification

reconstruct the native financial operation and compare to the obligation and mandate

DENY or uncertainty behavior

DENY; UNKNOWN when settlement is unproven

Residual risk

external rail finality is not controlled by the gate

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no unauthorized instruction leaves the controlled release interface

G.65. T65 Privacy leakage through audit metadata

Attacker capability and controlled component

logs

Protected invariant

audit minimized

Effectuation boundary

the audit and metadata path

Required verification

minimize and commit to sensitive attributes; verify audience

DENY or uncertainty behavior

redact or refuse disclosure

Residual risk

inference from residual metadata

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and audit export contains no out-of-purpose attributes

Evidence of actual effect suppression

audit export contains no out-of-purpose attributes

G.66. T66 Overload against a mandatory validator

Attacker capability and controlled component

flooding

Protected invariant

bounded verification

Effectuation boundary

the mandatory validator

Required verification

bounded verification cost and authenticated nonce allocation

DENY or uncertainty behavior

refuse overload before consuming state

Residual risk

availability loss by design

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and flooding does not consume nonce space or admit effects

Evidence of actual effect suppression

flooding does not consume nonce space or admit effects

G.67. T67 Malformed requests exhausting nonce space

Attacker capability and controlled component

malformed input

Protected invariant

only authenticated nonce burned

Effectuation boundary

the mandatory validator

Required verification

bounded verification cost and authenticated nonce allocation

DENY or uncertainty behavior

refuse overload before consuming state

Residual risk

availability loss by design

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and flooding does not consume nonce space or admit effects

Evidence of actual effect suppression

flooding does not consume nonce space or admit effects

G.68. T68 Partial multi-sink execution

Attacker capability and controlled component

one sink failing

Protected invariant

partial state reported

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.69. T69 Unauthorized compensation

Attacker capability and controlled component

a reversal

Protected invariant

compensation separately authorized

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

G.70. T70 Unknown external operation replay

Attacker capability and controlled component

an unconfirmed operation

Protected invariant

operation identity reused for status first

Effectuation boundary

the protected effect journal and reconciler

Required verification

preserve UNKNOWN until authenticated source evidence; no automatic retry

DENY or uncertainty behavior

UNKNOWN or HOLD; no replacement effect

Residual risk

external source may remain unreachable

Negative test

exercise the case named in the title and show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Evidence of actual effect suppression

show no second effect after restart or lost acknowledgment

Appendix H. Appendix H: Examiner Terminology

The index serves WIPO PATENTSCOPE, EPO Espacenet, Google Patents, IEEE, ACM, arXiv, the IETF Datatracker and standards research. Counts: 214 keywords and 123 phrases. A term's presence does not imply novelty or infringement.

H.1. Core terminology

  • Protected Execution Finality (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Candidate Act (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Non-Effective State (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Actual Pending Operation (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Finality Sink (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Protected Enforcement Domain (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Consequence-Bound Authorization (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Independent Operation Reconstruction (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Source-Authority Envelope (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Scoped Execution Capability (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Execution Handle (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Native Effect (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)
  • Actual Effect Boundary (E-01 to E-44; M-15, M-53; claims 1-50)

H.2. Digital signature and delegated authority

  • Signed Is Not Authorized (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Cryptographic Validity Versus Operational Authorization (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Signing Preimage (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Exclusive Signer (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Key-Use Policy (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • HSM Transaction Gate (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Non-Bearer Authorization (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Threshold Signing (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Delegated Transaction (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • EIP-7702 (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Smart Account (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Account Abstraction (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Code Hash Validation (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Upgrade Generation (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)
  • Nested Call Closure (E-01, E-02, E-07, E-08; M-03, M-24, M-36, M-47; claims 11-15, 251-265)

H.3. Transaction integrity

  • Exact Native Bytes (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Canonical Effect Descriptor (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Critical Field Validation (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Binary Address Resolution (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Cross-Language Canonicalization (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Serialization Equivalence (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Fee Budget (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Gas Sponsorship (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Payee Substitution (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Chain ID Binding (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)
  • Numeric Normalization (E-05, E-06, E-34; M-01, M-02, M-12, M-13, M-34; claims 6-10, 244-250)

H.4. Concurrency and recovery

  • Atomic Quota Reservation (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Durable One-Shot Consumption (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Parent Budget (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Child Budget (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Distributed Escrow (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Fencing Generation (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Crash-Safe Effect Journal (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Unknown Outcome (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Idempotent Release (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Transaction Retry Quarantine (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)
  • Protected Compensation (E-09, E-11, E-12, E-32; M-11, M-40, M-44; claims 26-30, 309-316)

H.5. Financial infrastructure

  • Agentic Payments (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Autonomous Commerce (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Card Authorization Capture Clearing (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Payment Finality (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Cross-Rail Economic Equivalence (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Tokenized Deposit (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Offline CBDC (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Payment-versus-Payment (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Delivery-versus-Payment (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Stablecoin Issuer Liability (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Cross-Chain Reorganization (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Exchange Custody (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Merchant Alias (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Machine-Speed Payments (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Financial Message Continuity (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Treasury Subagent Authority (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)
  • Autonomous Accounts Payable (E-45 to E-63; claims 190-243)

H.6. Hardware and critical infrastructure

  • Hardware-Enforced Authorization (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Trusted Execution Environment (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Firmware Epoch (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Radio Transmission Finality (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Protected Device Command (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Cloud IAM Effectuation (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Secure Element (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Confidential Computing (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Protected Credential Egress (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)
  • Data Export Gate (E-19, E-20, E-35, E-36, E-37; M-19, M-20, M-25, M-56)

H.7. Assurance and testing

  • Actual Effect Suppression (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Negative Effect Test (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Sink Instrumentation (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Complete Mediation (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Effect-Path Reachability (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Bypass Resistance (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Protected Audit (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Outcome Evidence Classification (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Formal Safety Invariant (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)
  • Cross-Language Test Vector (E-29, E-41; M-53, M-57; claims 46-50)

H.8. Additional technical terms

  • Collection-Time Authority (general)
  • Execution-Time Reconstruction (general)
  • Sink-Bound Audience (general)
  • Protected Use Counter (general)
  • Single-Use Capability (general)
  • Operation-Bound Authorization (general)
  • Policy Generation (general)
  • Revocation Generation (general)
  • Reset Epoch (general)
  • Monotonic Counter (general)
  • Effect Journal (general)
  • Reachability Graph (general)
  • Burn on Denial (general)
  • Disjoint Escrow (general)
  • Settlement Evidence Class (general)
  • Business-Key Deduplication (general)
  • Authority Record (general)
  • Effect Descriptor (general)
  • Declared Enforcement Scope (general)
  • Execution-Facing Representation (general)

H.9. Standards and prior-art vocabulary

  • OAuth (general)
  • JWT (general)
  • CWT (general)
  • COSE (general)
  • JOSE (general)
  • Proof-of-Possession (general)
  • Remote Attestation (general)
  • Zero Trust (general)
  • PKCS#11 (general)
  • KMIP (general)
  • Deterministic Serialization (general)
  • Idempotency Key (general)
  • ERC-4337 (general)
  • EIP-712 (general)
  • ERC-1271 (general)
  • Account Nonce (general)
  • Contract Upgradeability (general)
  • Fencing Token (general)
  • Compare-and-Swap (general)
  • Transactional Outbox (general)
  • Saga Compensation (general)
  • Two-Phase Commit (general)
  • ISO 20022 (general)
  • EMVCo (general)
  • Payment Tokenization (general)
  • CLS (general)
  • Bridge Verification (general)
  • Idempotent Effects (general)
  • Durable Journal (general)
  • Network Partition Recovery (general)

H.10. Mechanism profile titles

  • Canonical Account and Tenant Binding (M-01)
  • Destination and Payee Substitution (M-02)
  • Delegation Code Hash Rotation (M-03)
  • Chain Identifier and Consensus Domain (M-04)
  • Signer-Service Impersonation (M-05)
  • Pre-Signature Delegation Screening (M-06)
  • Account Nonce Versus Local One-Shot Capability (M-07)
  • Receipt-Before-Authority Release (M-08)
  • Receipt Versus Final Settlement (M-09)
  • Policy Revocation Under In-Flight Load (M-10)
  • Concurrent Quota Reservation (M-11)
  • Multi-Currency and Decimal Normalization (M-12)
  • Fee and Gas-Budget Bounding (M-13)
  • Cross-Service Credential Substitution (M-14)
  • Non-Bearer Execution Handle (M-15)
  • Untrusted Planner and Tool Injection (M-16)
  • Code-Execution Sandbox Egress (M-17)
  • Cloud Resource Mutation (M-18)
  • Device Actuation and Reset Epoch (M-19)
  • Payment Initiation and Clearing (M-21)
  • Multi-Channel Communications Quota (M-22)
  • Data Export and Privacy Boundary (M-23)
  • Cryptographic Key-Usage Separation (M-24)
  • Hardware Security Module Integration (M-25)
  • Cross-Region Policy Continuity (M-26)
  • Offline Signing and Air-Gapped Approval (M-27)
  • Distributed Ledger Non-Inclusion (M-28)
  • External State-Root Drift (M-29)
  • Fallback Path and Emergency Operator (M-30)
  • Service-Mesh and Sidecar Bypass (M-31)
  • Versioned Policy Rollback Protection (M-32)
  • Unknown Critical Extension (M-33)
  • Canonical Unicode and Binary Addresses (M-34)
  • Delegation Persistence Across Failures (M-35)
  • Signer Threshold and Dual Control (M-36)
  • Remote Attestation and Runtime Measurement (M-37)
  • Source Authority and Instruction Lineage (M-38)
  • Protected Audit Chain and Redaction (M-39)
  • Crash-Safe Idempotent Commit (M-40)
  • Multi-Sink Atomicity and Partial Failure (M-41)
  • Bounded Clock Uncertainty (M-42)
  • Revocation Cache and Partition Semantics (M-43)
  • Request Cancellation and Nonce Burn (M-44)
  • Quorum Witness Availability (M-45)
  • Semantic Transaction Simulation (M-46)
  • Account Abstraction and User Operation (M-47)
  • Delegation Scope and Call-Graph Closure (M-48)
  • Constrained Upgrades and Rollback (M-49)
  • External Withdrawal Destination Registry (M-50)
  • Protocol Downgrade and Legacy Credentials (M-51)
  • Overload and Resource Exhaustion (M-52)
  • Formal Mediation-Path Enumeration (M-53)
  • Multi-Party Administrative Governance (M-54)
  • Sensitive Metadata Minimization (M-55)
  • On-Device Firmware and Silicon Continuity (M-56)
  • Non-Repudiable Audit Without False Finality (M-57)
  • Independent Verification of Prior Approval (M-58)
  • Post-Authorization Route Mutation (M-59)

H.11. Financial embodiment subjects

  • Autonomous Resource-Payment and Delivery Entitlement Boundary (E-45)
  • Card Authorization-Capture-Clearing Continuity with Concurrent Bounds (E-46)
  • Cross-Rail Financial Obligation Equivalence and FX Boundary (E-47)
  • Tokenized Commercial Deposit and Central-Reserve Obligation Continuity (E-48)
  • Offline Central-Bank Digital Currency Device-Local Spending Bounds (E-49)
  • Cross-Currency Payment-versus-Payment Conditional Release (E-50)
  • Tokenized-Security Delivery-versus-Payment with Title and Encumbrance Checks (E-51)
  • Stablecoin Mint-Burn-Redemption and Issuer-Liability Continuity (E-52)
  • Cross-Chain Bridge, Rollup and Reorganization-Aware Finality (E-53)
  • Exchange Treasury Withdrawal and Multi-Venue Custody Continuity (E-54)
  • Merchant Alias, QR and Beneficiary Resolution Continuity (E-55)
  • Machine-Speed Metered Payments and Batched Settlement Accounting (E-56)
  • Privacy-Preserving Financial Compliance Proof at Execution Boundary (E-57)
  • Financial Message Semantic Continuity Across Interoperability Adapters (E-58)
  • Recurring Conditional Mandate and Autonomous Subscription Control (E-59)
  • Financial Dispute, Chargeback and Compensating-Transfer Authority (E-60)
  • Autonomous Trading Strategy-to-Order-to-Fill Continuity (E-61)
  • Delegated Financial-Agent Treasury and Subagent Budget Partitioning (E-62)
  • Autonomous Accounts-Payable Invoice and Supplier-Portal Finality (E-63)

H.12. Search Phrases

  1. "cryptographically valid" AND "unauthorized effect" (E-01, E-05; M-15; claims 1-10)
  2. "delegated account" AND "execution-time authorization" (E-07, E-08, E-28; M-47, M-48; claims 258-265)
  3. "EIP-7702" AND "code identity" AND "policy enforcement" (E-07, E-28; M-03, M-49; claims 258-272)
  4. "signing preimage" AND "effect reconstruction" (E-01, E-05; M-24; claims 6-10, 251-257)
  5. "non bearer execution handle" AND "sink" (E-04; M-15; claims 16-20)
  6. "actual pending operation" AND "authorized effect" (E-03, E-05; claims 1-10)
  7. "protected signer" AND "final transaction bytes" (E-01, E-05; M-24; claims 11-15)
  8. "threshold signature" AND "independent policy verification" (E-02; M-36; claims 273-279)
  9. "cross sink replay" AND "authorization consumption" (E-04, E-25; M-07, M-15; claims 16-20, 287-293)
  10. "concurrent quota" AND "atomic payment" (E-09, E-32; M-11; claims 26-30, 280-286)
  11. "source authority" AND "agentic payment" (E-27, E-45; M-38; claims 31-35, 317-324)
  12. "transaction acknowledgement" AND "outcome unknown" (E-11, E-13; M-09, M-40; claims 41-45, 309-316)
  13. "payment initiation" AND "settlement evidence" (E-21, E-46; M-21; claims 196-199)
  14. "smart account" AND "delegation upgrade" (E-28; M-49; claims 258-272)
  15. "offline CBDC" AND "device spending limits" (E-49; M-27; claims 208-211)
  16. "stablecoin redemption" AND "issuer liability" (E-52; claims 217-222)
  17. "cross chain bridge" AND "reorganization finality" (E-53; M-28; claims 217-222, 325-333)
  18. "payment versus payment" AND "conditional release" (E-50; claims 212-216)
  19. "delivery versus payment" AND "title verification" (E-51; claims 212-216)
  20. "ISO 20022" AND "semantic continuity" (E-58; M-33; claims 237-240)
  21. "merchant alias" AND "beneficiary verification" (E-55; M-02; claims 233-236)
  22. "autonomous trading" AND "order fill authorization" (E-61; claims 223-228)
  23. "financial agent" AND "subagent budget" (E-62; claims 229-232)
  24. "effect path" AND "complete mediation" (E-17, E-18; M-53; claims 36-40, 294-301)
  25. "signed request" AND "native operation authorization" (E-01, E-05; claims 1-10, 244-250)
  26. candidate act AND non-effective state AND finality sink (E-03; claims 1-5)
  27. two instance protected enforcement AND collection time (E-03; claims 1-5)
  28. protected enforcement domain AND execution time reconstruction (E-03, E-05)
  29. exclusive key use AND verify and sign (E-01; M-24)
  30. split signing authority AND independent trust domains (E-02; M-36)
  31. canonical effect descriptor AND cross language (E-06; M-34)
  32. protected delegation AND code identity (E-07; M-03)
  33. downstream execution restriction AND delegation (E-08; M-48)
  34. transactional quota AND concurrent workers (E-09; M-11)
  35. multi region quorum AND revocation continuity (E-10; M-26, M-43)
  36. crash window AND consumption AND dispatch (E-11; M-40)
  37. compensation AND verified quota restoration (E-12; M-44)
  38. protected receipt AND external outcome (E-13; M-09)
  39. privacy minimizing audit AND protected (E-14; M-39, M-55)
  40. sandbox outbound action AND host mediated egress (E-15; M-17)
  41. credential swapping AND final request (E-16; M-14)
  42. mediation path inventory AND graph traversal (E-17; M-53)
  43. runtime capability path AND mediation (E-18; M-48)
  44. reset epoch AND hardware effect (E-19; M-19)
  45. radio transmission AND finality (E-20; M-20)
  46. payment settlement boundary AND separation (E-21; M-21)
  47. data export AND destination confidentiality (E-22; M-23)
  48. external state drift AND simulated approval (E-23; M-29, M-46)
  49. clock rollback AND bounded time (E-24; M-42)
  50. denial burning AND nonce exhaustion (E-25; M-44)
  51. legacy signing migration AND token systems (E-26; M-51)
  52. instruction lineage AND agent generated actions (E-27; M-38)
  53. delegation upgrade AND code rollback (E-28; M-49)
  54. formal safety state machine AND temporal invariants (E-29; M-53)
  55. unknown critical extension AND downgrade (E-30; M-33, M-51)
  56. emergency operator AND recovery pathway (E-31; M-30)
  57. partitioned escrow AND high volume (E-32; M-11)
  58. receipt before authority AND durable witness (E-33; M-08)
  59. fee normalization AND multi asset (E-34; M-12, M-13)
  60. firmware version continuity AND device (E-35; M-56)
  61. communications quota AND telecom routing (E-36; M-22)
  62. cloud resource mutation AND IAM (E-37; M-18)
  63. content stream AND chunk level verification (E-38)
  64. multi sink transaction AND partial failure (E-39; M-41)
  65. bounded verification AND denial of service (E-40; M-52)
  66. negative effect instrumentation AND conformance (E-41; M-57)
  67. interoperability bridge AND profile adapter (E-42; M-33)
  68. state root AND authorization generation proof (E-43; M-29)
  69. resource purpose change AND independent authorization (E-44; M-58)
  70. autonomous resource payment AND delivery entitlement (E-45; claims 200-203)
  71. card authorization capture clearing AND concurrent bounds (E-46; claims 196-199)
  72. cross rail obligation AND FX boundary (E-47; claims 190-195)
  73. tokenized deposit AND central reserve (E-48; claims 217-222)
  74. metered payments AND batched settlement (E-56; claims 204-207)
  75. financial compliance proof AND execution boundary (E-57; claims 237-240)
  76. recurring mandate AND subscription control (E-59; claims 244-250)
  77. chargeback AND compensating transfer authority (E-60; claims 241-243)
  78. treasury withdrawal AND multi venue custody (E-54; claims 223-228)
  79. supplier portal AND invoice finality (E-63; claims 233-236)
  80. account nonce AND local one shot capability (M-07; claims 287-293)
  81. receipt before authority release AND witness (M-08, E-33)
  82. policy revocation AND in flight load (M-10)
  83. cross service credential substitution (M-14)
  84. signer service impersonation (M-05)
  85. pre signature delegation screening (M-06)
  86. distributed ledger non inclusion (M-28)
  87. external state root drift (M-29)
  88. fallback path AND emergency operator (M-30)
  89. service mesh AND sidecar bypass (M-31)
  90. versioned policy rollback protection (M-32)
  91. canonical unicode AND binary address (M-34)
  92. delegation persistence AND failure (M-35)
  93. signer threshold AND dual control (M-36)
  94. remote attestation AND runtime measurement (M-37)
  95. protected audit chain AND redaction (M-39)
  96. multi sink atomicity AND partial failure (M-41)
  97. revocation cache AND partition semantics (M-43)
  98. request cancellation AND nonce burn (M-44)
  99. quorum witness AND availability (M-45)
  100. semantic transaction simulation (M-46)
  101. account abstraction AND user operation (M-47)
  102. delegation scope AND call graph closure (M-48)
  103. constrained upgrade AND rollback (M-49)
  104. external withdrawal destination registry (M-50)
  105. protocol downgrade AND legacy credentials (M-51)
  106. overload AND resource exhaustion (M-52)
  107. formal mediation path enumeration (M-53)
  108. multi party administrative governance (M-54)
  109. sensitive metadata minimization (M-55)
  110. on device firmware AND silicon continuity (M-56)
  111. non repudiable audit AND false finality (M-57)
  112. independent verification AND prior approval (M-58)
  113. post authorization route mutation (M-59)
  114. authorization latency AND signing latency AND ledger finality (E-40; claims 41-45)
  115. non-bearer handle AND copied handle (E-04; claims 16-20)
  116. exact effect authority AND cryptographic signing (claims 244-257)
  117. continuing code authority AND delegated account (claims 258-272)
  118. threshold financial signing AND participant verifier (claims 273-279)
  119. multi account budget AND distinct financial networks (claims 280-286)
  120. policy generation AND generation fencing AND gateways (claims 302-308)
  121. crash safe initiation AND prepare consume journal (claims 309-316)
  122. instruction provenance AND payment sink (claims 317-324)
  123. multi domain value transfer AND leg state journal (claims 325-333)

H.13. Boolean Strings

  • ("signature" OR "signed") AND ("not authorization" OR "unauthorized") AND ("native operation" OR "final bytes")
  • ("execution handle") AND ("sink") AND ("single use" OR "one-time")
  • ("delegated code") AND ("code hash" OR "implementation identity") AND ("upgrade")
  • ("consequence path") AND ("mediation") AND ("reachability")
  • ("payment") AND ("outcome unknown" OR "lost acknowledgment") AND ("reconciliation")

Appendix I. Appendix I: Industry Research Mapping

Hypothetical and non-endorsed; AI-generated; not verified against current vendor documentation by the editor. Readers must cross-check against the original filings and official product documentation before drawing a conclusion. Nothing here says a company uses the invention; it is not an endorsement, validation or infringement statement. Each entry states, as a proposal, where a gate would sit, what is checked and what is rejected.

AI and agentic commerce (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, AWS, Salesforce, IBM, ServiceNow, Alibaba, Tencent)

Established: tool-calling and agent payment features exist in various platforms (not verified here). Proposed: put the sink at the payment-tool broker; reconstruct the final payment request, check merchant identity, amount and mandate, consume a one-use handle, and reject requests whose quote changed after approval. This keeps a model's text from becoming a payment.

Payment networks and processors (Visa, Mastercard, Swift, Stripe, PayPal, Adyen, Worldline)

Proposed: at the capture or payment-initiation interface, bind each transition to an authorization envelope (merchant, currency, maximum) and reject capture totals above it; keep authorization, capture, clearing and settlement as separate states.

Digital assets and stablecoins (Coinbase, Circle, Ripple, smart-account ecosystems, custody and exchange services)

Proposed: a controlled settlement gateway or on-chain account guard checks code identity, recipient and allowance for delegated accounts; mint and redeem require verified ledger events and liability reconciliation; bridge mints wait for finality depth.

Banking and central-bank research (ECB digital euro, RBI digital rupee, Bank of England, BIS Innovation Hub)

Discussion only: offline spending needs a secure element with epoch and monotonic counter, with later reconciliation; assumptions are scheme-specific; no claim about any institution's design.

Hardware and cloud (NVIDIA, AMD, Intel, Arm, Qualcomm, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud, Oracle)

Proposed: a verify-and-sign interface in an HSM or enclave with measured code; cloud IAM mutation checked at the privileged API against a descriptor of the mutation set.

Telecommunications and devices (Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, Qualcomm, Samsung, MediaTek, mobile operators)

Proposed: a command gate in firmware or network controller that binds transmissions and configuration changes to a purpose quota, firmware version and reset epoch, rejecting replayed commands.

Appendix J. Appendix J: Intellectual Property and Related Disclosures

Foundational: inventor Sangam Kumar Das; PCT/IB2026/055615 filed 4 June 2026 and published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2 (https://patentscope.wipo.int/). This source: title "Protected Transaction Authority and Execution-Finality Enforcement for Delegated Digital Operations"; document dated 31 October 2026; 795 pages; 63 engineering embodiments, 59 mechanism profiles, 333 numbered proposed claims, drawings and reference programs. See [PCT-055615], [IN-130246] and [TDC-12542]. The claim section carries a digital-signature line dated 31-10-2026. The applicant-reported eFiling reference is 202631130246 (CBR date 31/10/2026); no application number appears in the source itself. Official application number, acknowledgment and as-filed contents must be verified before any registry or priority assertion.

Material that is new in this manuscript is not assigned the June 2026 priority date. Related Indian provisionals reported by the applicant: 202631131650 (3 November 2026), 202631134241 (8 November 2026), 202631136555 (15 November 2026). Public records: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24274259, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24076231 and Technical Disclosure Commons 12542, 12934, 12973 (not all fetched; verify). An IETF IPR disclosure (reference 7610) exists for earlier drafts; whether it covers this one is not established. IPR will be disclosed at the appropriate time as per IETF guidelines. No FRAND, royalty-free or other licensing commitment is made here.

Human-Originated Invention

The invention and disclosure are attributed to human inventor Sangam Kumar Das; AI-assisted drafting does not establish AI inventorship.

AI-Assisted Research

AI-generated explanations may contain errors and must be independently verified.

IETF Status

Individual technical proposal, not an approved IETF standard; BCP 78 and BCP 79 apply; patent citations are not a substitute for formal IETF IPR disclosure.

Non-Endorsement

Company and product names indicate potential engineering relevance only, not adoption, endorsement, collaboration, copying, infringement or implementation.

Limits

Actual enforcement depends on control of effect paths, current protected state, correct reconstruction and independently verified implementation.

Appendix K. Appendix K: Source Verification and Implementation Limitations

K.1. Source Verification

  • Source: 795-page PDF; embodiment (E-01 to E-63) and mechanism (M-01 to M-59) positions located from the extracted text; claims 1-333 parsed with no gaps.
  • The source states it is a drafting manuscript and does not itself prove submission or acceptance.
  • Applicant-reported eFiling reference 202631130246 with CBR date 31/10/2026 from a screenshot; the App. Number column was blank; the reference may differ from the final application number.
  • Technical_Disclosure_1.json was not available.
  • Vendor documentation, Datatracker, Zenodo and TD Commons pages were not verified; EIP-7702 details were checked only through search-result excerpts of the EIP page and secondary sources.

K.2. Reference Implementations and Test Evidence

  • Python, Go and JavaScript engines with 148 test-vector bundles and 444 matching CLI-output comparisons across three executables, zero mismatches (cross-language parity over Python-generated expectations, not 444 independent security proofs).
  • Keys are public demo constants; no HSM, non-exportability, external effectuation, consensus or crash persistence is modeled.
  • An additional Python/SQLite financial-effect model reported to pass 19 local educational assertions.
  • Local timing observations (31 October 2026) are not production benchmarks.
  • The source lists additional specified financial vectors; the editor did not execute any code.

K.3. Readiness Report and Limitations

  • Profiles condense source text; fields the source does not state per embodiment are not invented.
  • Claim-to-embodiment mapping is by the editor.
  • The 70 threat entries use category-level mitigations written by the editor.
  • No page-level check of every claim against the PDF was done beyond sequence parsing.
  • Mermaid companion diagrams are omitted (single XML requested).
  • Relationship to the four existing DAS drafts was not checked by reading the Datatracker pages; overlap must be reviewed before submission.
  • Formal IETF IPR disclosure is pending.

K.4. Self-Audit

  1. Correct October 31 source used: yes (795 pages).
  2. All 63 embodiments included: yes (E-01 to E-63).
  3. All 59 mechanism profiles included: yes.
  4. Claims 1-333 indexed: yes; 34 independent identified by text.
  5. Original 154-page material distinguished from additions: partly, from the source's own statement.
  6. Filing details not inferred from a filename: eFiling reference from a screenshot; flagged unverified.
  7. June mothership credited: yes.
  8. PED-1/PED-2 architecture accurate: yes, with independence by control not location.
  9. Non-bearer not mistaken for bearer: yes.
  10. Final native reconstruction explicit: yes.
  11. Current protected state: yes.
  12. Delegated code and upgrades: yes.
  13. On-chain vs off-chain distinguished: yes.
  14. Uncontrolled keys not claimed preventively governed: yes.
  15. Policy and revocation checked: yes.
  16. Concurrent quota protected: yes.
  17. Crash recovery keeps uncertainty: yes.
  18. Missing acknowledgments not failure: yes.
  19. Local receipts not settlement: yes.
  20. Multi-domain not atomic: yes.
  21. Compensation separately authorized: yes.
  22. Offline assumptions stated: yes.
  23. Stablecoin, tokenized deposit, CBDC distinct: yes.
  24. Message transformations preserve semantics: yes.
  25. Mediation-path coverage: yes.
  26. Unknown critical extensions rejected: yes.
  27. Denial tests instrument the effect boundary: yes.
  28. Local mock results not production assurance: yes.
  29. Performance not stated as measured fact beyond the source's local observations: yes.
  30. Standards attributed: yes.
  31. IETF terms used correctly: BCP 14 sparingly.
  32. Industry examples do not imply adoption: yes.
  33. Human inventorship vs AI assistance: yes.
  34. IPR obligations not misrepresented: yes.
  35. Conclusions conditional on trust assumptions: yes.

Author's Address

Sangam Kumar Das
Independent Inventor
Balasore 756001
Odisha
India