Independent Submission S. Das Internet-Draft Independent Inventor Intended status: Informational 16 November 2026 Expires: 20 May 2027 Consequence-Bound Execution Authority for Autonomous Systems: Operation Reconstruction, Independent Validation, and Protected Effectuation Profiles draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority-00 Abstract Authorization to compute, propose, prepare, simulate or request an operation is not, by itself, authorization to cause the operation's actual consequential effect. An authorized operation may afterwards be transformed, delegated, delayed, replicated, compiled, offloaded or executed under different technical conditions. This document describes an architecture, and a set of candidate interoperability requirements, for separating those authorizations: a proposed operation is held as a Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State; the Actual Pending Operation is reconstructed; current source authority, context, dependencies and policy and revocation epochs are evaluated by an independent validator; a scoped, non-bearer execution authorization is issued; and a protected Finality Sink at the actual effectuation boundary re-derives the operation, enforces the authorization, and supports reconciliation against authoritative outcome evidence. The document is an individual, informational technical proposal. It credits OAuth, JWT/CWT, RBAC/ABAC, zero-trust, remote attestation, transaction logs, hardware isolation and cryptographic signatures for their established functions and does not characterize them as defective. It includes a threat model, 12 figures, 39 consequence- specific profiles, a non-normative European applicability discussion and an examiner-oriented terminology appendix. It is not an IETF standard, an EU regulatory instrument, a telecommunications or financial standard, or an endorsement by any named company. Source and Patent Information The technical subject matter is attributed to the human inventor Sangam Kumar Das. Foundational reference: PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026, published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2. Later Indian provisional application 202631136555, dated 15 November 2026 (as reported by the applicant). See Section 20 for the full IPR and attribution statement. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Where to read the full PCT filing: search "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE; search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615); or read the PCT file directly in Technical Disclosure Commons at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/. AI-assisted drafting was used to prepare this explanatory text, keyword index and industry mapping. Readers must verify patent numbers, dates, claim quotations, product capabilities and standards references against primary sources. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.2. Central Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3. Relationship to Existing DAS Internet-Drafts and Contribution of This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4. Status and Non-Endorsement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3. Established Mechanisms and Their Functions . . . . . . . 14 3. Scope and Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1. Transitions, Conditions, Trust Assumptions and Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2. Source Authority Versus Reconstructed Effective Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3. Distinguishing Staging, Commitment and Evidence . . . . . 20 5. Component Roles and Trust Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.1. Component Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.2. Trust Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6. Candidate Interoperability Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.1. REQ-01: Stable act identity and canonical operation representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.2. REQ-02: Current source authority and delegation restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.3. REQ-03: Actual destination and effective target identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.4. REQ-04: Effect-relevant policy, configuration and authority epochs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6.5. REQ-05: Protection against replay, duplication and stale authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6.6. REQ-06: Current revocation and consumed-capability checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6.7. REQ-07: Independent evidence qualification . . . . . . . 26 6.8. REQ-08: Effect-bound authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6.9. REQ-09: Actual effectuation-route enforcement . . . . . . 27 6.10. REQ-10: Compatibility with local protected state and cryptographic mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.11. REQ-11: Multi-phase progression where appropriate . . . . 28 6.12. REQ-12: Handling of uncertain or partially completed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.13. REQ-13: Crash-consistent consumption and replay protection where technically required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.14. REQ-14: Cross-platform semantic equivalence . . . . . . . 29 6.15. REQ-15: Provider-hosted tool execution that cannot be intercepted by an application-side gateway . . . . . . . 30 6.16. REQ-16: Alternate-path and bypass analysis . . . . . . . 30 6.17. REQ-17: Latency-aware validation at actual consequential boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7. Latency-Aware Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8. Application Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.1. Bounded Real Effect and Continuation . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.2. Cross-Agent Composition (E21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.3. Cross-Protocol Tool Dispatch (E20) . . . . . . . . . . . 34 8.4. Hardware Offload Equivalence (E10) . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8.5. Execution-Route Discovery and Coverage (E25) . . . . . . 36 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 8.6. Database Commit and Downstream Effects (E31, E32) . . . . 37 8.7. 6G and Open RAN Management-Plane Boundaries (E2, E37, E38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8.8. Agentic Payment Exposure (E33, E34, E35) . . . . . . . . 39 9. Operational States and Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 10. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11. Failure Handling and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 12. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 12.1. Assumptions and Adversary Capabilities . . . . . . . . . 44 12.2. T1: Compromised AI agents and untrusted model-generated operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 12.3. T2: Prompt injection and tool-output manipulation . . . 45 12.4. T3: Delegated authority expansion . . . . . . . . . . . 45 12.5. T4: TOCTOU changes between approval and execution . . . 46 12.6. T5: Authorization replay and stale capabilities . . . . 46 12.7. T6: Changed destinations and effective principals . . . 47 12.8. T7: Validator substitution or compromise . . . . . . . . 47 12.9. T8: Forged, replayed or self-reported effect receipts . 48 12.10. T9: Missing, delayed or contradictory outcome evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 12.11. T10: Confused-deputy and privileged-tool execution . . . 48 12.12. T11: Alternate API, credential, hardware or network bypass routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 12.13. T12: Hardware DMA, SmartNIC, DPU and accelerator offload paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 12.14. T13: Rollback, failover, checkpoint restoration and stale worker authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 12.15. T14: Cross-protocol semantic loss . . . . . . . . . . . 50 12.16. T15: Transaction races, duplicate payment attempts and unresolved settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 12.17. T16: Compromised secure elements and offline delegated authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 12.18. T17: Denial of service caused by unavailable validators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 12.19. T18: Recovery after partial or irreversible physical effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 14. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 16. Comparison with Established Standards and Prior Art . . . . . 55 17. Foundational Architecture and Later Consequence-Specific Refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 18. European Critical-Infrastructure and Digital-Sovereignty Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 18.1. Low-Latency Loops Versus Slower Consequential Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 18.2. Relationship to the Related European Research Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 19. Industry Integration Profiles (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . . 63 19.1. AI and cloud: OpenAI Agents SDK . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 19.2. AI and cloud: Anthropic Claude tool use and MCP . . . . 64 19.3. AI and cloud: Microsoft Azure AI (Foundry agents) . . . 64 19.4. AI and cloud: Google Cloud AI (ADK, Vertex agents, A2A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 19.5. AI and cloud: AWS agent services . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 19.6. Networking: Ericsson AI-RAN and automation platforms . . 65 19.7. Networking: Nokia MantaRay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 19.8. Networking: Open RAN, 5G Advanced, 6G slicing, edge/ mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 19.9. Enterprise: SAP Business AI and Joule . . . . . . . . . 66 19.10. Enterprise: Oracle database and ERP . . . . . . . . . . 66 19.11. Enterprise: Salesforce Agentforce . . . . . . . . . . . 67 19.12. Enterprise: ServiceNow AI workflows . . . . . . . . . . 67 19.13. Enterprise: IBM watsonx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 19.14. Enterprise: Databricks Unity Catalog . . . . . . . . . . 67 19.15. Enterprise: Snowflake Cortex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 19.16. Compute: NVIDIA accelerators and BlueField . . . . . . . 68 19.17. Compute: AMD Instinct and Pensando . . . . . . . . . . . 68 19.18. Compute: Intel confidential computing . . . . . . . . . 68 19.19. Compute: Arm CCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 19.20. Compute: Qualcomm on-device and Apple/Samsung devices . 69 19.21. Finance: ECB digital euro research, offline payments . . 69 19.22. Finance: Visa, Mastercard, Swift, Adyen, Worldline, tokenized settlement, agentic commerce . . . . . . . . 69 19.23. Industrial: Siemens, Schneider Electric, industrial edge, digital twins, robotics, energy . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 20. IPR Disclosure, Attribution and Non-Endorsement . . . . . . . 70 21. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 22. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Appendix A. Embodiment Profiles E1 to E38 and E12A . . . . . . . 77 A.1. E1 (Claims 1-11): Protected cryptographic key-lifecycle finality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 A.2. E2 (Claims 12-22): AI-native radio-network state authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 A.3. E3 (Claims 23-33): Declarative reconciliation and non-resurrection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 A.4. E4 (Claims 34-44): Causal downstream-effect closure . . . 84 A.5. E5 (Claims 45-55): Accelerator execution-authority cutover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 A.6. E6 (Claims 56-66): Trust-domain transition and prior-access closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 A.7. E7 (Claims 67-77): Cumulative connectivity trajectory authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 A.8. E8 (Claims 78-88): Consequence-specific numerical-error reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A.9. E9 (Claims 89-99): Remediation and current attestation correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 A.10. E10 (Claims 100-110): Software-to-hardware offload effect equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 A.11. E11 (Claims 111-121): Multimodal audience and presentation exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 A.12. E12A (Claims 122-132): Negative-observation and sensor-coverage evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 A.13. E12 (Claims 133-143): In-flight media release and route changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 A.14. E13 (Claims 144-154): Low-power intent escrow and wake-epoch continuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 A.15. E14 (Claims 155-165): Uncertain execution outcomes and retry safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 A.16. E15 (Claims 166-176): Authority continuity through agent context compaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 A.17. E16 (Claims 177-187): Independent verification of autonomous software repairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 A.18. E17 (Claims 188-198): Human delegation and minimal-disclosure authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 A.19. E18 (Claims 199-209): Spoken intent and interruption-epoch validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 A.20. E19 (Claims 210-220): Cross-source factual evidence consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 A.21. E20 (Claims 221-231): Cross-protocol tool-semantic authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 A.22. E21 (Claims 232-242): Aggregate multi-agent work-product finality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 A.23. E22 (Claims 243-253): Document-field spatial provenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 A.24. E23 (Claims 254-264): Visual-target and persistent referent continuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 A.25. E24 (Claims 265-273*): Cross-channel communication-origin authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 A.26. E25 (Claims 276-286): Governance enforcement-coverage reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 A.27. E26 (Claims 287-297): Late-bound ERP and accounting effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 A.28. E27 (Claims 298-308): Customer commitments versus actual fulfillment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 A.29. E28 (Claims 309-319): Live-topology IT remediation . . . 101 A.30. E29 (Claims 320-330): Analytical cohort identity and activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 A.31. E30 (Claims 331-341): Cross-engine data-policy semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 A.32. E31 (Claims 342-352): Transitive database stored-program effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A.33. E32 (Claims 353-363): Source-commit-certified downstream effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 A.34. E33 (Claims 364-374): Agentic payment exposure reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 A.35. E34 (Claims 375-385): Cross-border FX and beneficiary outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 A.36. E35 (Claims 386-396): Offline digital cash post-compromise fork evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 A.37. E36 (Claims 397-407): Edge subrequest and outbound-effect authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 A.38. E37 (Claims 408-418): Causal radio-service impairment control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 A.39. E38 (Claims 419-429): 6G network-slice capacity lending and reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Appendix B. Technical Terminology, Synonym Mapping, and Patent Examiner Search-Phrase Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 B.1. Terminology and Synonym Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 B.2. Keyword Clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 B.2.1. AI-agent security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 B.2.2. Cryptographic and trusted computing . . . . . . . . . 112 B.2.3. Network and telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . 113 B.2.4. Enterprise and database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 B.2.5. Data governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 B.2.6. Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 B.2.7. Industrial and semiconductor . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 B.2.8. Additional keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 B.3. Search Phrases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 B.4. Boolean Search Strings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Appendix C. Patent Lineage and Claim-Integrity Note . . . . . . 123 Appendix D. Examiner-Oriented Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 124 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 1. Introduction 1.1. Problem Statement Systems increasingly separate the component that decides what to do from the component that makes it happen. An AI agent proposes a tool call; a workflow engine queues it; a database trigger fans it out; a SmartNIC compiles it into a hardware rule; a retry worker repeats it after a timeout. Each hop can be individually authenticated and individually permitted, yet the operation that finally produces an effect may differ from the operation that was approved, may be executed under authority that has since been revoked, or may have an effect that is only visible after composition with other work. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 This document uses the term *consequence* for the externally effective result of an operation at the point where it can no longer be undone by the originating software alone. The architecture's organizing question is: at the boundary where a consequence would become real, what independent evidence shows that this exact effect, now, under current authority, is permitted? 1.2. Central Distinction The central principle preserved throughout this document is: Authorization to compute, propose, prepare, simulate, or request an operation is not automatically authorization to cause its actual consequential effect. The following are distinct questions with distinct evidence. A deployment can answer some and not others, and conflating them is the failure mode this document addresses. +=====================+=======================+====================+ | Question | Typical established | What it does not | | | mechanism | establish | +=====================+=======================+====================+ | Who is the caller? | TLS client auth, | That this | | (identity | OAuth client auth, | operation is | | authentication) | workload identity | permitted | +---------------------+-----------------------+--------------------+ | May the caller | OAuth scopes, RBAC, | That the operation | | invoke this tool? | ABAC, API gateways | actually reaching | | (tool-invocation | | the target is the | | permission) | | one evaluated | +---------------------+-----------------------+--------------------+ | May the caller | Draft/queue/propose | That staged work | | stage this | APIs, change requests | may later become | | operation? (staging | | effective | | permission) | | | +---------------------+-----------------------+--------------------+ | May this exact | Proposed here: act- | That the intended | | effect be committed | bound capability | outcome was | | now? (effect-commit | checked at a Finality | achieved | | permission) | Sink | | +---------------------+-----------------------+--------------------+ | Did the intended | Destination-of-record | That a later | | effect occur? | confirmation, | continuation is | | (outcome evidence) | settlement evidence | authorized | +---------------------+-----------------------+--------------------+ Table 1: Five questions that are not interchangeable Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 1.3. Relationship to Existing DAS Internet-Drafts and Contribution of This Document The same author has published several individual Internet-Drafts on execution finality. This document was compared with the following, using the text available to the editor at the time of drafting: * draft-das-receipt-gated-iev [I-D.das-receipt-gated-iev] (individual, Experimental, October 2026): staged effectuation, Bounded Trial Effect, receipt-gated continuation and the Interim Effectuation Validator. The editor read this draft's text. This document reuses its IEV idea only as an optional phase profile (Figure 4) and does not redefine it. * draft-das-execution-finality-foundations [I-D.das-execution-finality-foundations] and draft-das-agent- execution-finality [I-D.das-agent-execution-finality]: the editor could not retrieve the full text of either from the Datatracker during preparation. This document therefore makes no claim about their precise content. Overlap in the core chain (Candidate Act, Finality Sink, non-bearer authorization) is expected and should be resolved by the author before submission. * Other Datatracker drafts by the same author exist in the same family, including draft-das-interoperable-consequence-authority [I-D.das-interoperable-consequence-authority] (Part 1 of a series), draft-das-finality-sink-enforcement [I-D.das-finality-sink-enforcement] (Part 4), draft-das-causal- effect-receipts [I-D.das-causal-effect-receipts] (Part 6), draft- das-execution-finality-protocol-layer, and draft-das-ef-registries [I-D.das-ef-registries] (which proposes registries for the family). The editor read only search excerpts of these. The intended additional contribution of this document is limited to the following, and each should be checked for duplication: 1. A single taxonomy that separates identity, tool-invocation, staging, effect-commit and outcome evidence (Table 1). 2. A catalogue of 39 consequence-specific profiles, each stated as an enforcement predicate of the form 'X does not independently authorize Y', with its effectuation boundary and failure modes (Appendix A). These profiles derive from the later Indian provisional filing. 3. Seventeen candidate interoperability requirements with an enforcement rationale and a testable failure condition for each (Section 6). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 4. An 18-item threat analysis with attacker capability, trust boundary, protected invariant, mitigation, residual risk and a concrete test (Section 12). 5. Explicit treatment of route coverage, provider-hosted tool execution, uncertain outcomes and latency-aware placement. If, on comparison, the core chain material of this document substantially duplicates an existing draft, the recommended course is to revise that draft or to publish only the profile catalogue and threat analysis as a narrowly scoped companion document, rather than submitting a redundant document. 1.4. Status and Non-Endorsement This is an individual technical proposal. It is not an endorsed IETF standard, not an EU regulatory approval, not a telecommunications standard, not a financial certification and not an implementation by any named company. References to companies and products identify potential technical integration points only. They are not evidence of adoption, sponsorship, copying, infringement or commercial affiliation. Regulatory references (Section 18) are engineering relevance statements and are not claims of legal compliance. 2. Terminology 2.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Scope of normative language: because this document is Informational, normative keywords bind only an implementation that elects to claim the property to which the statement relates. Requirements are collected in Section 6; keywords used elsewhere restate those requirements, state architectural recommendations, or restate IETF process obligations. Such language does not oblige any deployment to claim a property and does not define a wire format, registry or transport. Statements marked [ARCH] are architectural recommendations. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 2.2. Definitions Definitions are listed with industry-standard synonyms where they exist. This document avoids new acronyms where a plain term suffices; "IEV" is retained only because it is used by the cited companion draft. Candidate Act A proposed consequential operation produced by a human, software or AI agent. Proposal confers no effectuation authority. Synonyms: proposed operation, deferred operation, staged transaction. Non-Effective State A protected state in which a Candidate Act exists without having produced its governed consequence. Synonym: pending non-committed state. Actual Pending Operation The operation that would really occur at the effectuation boundary, derived (reconstructed) from the Candidate Act, current resource state and applicable execution parameters, rather than taken from the proposer's description. Synonym: reconstructed effective operation. Operation Reconstruction The process of deriving the Actual Pending Operation, including the effective principal, target, parameters, material dependencies and derived child effects. Source-Authority Envelope The record of the originating authority for an act: principal, delegation chain, permitted task and operation class, limits, purpose and applicable epochs. Synonym: originating authorization context. Protected Enforcement Domain An environment whose integrity and policy state are protected against the operation source, in which validation occurs and protected state is kept. Realizations include a trusted execution environment, a hardware security module, a separate process or host, or a trusted application boundary. Independent Validator A component, outside the control of the operation source, that evaluates the Actual Pending Operation against current authority, policy, dependencies and evidence. Synonym: runtime policy revalidation service. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Scoped Execution Capability A non-bearer authorization bound to a specific act, scope, destination, validity period or consumption count, designated Finality Sink and current epochs. Possession alone is not sufficient to cause the effect. Synonym: operation-bound execution authorization. Finality Gate The decision logic at or before the effectuation boundary that admits or rejects an operation. Finality Sink The component at the first boundary at which the operation can become externally effective, which verifies a Scoped Execution Capability against the Actual Pending Operation and consumes it. Synonyms: protected effectuation boundary, execution enforcement point. Consequence-Bound Authorization Authorization whose predicate is evaluated over the effect that would actually result, including aggregate and transitive effects, rather than over the request alone. Synonym: effect-aware authorization. Authority Continuity The property that originating restrictions and delegated limits remain binding through transformation, summarization, delegation, queueing, translation and retry. Synonym: delegated authority preservation. Protected Policy Epoch A protected, monotonically advancing version of the effect- relevant policy. Synonym: policy generation counter. Revocation Epoch A protected, monotonically advancing version of revocation state, used to reject authority issued before a revocation. Evidence-Carrying Receipt A record, bound to an act and phase, carrying authenticated evidence of what occurred. Self-reported receipts from the act source are not Authoritative Outcome Evidence. Effect Confirmation Receipt A receipt whose evidence originates at the destination of record or an independent observer rather than at the operation source. Synonym: authenticated destination effect evidence. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Interim Effectuation Validation (IEV) A validation in which authenticated evidence of an earlier real (bounded) effect is evaluated before a continuation condition for a later effect is established. Synonym: receipt-gated continuation validation. Ledger-Anchored Validation Receipt A validation receipt whose existence and ordering are anchored in an append-only or transaction-log structure, so that omission or reordering is detectable. Anchoring is optional and does not by itself establish validity. Effective Operation Descriptor A structured description of the effective operation as reconstructed, including, where relevant, installed match/action behavior of a hardware path (Effective Hardware Action Descriptor). Material Dependency Graph The graph of resources, services, derived operations and state on which the effect depends or which it affects materially. Synonym: causal effect graph. Protected State Commitment A cryptographic or hardware-protected commitment to state used in validation (for example an epoch, ledger or watermark). Authoritative Outcome Evidence Evidence from the system of record, or from an independent observer with adequate coverage, sufficient to classify an operation as committed, conclusively not committed, or unresolved. Stale Authority Authority that was valid at issuance but whose epoch, revocation state, target, context or time bound no longer holds at effectuation. Transitive Effect An effect reachable from the authorized operation through a chain of triggers, workflows, queues, delegations or calls, not named by the entry point. Aggregate Consequence The combined effect of several operations or work products that are each individually acceptable. Bounded Real Effect Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A real but intentionally limited effect, not a simulation, preview or dry run, performed before broader effectuation. Synonyms: canary effect, limited trial effect. Effectuation-Boundary Enforcement Enforcement at the point where the operation actually becomes effective, as opposed to enforcement only at request, gateway or logging layers. Control-to-Effect Route Coverage The extent to which every discovered route capable of producing a governed effect is subject to the required control, demonstrated by evidence of rejection at the sink rather than by policy configuration or logs. 2.3. Established Mechanisms and Their Functions The following mechanisms are not criticized here. Each answers a real question, and the architecture below relies on them. OAuth 2.0 and token exchange Delegated authorization of a client to call resource servers ([RFC6749], [RFC8693]); proof-of-possession and sender- constraining ([RFC9449], [RFC8705], [RFC7800]); rich authorization details ([RFC9396]). These can carry fine-grained scopes and bind tokens to keys. They do not, by themselves, make the resource server re-derive the effective operation or guarantee that every route to the effect is covered. JWT, CWT and COSE Compact signed or MACed claim formats ([RFC7519], [RFC8392], [RFC9052]). They are suitable carriers for a Scoped Execution Capability; this document does not select a format. RBAC and ABAC Role-based and attribute-based access control ([NIST-ABAC]). They decide whether a principal may perform an operation class. The profiles here concern whether the particular effect is within scope at effectuation. Zero trust Continuous verification and least privilege ([NIST-ZTA]). The architecture is consistent with it and adds a requirement to verify at the actual effect boundary. Remote attestation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Evidence about an attester's state, appraised by a verifier for a relying party ([RFC9334], [RFC9711]). The attestation profile (E9) concerns correspondence between remediation, evidence and policy per consequence class and does not replace RATS roles. Transaction logs and audit Durable records of what was done. Logging is detection and accountability; it is not prevention unless the log write gates the effect. Hardware isolation and secure elements Isolation of keys and execution. They bound what compromise can do under intact-hardware assumptions; E35 considers the case where those assumptions fail. Cryptographic signatures Integrity and origin of a message. A valid signature over a request does not show that the request's effect is permitted now. 3. Scope and Non-Goals In scope: an architecture for controlling the transition from a proposed operation to its actual consequence; candidate interoperability requirements for implementations that claim specific properties; threat analysis; and a catalogue of consequence-specific profiles. Non-goals: * This document defines no wire format, message encoding, registry or transport. Where an encoding is needed, existing formats (for example COSE or JWT) are candidates. * It does not claim that the architecture prevents every attack, nor that it can control a system whose effectuation path lies outside the protected boundary and cannot be integrated. * It does not replace identity, authorization, attestation, safety or regulatory controls; it is intended to be layered with them. * It does not address real-time safety loops, PHY/MAC scheduling or other microsecond-scale control paths, except to state how they relate to the slower boundaries that this document does address (see Section 7 and Section 18). * It makes no experimental, performance, latency or adoption claim. None is reported. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 4. Architecture Figure 1 shows the principal flow. The ten elements that the architecture relates are: (1) Originating Authority, (2) Candidate Act, (3) Non-Effective State, (4) Actual Pending Operation reconstruction, (5) current execution context and dependencies, (6) independent validation, (7) scoped execution authorization, (8) Protected Finality Sink, (9) actual resulting effect, and (10) authoritative outcome reconciliation. +------------------------------+ | AI Agent / Software / Human | | Operation Source | +--------------+---------------+ | (1) propose v +------------------------------+ | Candidate Act | | Proposed consequential act | +--------------+---------------+ | (2) stage; no real effect yet v +------------------------------+ | Protected Non-Effective | | State | +--------------+---------------+ | (3) derive what would really happen v +------------------------------+ | Actual Pending Operation | | Reconstruction | +--------------+---------------+ | (4) bind current facts v +------------------------------+ | Source Authority + Context | | Dependencies + Policy Epoch | +--------------+---------------+ | (5) evaluate independently v +------------------------------+ | Independent Consequence- | | Bound Validation | +--------------+---------------+ | v +-------------+ | Valid now? | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +------+------+ NO | YES +-------+-------+ v v +--------------+ +------------------+ | HOLD / DENY | | Scoped Execution | | / RECONCILE | | Authorization | +--------------+ +--------+---------+ | (6) present at the boundary v +-------------------+ | Protected Finality| | Sink | +--------+----------+ | (7) sink re-derives and consumes v +-------------------+ | Actual Consequence| +--------+----------+ | (8) observe at the destination v +-------------------+ | Outcome Evidence | | & Reconciliation | +-------------------+ Figure 1: Principal protected execution-finality flow (mandatory conceptual flow) 4.1. Transitions, Conditions, Trust Assumptions and Failures Each numbered transition in Figure 1 is described with its mandatory condition, the trust assumption it relies on and its principal failure. Unless stated, a failed condition results in HOLD or DENY (fail closed). (1) Source to Candidate Act: propose Condition: the proposal is recorded with a stable act identity and the source's authority envelope. Trust: none placed in the source's own description of the operation. Failure: source supplies an inaccurate description, or an unbounded number of proposals (rate and quota limits apply). (2) Candidate Act to Non-Effective State: stage Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Condition: staging produces no governed consequence; staging area is itself protected from tampering by the source after submission. Trust: staging store integrity. Failure: staged act modified after validation; staged act becomes effective through an unmodelled path (route coverage failure). (3) Non-Effective State to Actual Pending Operation: reconstruct Condition: the effective principal, target, parameters, dependencies and derived child effects are derived from current resource state, not copied from the proposal. Trust: the reconstruction logic and its inputs are accurate. Failure: incomplete reconstruction (an effect branch is not modelled), reconstruction on stale state, or state changing between reconstruction and effect (time-of-check to time-of-use). (4) Reconstruction to context binding Condition: the current Source-Authority Envelope, material dependencies, and policy and revocation epochs are bound to the operation. Trust: epoch sources are authentic and fresh. Failure: epoch source unreachable or stale (treated as not current). (5) Context to Independent Validation Condition: the validator is independent of the source and evaluates the reconstructed operation, not the proposal. Trust: validator integrity. Failure: validator compromise or substitution (Section 12, T7); mitigated by attestation of the validator and by the sink's own re-derivation. Decision: valid now? Condition: every required predicate for the consequence class is true. UNKNOWN is not true. Failure: a predicate cannot be evaluated (HOLD); a predicate is mis-specified (policy error; residual risk). NO branch: HOLD, DENY or RECONCILE Condition: no capability is issued. RECONCILE applies where an earlier unresolved outcome must be classified first. Failure: denial of service by inducing HOLD (Section 12, T17); mitigated by bounded holds and safe-state rules. (6) YES branch: scoped authorization Condition: a Scoped Execution Capability is created, bound to the act, scope, destination, epochs, validity period or consumption count, and the designated sink. Trust: capability is non-bearer, so possession alone does not authorize. Failure: capability replay or widening (T5). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 (7) Sink: re-derive and consume Condition: the sink independently reconstructs the operation it is about to make effective, compares it with the capability, checks sink-local epoch and consumption state, then consumes the capability atomically with the effect where technically required. Trust: the sink controls the first effectual boundary. Failure: alternate route around the sink (T11), crash between consumption and effect (REQ-13). (8) Effect to Outcome Evidence and Reconciliation Condition: the outcome is classified from Authoritative Outcome Evidence as committed, conclusively not committed, or unresolved. Trust: evidence originates at the destination or an independent observer. Failure: forged, missing, delayed or contradictory evidence (T8, T9); unresolved outcomes remain quarantined (REQ- 12). 4.2. Source Authority Versus Reconstructed Effective Operation Figure 2 illustrates why the validator compares the authorized envelope with the reconstructed operation. The nominal target, derived children, effective principal, and epochs may differ between approval and effectuation. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 WHAT WAS AUTHORIZED WHAT WILL ACTUALLY HAPPEN (Source-Authority Envelope) (Actual Pending Operation) +---------------------------+ +---------------------------+ | principal / delegator | | effective principal | | permitted task class | | effective operation | | nominal target "T" | | resolved target "T'" | | scope, limits, purpose | | derived children, writes | | policy epoch Pe=17 | | current epoch Pe=19 | | revocation epoch Re=4 | | current Re=5 | +-------------+-------------+ +-------------+-------------+ | | +--------------+---------------+ v +------------------------------+ | Consequence-bound compare | | T == T'? children inside | | scope? epochs current? | | limits composed correctly? | +--------------+---------------+ | any mismatch | all hold +---------------------+---------------------+ v v +-------------+ +------------------+ | HOLD / DENY | | scope-limited | | fail closed | | authorization | +-------------+ +------------------+ Figure 2: Source authority versus reconstructed effective operation 4.3. Distinguishing Staging, Commitment and Evidence Permission to stage an operation (to write it into a queue, change request or draft) MUST be treated, in any implementation claiming effect-commit control, as separate from permission to commit its effect. Permission to commit the effect is in turn separate from evidence that the intended effect was achieved: a continuation or customer-facing statement that depends on the outcome requires the outcome evidence (Section 6, REQ-07 and REQ-12). 5. Component Roles and Trust Assumptions Figure 3 shows trust boundaries B1 (protected enforcement domain), B2 (Finality Sink) and B3 (effect domain). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNTRUSTED / PARTIALLY TRUSTED ZONE | | model, agent runtime, orchestrator, tool adapters, retry | | workers, caches, application-side gateways | +--------------------------------+--------------------------------+ | Candidate Act (no authority) v +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ | PROTECTED ENFORCEMENT DOMAIN (trust boundary B1) | | +-------------------+ +--------------------------------+ | | | Independent |<--->| Protected state | | | | Validator | | policy epoch, revocation | | | | (re-derives facts)| | epoch, consumption record, | | | +---------+---------+ | exposure ledger, commitments | | | | +--------------------------------+ | | | Scoped Execution Capability (non-bearer) | +------------+----------------------------------------------------+ v +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ | FINALITY SINK (trust boundary B2) | | verifies capability vs ACTUAL operation, checks sink-local | | epoch/consumption, then admits or rejects | +--------------------------------+--------------------------------+ | only admitted operations v +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ | EFFECT DOMAIN: database, network element, payment rail, device, | | actuator, accelerator, message channel (trust boundary B3) | +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ Assumption: B2 is the first boundary where the act can become externally effective. If another route reaches B3 around B2, the route-coverage requirements (REQ-09, REQ-16) are violated. Figure 3: Independent Validator, protected state, and Finality Sink trust boundaries 5.1. Component Roles Operation Source AI agent, software component or human. Untrusted for the purpose of describing its own operation. May hold identity credentials and tool-invocation permissions. Staging Store Holds Candidate Acts in the Non-Effective State. Integrity- protected; the source can append but not mark an act validated. Reconstruction Function Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Derives the Actual Pending Operation and Material Dependency Graph from current state. May be a part of the validator or of the sink, or both; the sink MUST be able to re-derive for the operation it admits where the sink claims to enforce REQ-01 to REQ-04. Independent Validator Evaluates predicates and issues the Scoped Execution Capability. Runs in a Protected Enforcement Domain. May be co-located with the sink for latency (see Section 7). Protected State Epochs, consumption records, exposure ledgers, watermarks, commitments. Crash-consistent where replay protection is claimed. Finality Sink The enforcement point at the first effectual boundary. Holds the credential or capability to cause the effect; the operation source does not. Effect Observer / Destination of Record Produces Authoritative Outcome Evidence. Independent of the operation source. Reconciler Classifies unresolved outcomes, authorizes retry, compensation or recovery under current authority. Interim Effectuation Validator (optional) Evaluates evidence of a bounded real effect before continuation authority is created (Figure 4). 5.2. Trust Assumptions * The operation source is untrusted for its own descriptions and may be compromised, prompt-injected or malicious. * The Protected Enforcement Domain and the Finality Sink are trusted to the extent of their stated integrity guarantees (for example hardware isolation or a separate administrative domain). Their compromise is within the threat model and is addressed by redundancy, attestation and bounded blast radius, not assumed away. * Effect-relevant epochs are authentic and monotonic; where an epoch source is unreachable the epoch is treated as not current. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * The sink is the first boundary at which the act becomes externally effective, or the deployment has explicitly declared and tested the uncovered routes (REQ-09, REQ-16). * Destination evidence is authentic. Where a destination cannot produce evidence, outcomes remain unresolved and the architecture offers containment (quarantine), not certainty. * Time sources used for validity periods are accurate within a stated tolerance. 6. Candidate Interoperability Requirements This section lists candidate interoperability requirements. Each applies only to an implementation that elects to claim the named property. Each has an enforcement rationale and a testable failure condition. The tag PROFILE denotes a candidate profile requirement; ARCH denotes an architectural recommendation. No mandatory wire format, registry or transport is imposed. 6.1. REQ-01: Stable act identity and canonical operation representation Tag PROFILE Statement An implementation claiming this property MUST derive a stable act identity from a canonical representation of the operation, such that two representations that cause the same effect map to the same identity and a materially different effect maps to a different one. The canonicalization MUST be deterministic and MUST be applied at validation and again at the sink. Enforcement rationale Without a canonical form, an attacker or a translation layer can present a different serialization to the validator and to the sink (semantic or encoding substitution). Testable failure condition Present the sink with an operation that differs only in a field the validator ignored; the sink MUST reject. Present two encodings of one effect; both MUST map to one identity. Related embodiments and threats E1-E38; T1, T14 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 6.2. REQ-02: Current source authority and delegation restrictions Tag PROFILE Statement The validator MUST evaluate the current Source-Authority Envelope including the delegation chain, and MUST ensure that each delegation narrows or preserves, and never widens, the permitted scope. Restrictions present at origin MUST remain binding after summarization, handoff, forwarding or translation. Enforcement rationale Authority that is reconstructed from model-visible or forwarded content can be lost or invented in transit; authority must come from a record the transforming component cannot rewrite. Testable failure condition Delegate A to B to C and have C request a wider scope; the request MUST be denied. Summarize context and drop a prohibition; the later effect MUST still be denied. Related embodiments and threats E4, E15, E17, E20, E24, E36; T3, T1 6.3. REQ-03: Actual destination and effective target identity Tag PROFILE Statement The sink MUST resolve and compare the actual destination and effective target (including effective principal) with those bound in the capability. A nominal target name MUST NOT be accepted where resolution can change between approval and effect. Enforcement rationale Aliases, redirects, re-resolution, account reassignment and target drift are the commonest TOCTOU form. Testable failure condition Change DNS, alias or account mapping after validation; the sink MUST reject the changed destination. Related embodiments and threats E22, E23, E24, E28, E34; T6 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 6.4. REQ-04: Effect-relevant policy, configuration and authority epochs Tag PROFILE Statement The capability MUST bind the policy, revocation and (where relevant) configuration epochs under which it was issued, and the sink MUST reject a capability issued under an epoch older than the sink's current epoch for that consequence class. Enforcement rationale Epoch binding makes revocation and policy change effective for already issued but unconsumed authority. Testable failure condition Advance the policy epoch after issuance; presenting the capability MUST fail. Related embodiments and threats E3, E9, E10, E13, E25; T4, T5, T13 6.5. REQ-05: Protection against replay, duplication and stale authorization Tag PROFILE Statement A capability MUST be single-use or bounded-use as designated, and the sink MUST record consumption so that a second presentation, including from a restored replica or a retry worker, is rejected. Enforcement rationale Possession of a valid capability must not allow repeated effect. Testable failure condition Present the same capability twice, including after a failover; the second MUST be rejected. Related embodiments and threats E5, E14, E32, E33; T5, T13, T15 6.6. REQ-06: Current revocation and consumed-capability checks Tag PROFILE Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Statement Where revocation is claimed to be effective, the sink MUST check the current Revocation Epoch (or equivalent) at effectuation, and MUST define the maximum staleness it tolerates for revocation data. Enforcement rationale Revocation that is only evaluated at issuance does not bind authority already in flight. Testable failure condition Revoke after issuance and before presentation; presentation MUST fail within the stated staleness bound. Related embodiments and threats E1, E3, E9; T4, T5 6.7. REQ-07: Independent evidence qualification Tag PROFILE Statement Evidence relied upon for a validation or continuation decision MUST originate outside the operation source, MUST be bound to the act and phase, and MUST be checked for coverage and freshness (including, for absence-of-event evidence, sensing opportunity). Self-reported completion by the source MUST NOT be accepted as Authoritative Outcome Evidence. Enforcement rationale Evidence the source can write or withhold gives the source control of the decision that is supposed to constrain it. Testable failure condition Have the source write a PASS record; it MUST NOT advance the act. Remove a sensor from coverage; a 'no event' inference MUST NOT be admitted. Related embodiments and threats E12A, E14, E16, E19, E27; T8, T9 6.8. REQ-08: Effect-bound authorization Tag PROFILE Statement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 The authorization predicate MUST be evaluated over the reconstructed effect, including aggregate and transitive effects relevant to the consequence class, and the capability's scope MUST be no wider than the validated effect. Enforcement rationale A request-level check can pass while the combined or derived effect is outside scope. Testable failure condition Submit two individually acceptable work products whose combination violates a limit; the aggregate MUST be withheld. Related embodiments and threats E2, E4, E7, E21, E26, E31, E33; T3 6.9. REQ-09: Actual effectuation-route enforcement Tag PROFILE Statement Enforcement MUST be located at the actual effectuation boundary for each covered route. A deployment claiming coverage MUST identify the routes it covers and MUST demonstrate, for each, that an operation lacking valid authority is rejected at the sink. Enforcement rationale Controls located upstream of an alternate route do not constrain the alternate route. Testable failure condition Invoke the effect through an alternate API, credential or hardware path; if the route is declared covered, the sink MUST reject. Related embodiments and threats E25, E10, E36; T11, T12 6.10. REQ-10: Compatibility with local protected state and cryptographic mechanisms Tag ARCH Statement Implementations SHOULD allow the capability to be realized by cryptographic means (for example signed or MACed tokens), by protected local state, by hardware interlocks, or by a hybrid, and Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 SHOULD state which is used for which consequence class. Fast paths SHOULD use pre-validated local state with cryptographic validation at lease creation, renewal, change and revocation rather than per event. Enforcement rationale A single mechanism cannot meet all latency and trust constraints; the property to preserve is the binding, not a specific cipher. Testable failure condition Run the same scenario under cryptographic and local-state realizations; observable accept/reject outcomes MUST be equivalent. Related embodiments and threats E1, E5, E10, E13, E38; T7 6.11. REQ-11: Multi-phase progression where appropriate Tag ARCH Statement Where a consequence is progressive, implementations SHOULD permit a bounded real effect followed by authenticated effect evidence and a continuation condition (Figure 4). A later phase MUST NOT exceed the maximum authorized cumulative envelope merely because earlier phases succeeded. Enforcement rationale Evidence of a small real effect can justify a larger one without granting authority for the whole session. Testable failure condition Request a next phase exceeding the remaining envelope; it MUST be denied even after a successful first phase. Related embodiments and threats E37, E38; T8 6.12. REQ-12: Handling of uncertain or partially completed effects Tag PROFILE Statement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A timeout, lost acknowledgment, worker failure or restart MUST NOT be treated as evidence that an effect did not occur. The implementation MUST keep a logical effect identity distinct from attempt identity, MUST hold conflicting continuations while the outcome is unresolved, and MUST classify the outcome from Authoritative Outcome Evidence before authorizing retry, compensation or recovery. Enforcement rationale Blind retry after an unknown outcome can duplicate an irreversible effect. Testable failure condition Drop the acknowledgment of a committed payment; a retry MUST NOT be admitted until the outcome is reconciled. Related embodiments and threats E14, E32, E33, E34; T9, T15, T18 6.13. REQ-13: Crash-consistent consumption and replay protection where technically required Tag PROFILE Statement Where single-use is claimed, consumption of the capability and the governed effect MUST be atomic or recoverable such that a crash cannot yield both a retained valid capability and a completed effect, nor a consumed capability without a recorded effect state. Enforcement rationale Non-atomic consume-then-act or act-then-consume orders create duplicate or lost effects across crashes. Testable failure condition Kill the sink between consume and effect and between effect and record; on recovery the state MUST be classifiable and no duplicate MUST occur. Related embodiments and threats E5, E14, E32; T5, T13 6.14. REQ-14: Cross-platform semantic equivalence Tag PROFILE Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Statement Where an operation, policy or authority contract is translated between protocols, engines or platforms, the implementation MUST verify, per consequence class, that the destination preserves the semantics the contract requires, and MUST fail closed (deny or declare uncovered) for features the destination does not preserve. Enforcement rationale Syntactic acceptance of a translated request does not show that restrictions survived. Testable failure condition Translate a request with a prohibition into a protocol lacking that feature; the result MUST be denial or an explicit uncovered declaration. Related embodiments and threats E20, E30; T14 6.15. REQ-15: Provider-hosted tool execution that cannot be intercepted by an application-side gateway Tag PROFILE Statement Where a tool runs in a provider-hosted environment that an application-side gateway cannot intercept (Figure 6), authority MUST be enforced at the end-target sink, or the tool MUST be disabled for covered consequence classes, or the path MUST be declared uncovered. Enforcement rationale An application-side control does not see a call that never passes through the application. Testable failure condition Enable a hosted tool that calls a covered target; the end target MUST reject without valid authority, or the tool MUST be unavailable. Related embodiments and threats E20, E25; T10, T11 6.16. REQ-16: Alternate-path and bypass analysis Tag PROFILE Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Statement A deployment claiming non-bypassability MUST perform and document an alternate-path analysis covering credentials, APIs, hardware paths, management planes, retry workers and administrative routes, and MUST treat any known act-equivalent path as disabled, mediated, restricted or declared uncovered. Enforcement rationale Claims of non-bypassability are only as strong as the route inventory. Testable failure condition Add a new credential with direct access to the target; a route- coverage test MUST fail or the credential MUST be rejected at the sink. Related embodiments and threats E25, E10, E6, E36; T11, T12 6.17. REQ-17: Latency-aware validation at actual consequential boundaries Tag ARCH Statement Implementations SHOULD place full validation at slower consequential boundaries (management, configuration, authorization, settlement, deployment) and SHOULD use pre- validated bounded local state for low-latency loops, validating at lease creation, renewal, change and revocation. No latency figure is specified or claimed here. Enforcement rationale Per-event cryptographic validation can be infeasible in microsecond loops; the control point must match the time scale of the consequence. Testable failure condition Measure that a revocation takes effect within the declared bound for a fast path without per-event signature verification. Related embodiments and threats E2, E10, E13, E38; T17 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 7. Latency-Aware Placement The architecture distinguishes two time scales. First, consequential management, configuration, authorization, settlement and deployment boundaries, where a validation step can be placed before the effect without making the operation infeasible. Second, low-latency radio, scheduling and safety-control loops, where a per-event cryptographic check may be infeasible. For the second class this document proposes only that validation occur when protected local state is created, renewed, changed or revoked, with the fast path enforcing the resulting bounded state using local protected checks (Section 6, REQ-10 and REQ-17). No latency figure is stated or implied. Whether a given loop can be covered at all, and with what safety consequences, is a matter for measurement in the deployment and for the safety case of that system. Safety consequence: for cyber-physical effects, validator unavailability MUST NOT translate into an unsafe default. The safe state (hold, continue last safe configuration, or stop) is system specific and is chosen by the safety case, not by this document. 8. Application Profiles The following profiles apply the architecture to specific boundaries. They are illustrative of disclosed mechanisms and are not wire protocols. 8.1. Bounded Real Effect and Continuation Where a consequence is progressive, a first phase produces a bounded real effect. Authenticated evidence of that effect is evaluated, and only then is a continuation condition created for the next phase (Figure 4). Evidence is a structural dependency, not a log: the next sink verifies or consumes the continuation condition. This is the idea developed in the cited companion draft on receipt-gated IEV; it is included here as an optional profile and not redefined. Unknown or indeterminate evidence holds the act; it never defaults to pass. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Candidate Act A, Envelope_MAX | v +--------------------+ scope1 <= Envelope_MAX | Validation Phase 1 |--------------------------+ +---------+----------+ | v | +--------------------+ | | Finality Sink FS1 | | +---------+----------+ | v | [ BOUNDED REAL EFFECT E1 ] (not a simulation) | | | v | +--------------------------+ | | Effect Evidence R1 | destination- | | (authenticated, bound to | origin, not | | act, phase, nonce) | self-reported | +------------+-------------+ | v | +--------------------------+ | | Interim Effectuation | expected X1 vs | | Validation (IEV) | observed O1 | +------+-----------+-------+ | PASS | | FAIL / UNKNOWN | v v | +-------------+ +-----------------------+ | | Continuation| | HOLD / SAFE STATE / | | | condition | | RECONCILE (no blind | | | G2 created | | retry) | | +------+------+ +-----------------------+ | v | +--------------------+ verifies/consumes G2 | | Finality Sink FS2 |<-------------------------+ +--------------------+ scope2 <= Envelope_MAX - spent Figure 4: Bounded real effect, authenticated effect evidence, and optional continuation authorization 8.2. Cross-Agent Composition (E21) When several agents produce work products, each may pass local validation while their composition does not. The profile materializes the composition at a shared commit boundary, evaluates cross-branch reads and writes, negative constraints and cumulative limits, and authorizes the accepted aggregate or a validated subset (Figure 5). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ | Agent A | | Agent B | | Agent C | | WP-A ok | | WP-B ok | | WP-C ok | +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ | locally valid, each one | +------------+-----------------+ v +-------------------------+ | Composition snapshot | materialized merge result, | (shared commit boundary)| not three separate diffs +------------+------------+ v +-------------------------+ | Aggregate validator | cross-branch reads/writes, | | negative constraints, +------+-------------+----+ cumulative limits reject| |accept (whole or valid subset) v v +-----------+ +-------------------+ | withhold | | scoped capability | | aggregate | | for accepted state| +-----------+ +---------+---------+ v +-------------------+ | Merge/commit sink | +-------------------+ Figure 5: Cross-agent work-product composition and aggregate- effect validation 8.3. Cross-Protocol Tool Dispatch (E20) Conversion between model APIs, MCP adapters and provider-hosted or client-managed tool execution can drop restrictions or change effect semantics. The profile keeps a canonical authority contract outside the model context, a feature and exception matrix, and an effective tool-location map. For provider-hosted tools that an application- side gateway cannot intercept, enforcement moves to the end-target sink (Figure 6). This document does not assert which specific providers expose which hosted-tool modes; that must be verified per provider and version. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +----------------------------------------------+ | Canonical authority contract (outside model | | context): prohibitions, scope, tool-location | | map, feature/exception matrix | +--------------------+-------------------------+ | consulted at every hop Agent runtime v +----------+ +-------------+ +-----------------------+ | model |-->| protocol |-->| tool-call dispatch | | output | | bridge / | +-----+-----------+-----+ +----------+ | MCP adapter | | | +-------------+ CLIENT-MANAGED PROVIDER-HOSTED | | v v +-------------------+ +-------------------------+ | app-side gateway | | provider executes tool; | | can intercept | | app gateway cannot | +---------+---------+ | intercept the call | | +------------+------------+ v | +-------------------+ | | tool server / MCP | | +---------+---------+ | +-------------+------------+ v +-------------------------------+ | END-TARGET FINALITY SINK | | (independent of both paths) | +-------------------------------+ Rule: where a path cannot be intercepted, authority must be enforced at the end target, or the path must be disabled or declared uncovered. Figure 6: Cross-protocol MCP/tool-dispatch authority preservation; provider- hosted versus client-managed execution 8.4. Hardware Offload Equivalence (E10) A software decision that is compiled into wildcarded, prioritized, cached or stateful hardware rules may have a different real effect from the decision. The profile compares the effective installed behavior (read back from the device where supported) with the permitted effect and fences stale fast-path authority on policy change (Figure 7). Compared with existing practice (P4 runtime verification, match-action verification, consistent updates), the distinguishing element to examine is the binding of installed-effect equivalence to the software authorization and to an authority epoch (Appendix D). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Slow path (software) Fast path (hardware) +---------------------------+ +---------------------------+ | Slow-Path Authorization | | Effective Hardware Action | | Witness W | | Descriptor H | | + Offload Effect Contract | | (wildcards, priority, | | permitted behavior | | caches, state, actions) | +-------------+-------------+ +-------------+-------------+ | compile / install | +--------------+-------------------+ v +-----------------------------+ | Offload-equivalence check: | | effects(H) subset-of | | permitted(W, Contract)? | | + Fast-Path Authority Epoch | +--------+-----------+--------+ FAIL | | PASS v v +-------------+ +----------------------+ | do not | | enable offload; read | | enable; | | back installed rules | | remove rule | | and compare | +-------------+ +-----------+----------+ v +--------------------------+ | epoch change / revocation| | => stale fast-path rules | | fenced (barrier) | +--------------------------+ Figure 7: Hardware-offload equivalence between authorized software action and installed fast-path behavior 8.5. Execution-Route Discovery and Coverage (E25) A dashboard, policy document or compliant sample trace does not show that every effect-producing route is controlled. The profile builds a route inventory, relates required controls to actual enforcement points, and obtains evidence of rejection at the sink for each route, using non-consequential probes where safe (Figure 8). Routes that cannot be probed safely or covered are declared uncovered, and authority for the associated consequence classes is lowered accordingly. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +-------------------+ +----------------------------------+ | Route inventory | | Governance coverage contract | | APIs, credentials,| | required control per effect class| | hardware, network | +----------------+-----------------+ | paths, tools | | +---------+---------+ | +-------------------+-------------+ v +-------------------------------+ | Governance-to-effect graph | +---------------+---------------+ v +-------------------------------+ | Coverage probe: attempt a | | non-consequential test effect | | on each route (where safe) | +--------+---------------+------+ sink | | effect got through rejects | | without control v v +--------------+ +--------------------+ | route COVERED| | route UNCOVERED: | | (evidence) | | disable, restrict, | +--------------+ | or lower authority | +--------------------+ Logs and dashboards are not coverage evidence; sink rejection is. Figure 8: Execution-route discovery and governance enforcement coverage 8.6. Database Commit and Downstream Effects (E31, E32) A permitted stored procedure can reach triggers, definer-rights code, autonomous transactions and external functions beyond its entry point (E31). A downstream consumer of an outbox or change-data-capture event should not treat an uncommitted intent, a stale outbox row or an unrelated transaction's event as authority; release is bound to a source-commit certificate and current effect state, with reconciliation after uncertain acknowledgments (E32). Figure 9 shows the flow. The transactional outbox and CDC are established patterns ([OUTBOX]); the profile concerns binding consumer effect authority to the source commit. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +--------------------+ txn +-----------------------------+ | Agent / app |------>| Source database | | proposes write | | (stored programs, triggers) | +--------------------+ +--------------+--------------+ | transitive effect closure of the | COMMIT entry point is reconstructed v +-----------------------------+ | Commit log / outbox / CDC | | source-commit certificate | +--------------+--------------+ uncommitted intent X no authority | stale outbox row X no authority v unrelated txn event X no authority +----------------------------+ | Downstream consumer | | derives child operation | +-------------+--------------+ v +----------------------------+ | Effect Finality Sink | | checks: commit certificate,| | policy epoch, child scope | +-------------+--------------+ v +----------------------------+ | External effect + ack | | uncertain ack => reconcile | +----------------------------+ Figure 9: Database source commit, downstream event provenance, and consequential effectuation 8.7. 6G and Open RAN Management-Plane Boundaries (E2, E37, E38) At the non-real-time management plane, an AI-generated configuration or slice change is reconstructed into its effective multi-cell and slice state, validated, and applied as a limited real change; attributable impact evidence bounds expansion (Figure 10). Slice capacity lending (E38) additionally requires conservation (lending creates no capacity), preservation of the lender's entitlement floor and an enforceable reclaim bound. Real-time loops are out of scope and use pre-validated local state (Section 7). Relevant established mechanisms include 3GPP network slicing and the O-RAN architecture ([TS23501], [ORAN-ARCH]). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 NON-REAL-TIME / MANAGEMENT PLANE (in scope) +--------------+ +----------------+ +---------------------+ | rApp / AI |-->| SMO / Non-RT |-->| Candidate config | | optimizer | | RIC policy | | or slice change | +--------------+ +----------------+ +----------+----------+ v +-------------------------------+ | Reconstruct effective state: | | multi-cell, neighbors, slices,| | affected-service footprint | +---------------+---------------+ v +-------------------------------+ | Validator + Finality Sink at | | the configuration-effect point| +---------------+---------------+ v +-------------------------------+ | Limited real change (canary) | +---------------+---------------+ attributable impact evidence| v +-------------------------------+ | Causal impairment evaluator | | expand only if bounded impact | +-------------------------------+ OUT OF SCOPE: PHY / MAC / HARQ and other real-time loops. Those use prevalidated local state; validation occurs at lease or policy creation, renewal, change and revocation, not per transport block. Figure 10: 6G/Open RAN authorization at network-management and configuration- effect boundaries 8.8. Agentic Payment Exposure (E33, E34, E35) Multiple pending authorizations, captures and agent-issued instructions can collectively exceed a mandate. The profile maintains a conservative exposure ledger, reserves capacity before admitting an operation, and keeps unresolved exposure held until authoritative evidence resolves it (Figure 11). Existing network and issuer controls remain authoritative; the profile is complementary. For cross-border payments the nominal instruction, settlement stages and beneficiary-net outcome are distinguished (E34, with ISO 20022 tracking as established context [ISO20022]). For offline digital cash, E35 addresses delegated spending authority and post-compromise fork reconciliation and does not claim that secure-element protection is ineffective under intact-hardware assumptions. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +---------------------------+ | Protected Exposure Mandate| principal, agents, aggregate limit, +-------------+-------------+ beneficiary/merchant restrictions v +---------------------------+ +--------------------------+ | Exposure ledger |<---->| reserved | authorized | | | conservative accounting | | captured | released | | +-------------+-------------+ | UNRESOLVED (kept held) | v +--------------------------+ +---------------------------+ | Reserve capacity, then | capacity must exist BEFORE the | issue transaction-bound | operation is admitted | capability | +-------------+-------------+ v +---------------------------+ authorization --> capture --> | Payment finality sink | clearing --> settlement +-------------+-------------+ v +---------------------------+ timeout or lost ack is NOT failure | Outcome evidence: |------------+ | settlement / beneficiary | v | net amount, FX, fees | +--------------------------+ +-------------+-------------+ | quarantine; query | v | authoritative status; | +---------------------------+ | retry/compensate only | | Reconcile ledger |<--| under current authority | +---------------------------+ +--------------------------+ Figure 11: Agentic payment exposure reservation, actual settlement or beneficiary evidence, and uncertainty reconciliation 9. Operational States and Transitions Figure 12 shows the state machine with the attack and recovery paths. Every transition not drawn defaults to DENIED or HELD. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 stage [PROPOSED] ------------> [NON_EFFECTIVE] | reconstruct v [RECONSTRUCTED]--substitution/mismatch--+ | validate | v v [VALIDATING]--stale epoch/revoked-->[DENIED] | all predicates true ^ v | [AUTHORIZED]--expiry-->[EXPIRED] | | present at sink | v | replay / consumed -->[SINK_CHECK]---mismatch/no cap--------+ capability = reject | admit + consume (atomic) v [EFFECTUATING] | | effect evidence | | validator or evidence v | unavailable [CONFIRMED] v [HELD] <---- [INDETERMINATE] (timeout or | ^ lost ack) +-- reconcile--+ | authoritative evidence +--> [CONFIRMED] or [NOT_EFFECTED] Every arrow not drawn defaults to DENIED or HELD (fail closed). Retry from INDETERMINATE requires fresh authority and reconciliation. Figure 12: Attack and recovery state machine: replay, stale epochs, substitution, revocation, timeout, fail-closed Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +==================+=======================+=====================+ | State | Entered when | Leaves to | +==================+=======================+=====================+ | PROPOSED | Source submits act | NON_EFFECTIVE | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | NON_EFFECTIVE | Act staged; no | RECONSTRUCTED | | | consequence | | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | RECONSTRUCTED | Actual Pending | VALIDATING; DENIED | | | Operation derived | (mismatch) | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | VALIDATING | Predicates being | AUTHORIZED; DENIED; | | | evaluated | HELD | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | AUTHORIZED | Capability issued | SINK_CHECK; EXPIRED | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | SINK_CHECK | Capability presented | EFFECTUATING; | | | at sink | DENIED | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | EFFECTUATING | Capability consumed | CONFIRMED; | | | with effect | INDETERMINATE; HELD | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | INDETERMINATE | Timeout, lost ack, | HELD; CONFIRMED; | | | partial effect | NOT_EFFECTED | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | HELD | Validator or evidence | VALIDATING (fresh); | | | unavailable, or | DENIED | | | quarantine | | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ | CONFIRMED / | Terminal for this act | (new act required) | | NOT_EFFECTED / | identity | | | DENIED / EXPIRED | | | +------------------+-----------------------+---------------------+ Table 2: Operational states Retry from INDETERMINATE is not a transition back to AUTHORIZED. It requires a fresh validation under current authority after reconciliation, and it carries the same logical effect identity so that a duplicate is detectable (Section 6, REQ-12). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 10. Interoperability Considerations Because no wire format is defined, interoperability here means preserving the binding between act, effect, authority and epoch across components from different vendors. Candidate carriers for a Scoped Execution Capability include CWT/COSE and JWT ([RFC8392], [RFC9052], [RFC7519]); sender-constraint mechanisms exist ([RFC9449], [RFC8705]); attestation evidence may use RATS roles and EAT ([RFC9334], [RFC9711]). Existing deployments can often remain unchanged above and below the sink, provided the effect-holding credential is held by the sink rather than by the source. Where a component cannot be integrated, the route MUST be declared uncovered rather than assumed protected (REQ-16). Legacy components that may remain unchanged include identity providers, existing RBAC/ABAC policy engines, transaction logs and message brokers; the architecture adds a binding and a check at the effect point. Whether any particular legacy component can host a sink is a deployment question this document does not answer. 11. Failure Handling and Recovery Validator unavailable Operations HOLD; no default allow. Fast paths continue under pre- validated bounded state until its expiry, then fail to the declared safe state. Epoch source unreachable or stale The epoch is treated as not current for consequence classes that require it. Sink crash between consume and effect Recovery classifies the act from sink and destination state before any retry (REQ-13). Timeout or lost acknowledgment Outcome is INDETERMINATE; competing operations are held; reconciliation against the authoritative outcome criterion precedes retry or compensation (REQ-12). Contradictory evidence Treated as unresolved; escalated to human or multi-party resolution as the profile specifies; never defaulted to success. Revocation during flight Unconsumed capability is rejected at the sink; in-flight effects follow the profile's fencing rule (for example E12 for queued segments, E3 for desired-state controllers). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Partial or irreversible physical effect Contain, hold further phases, move to safe state, then reconcile; compensation requires fresh authority. Reclaim and unwind Where lending or delegation was made (E38, E35), reclamation or fork reconciliation proceeds under the profile's deadline and evidence rules. 12. Threat Model 12.1. Assumptions and Adversary Capabilities The adversary may control or influence the operation source and its inputs, may observe and replay messages, may race operations, may obtain credentials for routes that bypass the intended path, and may attempt to disable the validator. The adversary is not assumed to control both a genuine validator and a genuine sink simultaneously; if it does, the architecture offers no protection. The architecture does not promise that it prevents every attack; each threat below lists residual risk. 12.2. T1: Compromised AI agents and untrusted model-generated operations Attacker capability Controls or influences the model output; can propose arbitrary Candidate Acts and describe them misleadingly. Trust boundary Operation source to protected enforcement domain (B1). Protected invariant No act becomes effective unless the reconstructed operation is validated against current authority. Mitigation Validation over the reconstructed operation (REQ-01, REQ-08); sink re-derivation (REQ-03); quotas on proposals. Residual risk an operation within valid scope but harmful in intent; mandate limits bound the harm but do not remove it. Testable failure condition A compromised agent submits an act whose description says 'read' but whose effect is 'write'; the sink MUST reject. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 12.3. T2: Prompt injection and tool-output manipulation Attacker capability Places instructions in retrieved content, tool results or messages that the model treats as authority. Trust boundary Model context versus authority record. Protected invariant Instructions found in data never create or widen authority. Mitigation Authority taken from a record outside the model context (REQ-02); quoted or forwarded content not operative (E24); tool output treated as data. Residual risk injection may still cause an in-scope but unwanted operation. Testable failure condition Inject 'ignore prior limits' via tool output; subsequent act beyond the original scope MUST be denied. 12.4. T3: Delegated authority expansion Attacker capability Uses a delegation chain, handoff or summarization to obtain a wider scope than the originator held. Trust boundary Delegation boundaries and context transformations. Protected invariant Each hop narrows or preserves scope. Mitigation REQ-02; authority record survives compaction (E15); human capsule minimizes disclosure (E17); aggregate and transitive checks (REQ- 08). Residual risk legitimately broad originating authority. Testable failure condition Chain A to B to C where C asks for broader scope; MUST be denied; summarization removes a prohibition; later effect MUST still be denied. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 45] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 12.5. T4: TOCTOU changes between approval and execution Attacker capability Changes target, configuration, dependency topology or policy after validation. Trust boundary Time gap between B1 decision and B2/B3 effect. Protected invariant Effect occurs only under the state that was validated or a state that is at least as restrictive. Mitigation Short validity; re-derivation at the sink (REQ-03); epoch binding (REQ-04); live-topology revalidation (E28). Residual risk change after the sink's check but before the effect in systems without atomic commit. Testable failure condition Change a dependency edge after validation; the sink MUST reject or re-validate. 12.6. T5: Authorization replay and stale capabilities Attacker capability Copies, replays or retains a capability; restores a replica that lost consumption state. Trust boundary Capability store and sink-local state. Protected invariant A capability produces at most its designated effect. Mitigation Non-bearer binding; consumption record (REQ-05, REQ-13); epoch binding (REQ-06). Residual risk loss of consumption state without detection; mitigated by fencing and state commitments. Testable failure condition Present the same capability to a failed-over replica; the second use MUST be rejected. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 46] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 12.7. T6: Changed destinations and effective principals Attacker capability Changes the resolved destination, account or principal behind a nominal name. Trust boundary Name resolution and identity mapping at B2. Protected invariant Effect binds to the destination and principal validated. Mitigation REQ-03; bind to resolved identity not nominal name. Residual risk legitimate re-assignment between sink check and effect. Testable failure condition Reassign an account after validation; the sink MUST reject. 12.8. T7: Validator substitution or compromise Attacker capability Replaces or controls the validator, or forges its decisions. Trust boundary B1. Protected invariant Only a genuine validator in a genuine domain can issue authority; the sink does not rely solely on validator output. Mitigation Attestation of the validator ([RFC9334]); sink-side re-derivation; multi-validator quorum for high-consequence classes; bounded capability scope. Residual risk a compromised validator and a compromised sink together defeat the control. Testable failure condition Substitute a validator with an unattested build; sinks MUST refuse its capabilities. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 47] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 12.9. T8: Forged, replayed or self-reported effect receipts Attacker capability Forges or reuses a receipt, or writes a self-reported 'done'. Trust boundary Evidence path from destination to validator. Protected invariant Only evidence bound to the act, phase and nonce and originating outside the source advances an act. Mitigation REQ-07; single-use receipts; binding to act and phase; destination-origin evidence. Residual risk a compromised destination. Testable failure condition Replay a prior receipt for a new phase; MUST be rejected. 12.10. T9: Missing, delayed or contradictory outcome evidence Attacker capability Suppresses or delays evidence, or induces contradictions among sources. Trust boundary Evidence collection. Protected invariant Absence or conflict is never treated as success or as failure. Mitigation REQ-07, REQ-12; hold and quarantine; reconciliation against authoritative criteria (E14, E19). Residual risk prolonged unresolved outcome ties up exposure. Testable failure condition Withhold evidence; the act MUST remain HELD and no retry MUST be admitted. 12.11. T10: Confused-deputy and privileged-tool execution Attacker capability Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 48] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Induces a privileged tool or service to act on the attacker's behalf. Trust boundary Privileged tool versus act scope. Protected invariant A tool's privilege never exceeds the scope of the act on whose behalf it runs. Mitigation Credential isolation; capability bound to act and tool; REQ-15. Residual risk tools that cannot be wrapped. Testable failure condition Have a privileged tool accept an act-scoped request that asks for broader privilege; MUST be denied. 12.12. T11: Alternate API, credential, hardware or network bypass routes Attacker capability Reaches the target through a route the sink does not mediate. Trust boundary Route inventory versus enforcement points. Protected invariant Every covered route reaches the effect only through a sink. Mitigation REQ-09, REQ-16; route discovery and rejection evidence (E25). Residual risk undiscovered routes. Testable failure condition Add a credential with direct target access; the coverage test MUST flag it or the sink MUST reject its use. 12.13. T12: Hardware DMA, SmartNIC, DPU and accelerator offload paths Attacker capability Uses DMA, residual translations, offloaded rules or accelerator queues to cause an effect outside software checks. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 49] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Trust boundary Software authorization versus installed hardware behavior. Protected invariant Installed behavior is within the authorized effect and prior- domain access paths are closed before reassignment. Mitigation E6 prior-path closure; E10 equivalence and readback; fast-path epoch. Residual risk hardware that cannot report installed state. Testable failure condition Install a rule broader than authorized; enablement MUST be refused. Reassign a device with an open DMA mapping; transition MUST be withheld. 12.14. T13: Rollback, failover, checkpoint restoration and stale worker authority Attacker capability Restores a checkpoint or fails over so that two workers hold effect authority. Trust boundary Worker identity and ownership epoch. Protected invariant At most one worker holds effect-commit authority for a logical computation. Mitigation E5 source fence, destination admission, effect watermark; REQ-05, REQ-13. Residual risk loss of fencing state. Testable failure condition Restore a checkpoint while the source still runs; the source's publish MUST be rejected after cutover. 12.15. T14: Cross-protocol semantic loss Attacker capability Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 50] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Exploits translation that drops restrictions or changes effect semantics. Trust boundary Protocol bridges. Protected invariant Translated operation preserves authority semantics or fails closed. Mitigation REQ-14, REQ-15; feature and exception matrix; end-target enforcement. Residual risk unknown unsupported features. Testable failure condition Translate a prohibition into a protocol lacking it; result MUST be denial or declared uncovered. 12.16. T15: Transaction races, duplicate payment attempts and unresolved settlement Attacker capability Races concurrent agents or retries to exceed a mandate or duplicate a payment. Trust boundary Exposure ledger and payment sink. Protected invariant Reserved plus committed plus unresolved exposure never exceeds the mandate. Mitigation E33 reservation before admission; E14 retry quarantine; conservative unresolved accounting. Residual risk counterparty behavior outside the ledger. Testable failure condition Run N concurrent agents; the sum MUST not exceed the mandate; lose an ack; retry MUST be held. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 51] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 12.17. T16: Compromised secure elements and offline delegated authority Attacker capability Extracts keys or clones state from an offline secure element. Trust boundary Secure element assumptions. Protected invariant Conflicting transfers become detectable and loss is bounded by allocation limits. Mitigation E35 bounded child allocations, lineage and recipient evidence, fork reconciliation. Residual risk undiscovered conflicting transfers; privacy cost of reconciliation. Testable failure condition Clone state and spend twice offline; reconciliation MUST identify the fork and the bounded exposure. 12.18. T17: Denial of service caused by unavailable validators Attacker capability Floods or disables validators or epoch sources to stall operations or force unsafe defaults. Trust boundary Availability of B1. Protected invariant Unavailability yields HOLD/safe state, never implicit allow. Mitigation Redundant validators; local pre-validated bounded state for fast paths; bounded hold and safe-state rules; rate limits. Residual risk availability loss is a real cost; fail-closed trades availability for safety. Testable failure condition Disable the validator; consequential operations MUST be held and no default allow MUST occur. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 52] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 12.19. T18: Recovery after partial or irreversible physical effects Attacker capability Causes or exploits a partially completed physical or irreversible effect. Trust boundary Effect domain. Protected invariant Partial effect is classified and contained before any continuation. Mitigation Bounded real effect; hold; authoritative outcome criteria; safe- state; compensation only under current authority (REQ-11, REQ-12). Residual risk some effects cannot be undone. Testable failure condition Interrupt a multi-step actuation; further steps MUST be held pending classification. 13. Security Considerations This document follows the guidance of [RFC3552]. The threat analysis in Section 12 is part of these Security Considerations. Additional points: * The architecture is an additional layer. It does not replace authentication, authorization, attestation, network security (for example TLS 1.3, [RFC8446]), safety engineering or incident response, and is weakest where the sink cannot be placed at the true first effectual boundary. * Fail-closed behavior trades availability for safety. Operators SHOULD define, per consequence class, the safe state and the maximum hold duration. * Compromise of the validator and the sink together defeats the control. Separation of administrative domains, attestation and quorum mitigate but do not eliminate this. * Reconstruction is only as complete as the model of effects. Unmodelled branches are a primary residual risk; route coverage evidence (REQ-09) and dependency graphs help. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 53] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * Evidence admission is security critical. A sink that accepts self-reported evidence gives the source control of continuation. * No security claim in this document is supported by experimental results. Any implementation needs its own testing, including the testable failure conditions listed above. 14. Privacy Considerations This section follows [RFC6973]. The architecture creates records that can contain personal or confidential data and can enable correlation: * Canonical operation representations and receipts may carry identifiers of users, counterparties, amounts and destinations. Implementations SHOULD minimize the data bound into a capability or receipt and SHOULD avoid including content that is not needed for the decision (data minimization). * Receipts, consumption records and ledgers create long-lived linkable records. Retention, access control and purpose limitation SHOULD be defined, and unlinkability techniques SHOULD be considered where the consequence class allows. * Human-assistance capsules (E17) are intended to limit disclosure to the bounded task and evidence needed. * Audience and presentation profiles (E11, E12, E24) process information about who can perceive output; this is itself personal data. * Offline cash reconciliation (E35) has an inherent tension between detecting forks and preserving transaction privacy; the profile aims to protect appropriate privacy but this document does not resolve the trade-off. * Cross-engine data-policy checks (E30) and cohort reconciliation (E29) apply the data subject's existing consent and suppression state and do not create new lawful bases. 15. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. A separate individual draft by the same author, draft-das-ef-registries, proposes registries for the execution-finality family; nothing in this document depends on that proposal. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 54] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 16. Comparison with Established Standards and Prior Art This section credits established work and states candidate differences without asserting originality. Patentability arguments (motivation to combine, reasonable expectation of success, technical interdependence) are kept in Appendix D and are not part of the proposed architecture. RFC 9334 RATS architecture; RFC 9711 EAT Established function: Attestation evidence, verifier appraisal and relying-party policy. Overlap and candidate difference: E9 concerns correspondence between remediation, evidence and policy per consequence class, and E10/E6 bind attested or installed state to specific effects. It uses RATS roles and does not replace them. OAuth 2.0, token exchange, DPoP, mTLS-bound tokens, RAR Established function: Delegated authorization, sender constraint, fine-grained authorization details. Overlap and candidate difference: The candidate additions are re- derivation of the effective operation at the resource boundary, binding to epochs and consumption, and route-coverage evidence. A RAR authorization detail could carry part of the scope. JWT, CWT, COSE Established function: Claim and signature formats. Overlap and candidate difference: Candidate carriers only; no format is selected. Distributed fencing tokens and generation counters Established function: Prevent stale holders from writing after lease change. Overlap and candidate difference: E5 and E3 use epoch fencing for effect-commit authority of a computation and for reconciliation generations. The difference to examine is the combination with checkpoint cutover, destination admission and an effect watermark. Database transactions and the transactional outbox Established function: Atomic state change plus reliable event publication; CDC. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 55] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Overlap and candidate difference: E32 binds downstream effect authority to the source commit and to effect state; E31 addresses transitive stored-program effects. Established patterns are credited; the examined element is the authority binding. Service-mesh enforcement and workload identity Established function: Per-hop identity and policy. Overlap and candidate difference: E36 traces parent authority across subrequests, queues and background workers and enforces at outbound effect paths. Mesh policy is closely related and must be compared. Programmable-network policy verification Established function: P4Runtime, match-action verification, consistent updates. Overlap and candidate difference: E10 compares installed effective behavior with a software-authorized effect and fences stale fast- path authority. Existing verification work overlaps and must be compared. 3GPP mobility, ATSSS and network slicing Established function: Access steering, mobility hysteresis, slice isolation and resource management. Overlap and candidate difference: E7 evaluates cumulative connectivity trajectory; E38 evaluates slice lending with conservation and enforceable reclaim. 3GPP mechanisms are the primary comparison. Secure elements and offline cash Established function: Offline double-spend prevention under intact-hardware assumptions. Overlap and candidate difference: E35 considers delegated allocations and post-compromise fork reconciliation. It does not claim that existing designs lack double-spend protection under their own assumptions. Zero trust, RBAC, ABAC Established function: Principle of continuous verification; role and attribute decisions. Overlap and candidate difference: Consistent with and layered over; the added element is verification at the actual effect boundary. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 56] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 17. Foundational Architecture and Later Consequence-Specific Refinements This section is non-normative. Per Source C and the applicant's description, the June 2026 mothership (PCT/IB2026/055615) already describes the broad protected execution-finality architecture, including Candidate Acts, non-effective staging, protected evidence and receipts, cryptographic validation, Finality Sinks, and accelerator and network egress control in many domains. The later Indian provisional (202631136555, 15 November 2026) is a specialized disclosure that examines narrower implementations and combinations. Limit of this comparison: the editor did not have the mothership JSON text. Statements about what the mothership contains are taken from the applicant's comparison and are not independently verified. This document does not claim that any feature below is absent from the original text; a feature not appearing under an exact phrase may still be disclosed expressly or inherently. Distinguishing a disclosure refinement from independently established novelty or priority is a matter for examination against the as-filed text and relevant prior art. Accelerator authority cutover (E5) Technical predicate: Source fence, destination admission and effect watermark give a single effect-commit owner. Actual effect governed: Externally authoritative compute output (publish or model-state commit) during migration or failover. Claimed functional interdependence: Checkpoint transfer, fencing and the sink's admission check must cooperate; copying state alone confers no authority. Hardware trust-domain access-path closure (E6) Technical predicate: Evidence that old-domain DMA, interrupt, debug and queued-I/O paths are closed. Actual effect governed: Reassignment of a peripheral, memory region or accelerator to another trust domain. Claimed functional interdependence: Successor authority is withheld until path-quiescence evidence from the controller and the translation hardware is joined. Cumulative temporal connectivity limits (E7) Technical predicate: Cumulative effect of transition history compared with a temporal envelope. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 57] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Actual effect governed: Discretionary access transitions of a device. Claimed functional interdependence: A protected transition record and the next transition's validation cooperate. Consequence-specific composed numerical uncertainty (E8) Technical predicate: Composed error versus decision margin; permit, request higher precision, or block. Actual effect governed: Release of a numerical decision to a consequential consumer. Claimed functional interdependence: Model/precision state, error composition and the consequence's margin must be evaluated together. Remediation, attestation and policy correspondence (E9) Technical predicate: Patch state, fresh evidence, reference values and policy match per consequence class. Actual effect governed: Admission of workload effects after a security remediation. Claimed functional interdependence: Remediation controller, attestation evidence controller and class-admission matrix cooperate. Software-to-installed-hardware effect equivalence (E10) Technical predicate: Installed fast-path match/action effects are a subset of the permitted effect, with an authority epoch. Actual effect governed: Hardware-accelerated processing of authorized flows. Claimed functional interdependence: Slow-path witness, offload contract, effective hardware descriptor and barrier cooperate. Multimodal route and audience continuity (E11, E12) Technical predicate: Audience and route evaluated across concurrent and in-flight output. Actual effect governed: Human-perceptible presentation of information. Claimed functional interdependence: Presentation controller, route state and queue fencing cooperate. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 58] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Negative-observation admissibility (E12A) Technical predicate: 'No event' admitted only with sensing opportunity and coverage. Actual effect governed: Actions inferred from absence of an event. Claimed functional interdependence: Sensor health, coverage and time-gap evidence feed the admission decision. Agent-context authority continuity (E15) Technical predicate: Authority register independent of model context binds later calls. Actual effect governed: Tool calls after context summarization or handoff. Claimed functional interdependence: Register, dispatcher and credential isolation cooperate. Verification-oracle independence (E16) Technical predicate: Acceptance criteria and oracle isolated from the modifying agent; deployed bytes bound to approval. Actual effect governed: Release of agent-produced software. Claimed functional interdependence: Oracle isolation and artifact binding cooperate at the promotion gate. Cross-protocol tool semantic preservation (E20) Technical predicate: Canonical authority contract, feature/ exception matrix and tool-location map. Actual effect governed: Tool execution across model APIs and hosted or client-executed tools. Claimed functional interdependence: Bridge, contract and end- target enforcement cooperate. Aggregate work-product validation (E21) Technical predicate: Materialized composition validated against cross-branch constraints. Actual effect governed: Commit of combined agent work. Claimed functional interdependence: Composition snapshot and aggregate validator cooperate at the merge boundary. Governance enforcement-path coverage (E25) Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 59] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Technical predicate: Route inventory and sink-rejection evidence. Actual effect governed: Assurance that governance controls are enforceable at effect routes. Claimed functional interdependence: Inventory, contract, probes and sink evidence cooperate. Cross-engine data-policy equivalence (E30) Technical predicate: Mandatory row, column, masking and recipient obligations survive the actual route. Actual effect governed: Disclosure of governed data through alternative engines or shares. Claimed functional interdependence: Policy semantics per engine and result-release validation cooperate. Source-commit-certified downstream effects (E32) Technical predicate: Consumer effect authority bound to a source- commit certificate. Actual effect governed: External operations derived from committed transactions. Claimed functional interdependence: Source-transaction controller, certificate and consumer sink cooperate. Agentic payment exposure (E33) Technical predicate: Conservative aggregate exposure with reservation before admission. Actual effect governed: Payment obligations from one or more agents. Claimed functional interdependence: Mandate, ledger, reservation and capture reconciliation cooperate. Offline cash post-compromise reconciliation (E35) Technical predicate: Delegated allocations, lineage and recipient evidence for fork attribution and bounded loss. Actual effect governed: Offline monetary transfers. Claimed functional interdependence: Allocation continuity, transfer evidence and fork reconciliation cooperate. Causal radio impairment (E37) Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 60] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Technical predicate: Attributable impact evidence bounds expansion of a limited real change. Actual effect governed: Progressive deployment of RAN optimization. Claimed functional interdependence: Canary change, impact attribution and expansion gate cooperate. 6G slice-lending conservation and reclaimability (E38) Technical predicate: Lending conserves capacity, preserves floors and is reclaimable by a deadline. Actual effect governed: Temporary slice resource loans. Claimed functional interdependence: Entitlement table, lease state, reclaim state and scheduler enforcement cooperate. 18. European Critical-Infrastructure and Digital-Sovereignty Applicability This section is non-normative. It explains engineering relevance only. This document is not an EU compliance standard, and nothing here states that the architecture satisfies any legal obligation. Obligations vary by actor, product, sector and application date; readers should consult the legal texts and competent authorities. EU AI Act ([EU-AIA]) The Regulation addresses risk management, record-keeping, human oversight and robustness for certain AI systems. A mechanism that makes a high-consequence action conditional on current, evidence- backed authority at the point of effect, with records of what was authorized and what occurred, is of engineering relevance to these themes. It is not shown here to satisfy any article. NIS2 ([EU-NIS2]) Entities in covered sectors manage cybersecurity risk and incident handling. Bounded blast radius, route coverage evidence and fail- closed holds relate to risk-management measures at an engineering level. DORA ([EU-DORA]) Financial entities manage ICT risk and third-party risk. Exposure ledgers, reconciliation of unresolved outcomes and control over agent-initiated operations relate to operational resilience themes (E14, E33, E34). Cyber Resilience Act ([EU-CRA]) Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 61] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Products with digital elements require security by design and vulnerability handling. The remediation-attestation correspondence profile (E9) and artifact-promotion gate (E16) are relevant to engineering of update and release flows. European digital sovereignty Jurisdiction-bound, region-bound authority and evidence held by European operators can be modelled as policy predicates at a sink. The architecture does not itself guarantee data residency or provider independence. European 6G research AI-native orchestration and network automation research may benefit from management-plane authorization at configuration- effect boundaries (E2, E37, E38). No claim is made about any research programme's work or standards contribution. Telecommunications service continuity Causal impairment control (E37), slice lending with reclaim (E38) and cumulative connectivity limits (E7) address service continuity at the management and device-policy level. Industrial and operational-technology security Protected hand-off of setpoints, deployments and remote commands can be gated at the actuation or deployment boundary, with local interlocks retained and explicit time budgets. Banking and digital-euro research Exposure control for agent payments (E33), beneficiary-net outcomes (E34) and offline post-compromise reconciliation (E35) are research-level extensions. Existing secure-element and scheme controls remain authoritative; the Eurosystem's own research should be consulted ([ECB-DE]). Trusted and confidential computing Attestation-to-effect linkage (E9), trust-domain transitions (E6) and offload equivalence (E10) relate to confidential computing deployments and require the relevant hardware interfaces. Critical energy, transport and communications infrastructure Autonomous change and distributed actuation can be controlled by effect-specific gates. The architecture does not claim universal safety or certification. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 62] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 18.1. Low-Latency Loops Versus Slower Consequential Boundaries Radio scheduling, HARQ, protection relays and similar safety-control loops operate at time scales where per-event authorization is generally infeasible; they rely on pre-validated local state and on certified safety functions. The proposals in this document address the slower boundaries where AI-generated or autonomous decisions become configuration, authorization, settlement or deployment effects. Where both are present, validation occurs when the bounded local state is created, renewed, changed or revoked (Section 7). 18.2. Relationship to the Related European Research Publication Sangam Das, "EUROPE'S NEXT AI SECURITY CHALLENGE: WHO CONTROLS THE FINAL ACTION? From EU AI Act and NIS2 to 6G, the Digital Euro, Industrial AI and Critical Infrastructure", published 16 November 2026, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24274259 ([ZENODO-EU]). It is a non-peer- reviewed public research publication by the same author. Its relevance to this document is that it discusses, from a European perspective, who controls the final action in AI and autonomous systems, which is the question this document turns into an architecture. The editor could not retrieve the record when preparing this text, so this description is limited to the title and author-supplied context. Neither this document nor that publication establishes regulatory compliance or technical verification. 19. Industry Integration Profiles (Proposed) This section is non-normative and AI-assisted. Each entry separates verified public context from proposed integration. Verified context is a coarse public description that readers must re-verify against current vendor documentation. Proposed integration points are the author's engineering hypotheses and are not adoption, endorsement or infringement statements. No vendor has been shown to implement the proposed combinations. 19.1. AI and cloud: OpenAI Agents SDK Verified public context (re-verify) Public SDK with function tools, handoffs and guardrails. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Place the sink in the tool dispatcher: before a function tool with a consequential effect runs, the dispatcher re-derives the operation, checks the authority record held outside the prompt, and rejects calls whose target or scope differs. It matters because handoffs and summarization can otherwise lose prohibitions (E15, E20). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 63] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Agent code and model unchanged; real credentials held by the dispatcher or a proxy, not the model process. Adds one local check per consequential call; no latency measurement is claimed. 19.2. AI and cloud: Anthropic Claude tool use and MCP Verified public context (re-verify) Public tool-use interfaces; MCP is an open protocol for tool and context servers. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Place enforcement in the MCP client/host dispatch and at the MCP server's end target: the host looks up the canonical authority contract for each tool call, the server's sink verifies a scoped capability against the actual operation and rejects widened scope. It matters for cross-protocol semantic loss (E20) and confused- deputy risk (T10). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety MCP servers continue to expose tools; the capability is an additional parameter or header; downstream credentials stay server-side. 19.3. AI and cloud: Microsoft Azure AI (Foundry agents) Verified public context (re-verify) Public managed agent service with tool integration and managed identities. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Insert the sink in the connector that holds the downstream credential: the managed identity is used only by the sink after capability verification, so an agent cannot call the target directly. It matters for alternate-credential bypass (T11). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Existing RBAC and identity unchanged; the agent loses direct access to the target credential. 19.4. AI and cloud: Google Cloud AI (ADK, Vertex agents, A2A) Verified public context (re-verify) Public agent framework and agent-to-agent protocol. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 64] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 In multi-agent runs, validate the composed work product at the shared commit step (E21), and preserve the authority contract across agent-to-agent hand-offs (E15, E20). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Framework unchanged; commit step gains a validator call. 19.5. AI and cloud: AWS agent services Verified public context (re-verify) Public managed agent runtime with gateway and policy features. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Where a gateway already enforces policy, add end-target sink checks for effect classes the gateway cannot see (provider-hosted or direct-credential paths), and gather rejection evidence for route coverage (E25). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Gateway unchanged; adds coverage evidence and an end-target check. 19.6. Networking: Ericsson AI-RAN and automation platforms Verified public context (re-verify) Public automation platform with rApps in the non-real-time domain. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Gate the point where an rApp's output becomes an applied configuration: reconstruct multi-cell and slice effect, validate, apply as a limited change, and expand only on attributable impact evidence (E2, E37). It matters because a locally successful change can harm neighbors. Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety rApps and SMO unchanged; adds an admission step; PHY/MAC loops untouched. 19.7. Networking: Nokia MantaRay Verified public context (re-verify) Public SMO and RAN automation offering. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Same placement as above for SMO policy and slice control; for slice lending, the slice controller enforces entitlement floors and reclaim deadlines (E38). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 65] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Existing controllers unchanged; lease state added. 19.8. Networking: Open RAN, 5G Advanced, 6G slicing, edge/mobile Verified public context (re-verify) O-RAN defines Non-RT/Near-RT RIC and open interfaces; 3GPP defines slicing. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Admission and effect verification at A1/O1-style management actions; no per-transport-block validation. Cumulative connectivity policy at the device (E7). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Standard interfaces unchanged; new checks sit in management or device policy. 19.9. Enterprise: SAP Business AI and Joule Verified public context (re-verify) Public agents operating on SAP business processes. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Insert a late-bound validator at the posting or release boundary: recompute tax, FX, pricing and allocation effects from live state and compare with the approval before the posting commits (E26). It matters because the approved document and the posted effect can differ. Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety ERP logic remains authoritative; the check calls the same computation in preview mode where available. 19.10. Enterprise: Oracle database and ERP Verified public context (re-verify) Public database with stored programs, triggers and agent integration. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Close the effect set of a stored program before a privileged mutation: enumerate triggers, definer-rights code and autonomous transactions reachable from the entry point and require authority for each material effect (E31). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Database security remains authoritative; enforcement in a supported hook or proxy. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 66] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 19.11. Enterprise: Salesforce Agentforce Verified public context (re-verify) Public agent platform on CRM data and flows. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Gate customer-facing 'completed' statements on authoritative fulfillment evidence (E27) and validate cohort fan-out (E29). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Flows unchanged; communication dispatch gains an evidence check. 19.12. Enterprise: ServiceNow AI workflows Verified public context (re-verify) Public workflow and ITOM features. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Revalidate the live dependency topology at the remediation commit (E28) and quarantine unresolved outcomes (E14). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety CMDB unchanged; commit step adds a check. 19.13. Enterprise: IBM watsonx Verified public context (re-verify) Public governance and orchestration products. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Governance dashboards can export route inventory; add sink- rejection evidence per route to turn dashboards into coverage proof (E25). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Existing governance product unchanged. 19.14. Enterprise: Databricks Unity Catalog Verified public context (re-verify) Public catalog with row and column controls. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Test that obligations survive each query route, including shared or alternative engines, and validate the actual result released (E30); reconcile activation populations (E29). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 67] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Catalog policies unchanged; adds route-level equivalence tests. 19.15. Enterprise: Snowflake Cortex Verified public context (re-verify) Public catalog and agent features. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Same as above for cross-engine semantics and result release (E30). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Native governance unchanged. 19.16. Compute: NVIDIA accelerators and BlueField Verified public context (re-verify) Public GPU partitioning and DPU offload. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Single-writer output cutover on failover (E5); offload readback versus authorized flow (E10). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Drivers unchanged; requires device interfaces for installed-state readback, which must be verified. 19.17. Compute: AMD Instinct and Pensando Verified public context (re-verify) Public accelerators and DPU. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Same placements (E5, E10). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Dependent on device interfaces. 19.18. Compute: Intel confidential computing Verified public context (re-verify) Public TDX and attestation services. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Join attestation evidence with patch state and policy per consequence class before admitting effects (E9) and close prior- domain paths on reassignment (E6). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 68] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Attestation service unchanged. 19.19. Compute: Arm CCA Verified public context (re-verify) Public confidential compute architecture with realm management. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Domain transition controller withholds successor authority until DMA and interrupt paths are closed (E6). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Depends on SMMU and RME interfaces. 19.20. Compute: Qualcomm on-device and Apple/Samsung devices Verified public context (re-verify) Public SoCs and mobile platforms with sensor hubs and output routing. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Wake-time revalidation of escrowed intents (E13); audience-bound release across display and casting routes (E11, E12); connectivity trajectory limits (E7). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Requires OS vendor interfaces; no adoption is implied. 19.21. Finance: ECB digital euro research, offline payments Verified public context (re-verify) Public Eurosystem research on offline payments with secure hardware. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Research extension: delegated child allocations and post- compromise fork reconciliation (E35). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Existing secure-element controls remain authoritative. 19.22. Finance: Visa, Mastercard, Swift, Adyen, Worldline, tokenized settlement, agentic commerce Verified public context (re-verify) Public agent-payment initiatives and payment networks. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 69] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Exposure ledger and reservation at authorization-to-capture (E33); beneficiary-net checks and reconciliation at cross-border flows (E34); retry quarantine after lost acknowledgments (E14). Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Network controls remain authoritative; participants control only their own phases. 19.23. Industrial: Siemens, Schneider Electric, industrial edge, digital twins, robotics, energy Verified public context (re-verify) Public industrial edge platforms and automation suites. Proposed enforcement interface and how it works Gate deployments and remote commands at the edge runtime and at the actuation boundary; retain local interlocks; use digital-twin results as evidence, not as authority. Legacy components, credentials, latency and safety Safety functions unchanged; validator unavailability must map to the system's safe state. 20. IPR Disclosure, Attribution and Non-Endorsement Foundational reference: PCT/IB2026/055615 [PCT-055615], filed 4 June 2026, published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2. Later Indian provisional application: 202631136555 [IN-136555], dated 15 November 2026 (as reported by the applicant from the filing acknowledgment; the supplied PDF is not a certified registry record). Public research cross-reference: https://doi.org/10.5281/ zenodo.24274259 [ZENODO-EU] Related public disclosures by the same author (informative): Technical Disclosure Commons records [TDC-12542], [TDC-12667], [TDC-12668], [TDC-12853], [TDC-12931], [TDC-12961]; Zenodo records [ZEN-21861642], [ZEN-22082995], [ZEN-23040181], [ZEN-23657985]; and the earlier Internet-Drafts cited in Section 1.3, including [I-D.das-execution-finality-protocol-layer]. Titles are as listed in the applicant's index and should be verified. Attribution: the underlying technical invention is attributed to the human inventor, Sangam Kumar Das. AI-assisted drafting, summarization, indexing, translation or literature analysis does not establish independent inventorship. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 70] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Limits: citation of a patent document does not establish patent validity, priority, essentiality or licensing terms. This document contains no licensing commitment and makes no statement about royalties. Contributors are bound by BCP 78 and BCP 79 ([RFC5378], [RFC8179]). The author will make the IPR disclosure for this document at the appropriate time, through the official IETF process and in accordance with IETF guidelines; text in this document is not a substitute for that formal disclosure. An earlier IPR declaration relating to related DAS Internet-Drafts is listed at [IETF-IPR-7610]; whether it covers this document has not been established. Readers should consult the IETF IPR disclosure database for the current status of any declaration relating to this author's drafts. Source integrity: the Indian filing text supplied to the editor contains 427 physically present numbered claims (1-273 and 276-429). Claims 274 and 275 are absent and claim 273 ends mid-sentence (at 'current Group Audience'). This document does not reconstruct the missing text. Verify against the official filed copy (Appendix C). Non-endorsement: this is an individual technical proposal and not an endorsed IETF standard, EU regulatory approval, telecommunications standard, financial certification or implementation by a named company. Company and product references indicate potential technical integration points and are not evidence of adoption, sponsorship, copying, infringement or commercial affiliation. Because AI- generated material may contain errors, readers should verify all patent numbers, dates, claim quotations, product capabilities, standards references and technical assertions against primary sources. 21. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, BCP 14, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, BCP 14, May 2017, . 22. Informative References [ECB-DE] European Central Bank, "Digital euro", 2026, . Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 71] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 [EU-AIA] European Union, "Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act)", 2024, . [EU-CRA] European Union, "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act)", 2024, . [EU-DORA] European Union, "Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (Digital Operational Resilience Act)", 2022, . [EU-NIS2] European Union, "Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2)", 2022, . [I-D.das-agent-execution-finality] Das, S., "draft-das-agent-execution-finality (full title not verified by the editor)", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-das-agent-execution-finality, 2026, . [I-D.das-causal-effect-receipts] Das, S., "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 6: Verified Actual- Effect Receipts and Protected Causal Continuation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-causal-effect- receipts, October 2026, . [I-D.das-ef-registries] Das, S., "Illustrative Codes Are Not a Namespace: Registries for Execution-Finality Consequence Classes, Sink Types, Act Types, Failure Codes, Profiles, and Media Types", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-ef- registries, 2026, . [I-D.das-execution-finality-foundations] Das, S., "draft-das-execution-finality-foundations (full title not verified by the editor)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-execution-finality-foundations, 2026, . [I-D.das-execution-finality-protocol-layer] Das, S., "The Missing Protocol Layer for the Agentic Internet: Computation Is Not Authority", Work in Progress, Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 72] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Internet-Draft, draft-das-execution-finality-protocol- layer, September 2026, . [I-D.das-finality-sink-enforcement] Das, S., "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 4: Finality Sink Enforcement, Actual-Operation Reconstruction, and Anti- Bypass Security", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- das-finality-sink-enforcement, October 2026, . [I-D.das-interoperable-consequence-authority] Das, S., "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 1: Foundational Consequential Authority and Common Workflows", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-interoperable- consequence-authority, October 2026, . [I-D.das-receipt-gated-iev] Das, S., "Evidence Is the Key, Not the Log: Receipt-Gated Staged Effectuation and Interim Effectuation Validation for AI Agents, Frontier AI Model Providers, and Autonomous Systems", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das- receipt-gated-iev, October 2026, . [IETF-IPR-7610] IETF, "IETF IPR Disclosure 7610 (as cited in the applicant index)", 2026, . [IN-136555] Das, S., "Indian Provisional Patent Application 202631136555", As reported by the applicant. Not a certified registry record., 15 November 2026, . [ISO20022] ISO, "ISO 20022 Financial services - Universal financial industry message scheme", 2026, . Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 73] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 [NIST-ABAC] NIST, "Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations (NIST SP 800-162)", January 2014, . [NIST-ZTA] NIST, "Zero Trust Architecture (NIST SP 800-207)", August 2020, . [ORAN-ARCH] O-RAN Alliance, "O-RAN Architecture Description", 2026, . [OUTBOX] microservices.io, "Pattern: Transactional outbox", 2018, . [PCT-055615] Das, S., "Systems and Methods for Protected Execution Finality (PCT/IB2026/055615; WO 2026/150382 A2)", Filed 4 June 2026; published 16 July 2026. Verify the exact title and text in WIPO PATENTSCOPE., 16 July 2026, . [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", RFC 3552, DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, BCP 72, July 2003, . [RFC5378] Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Rights Contributors Provide to the IETF Trust", RFC 5378, DOI 10.17487/RFC5378, BCP 78, November 2008, . [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, . [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, . [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, . Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 74] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 [RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of- Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016, . [RFC8179] Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology", RFC 8179, DOI 10.17487/RFC8179, BCP 79, May 2017, . [RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, May 2018, . [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, . [RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, . [RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020, . [RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, . [RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, . [RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023, . [RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, September 2023, . Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 75] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 [RFC9711] Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711, DOI 10.17487/RFC9711, April 2025, . [TDC-12542] Das, S., "Agent Proposes, Boundary Decides (prior- disclosure research challenge)", Technical Disclosure Commons. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [TDC-12667] Das, S., "Beyond HTTPS and OAuth: action-level execution authorization", Technical Disclosure Commons. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [TDC-12668] Das, S., "TLS Protects the Channel, Not the Consequence", Technical Disclosure Commons. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [TDC-12853] Das, S., "Jurisdiction-bound execution finality for sovereign infrastructure", Technical Disclosure Commons. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [TDC-12931] Das, S., "AI safety for on-device assistants and European interoperability", Technical Disclosure Commons. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [TDC-12961] Das, S., "6G / AI-RAN / protected network-effect execution", Technical Disclosure Commons. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [TS23501] 3GPP, "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS) (3GPP TS 23.501)", 2026, . Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 76] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 [ZEN-21861642] Das, S., "Execution-finality technical architecture: computation is not authority", Zenodo. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [ZEN-22082995] Das, S., "The Internet Solved Communication. It Never Solved Authority", Zenodo. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [ZEN-23040181] Das, S., "Earlier DAS disclosures and Meta Muse/Sentinel: independent comparison guide", Zenodo. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [ZEN-23657985] Das, S., "Cross-platform iOS/Android AI-agent execution- finality specification", Zenodo. Title as listed in the applicant index; verify., 2026, . [ZENODO-EU] Das, S., "EUROPE'S NEXT AI SECURITY CHALLENGE: WHO CONTROLS THE FINAL ACTION? From EU AI Act and NIS2 to 6G, the Digital Euro, Industrial AI and Critical Infrastructure", Zenodo record https://zenodo.org/records/24274259, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24274259, 16 November 2026, . Appendix A. Embodiment Profiles E1 to E38 and E12A This appendix is non-normative. It uses the claim mapping of the Indian provisional's consolidated claim section as supplied to the editor. For each profile it gives the technical objective, the distinguishing enforcement predicate (taken from the 'wherein' clause of the independent claim), the effectuation boundary, primary failure modes, the claim group, interoperability relevance and a classification. The classification (N narrows an earlier principle; C combines earlier mechanisms; X appears to introduce additional subject matter requiring independent examination) is an editorial reading of the applicant's comparison and is not verified against the mothership text. No independent novelty is asserted merely because a profile contains newly named components. Claim numbers must be verified against the official filed copy: claims 274 and 275 are Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 77] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 absent and claim 273 is truncated in the supplied PDF. +====+==========+=========================+========================+ |ID | Claims | Subject | Class | +====+==========+=========================+========================+ |E1 | 1-11 | Protected cryptographic | HSM and KMS command | | | | key-lifecycle finality | admission; PKCS#11/ | | | | | KMIP-style management | | | | | interfaces; key-state | | | | | fencing. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E2 | 12-22 | AI-native radio-network | O-RAN SMO/Non-RT RIC | | | | state authorization | policy admission; O1/ | | | | | A1-style configuration | | | | | paths; vendor | | | | | automation platforms. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E3 | 23-33 | Declarative | Kubernetes | | | | reconciliation and non- | controllers, GitOps | | | | resurrection | revision pinning, | | | | | admission control, | | | | | lease/epoch fencing. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E4 | 34-44 | Causal downstream- | Event meshes, workflow | | | | effect closure | engines, message | | | | | brokers, saga | | | | | orchestrators; ERP and | | | | | CRM event consumers. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E5 | 45-55 | Accelerator execution- | Distributed training/ | | | | authority cutover | inference fleets; GPU | | | | | partitioning; | | | | | checkpoint promotion; | | | | | fencing-token style | | | | | ownership epochs. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E6 | 56-66 | Trust-domain transition | Arm CCA/RME with SMMU, | | | | and prior-access | Intel TDX, AMD SEV- | | | | closure | SNP, SoC domain | | | | | controllers. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E7 | 67-77 | Cumulative connectivity | Device connectivity | | | | trajectory | managers; multi-access | | | | authorization | steering policies; | | | | | mobility hysteresis | | | | | and dwell-time | | | | | management. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 78] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 |E8 | 78-88 | Consequence-specific | Mixed-precision and | | | | numerical-error | quantized inference | | | | reliability | stacks; safety- | | | | | relevant decision | | | | | gates; accelerator | | | | | runtimes. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E9 | 89-99 | Remediation and current | RATS verifier/relying- | | | | attestation | party roles (RFC | | | | correspondence | 9334); confidential- | | | | | computing attestation | | | | | services. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E10 | 100-110 | Software-to-hardware | SmartNIC/DPU/IPU | | | | offload effect | offload; P4 pipelines; | | | | equivalence | flow-rule tables; | | | | | programmable switch | | | | | fast paths. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E11 | 111-121 | Multimodal audience and | Device output routers; | | | | presentation exposure | casting and screen- | | | | | sharing stacks; | | | | | notification delivery. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E12A| 122-132 | Negative-observation | Home/building | | | | and sensor-coverage | automation hubs; | | | | evidence | physical-security and | | | | | ambient-sensing | | | | | platforms. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E12 | 133-143 | In-flight media release | Streaming and | | | | and route changes | notification queues; | | | | | casting revocation; | | | | | secure audio/video | | | | | output. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E13 | 144-154 | Low-power intent escrow | Sensor hubs and | | | | and wake-epoch | always-on | | | | continuity | coprocessors; mobile | | | | | and embedded SoC power | | | | | domains. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E14 | 155-165 | Uncertain execution | Idempotency keys, | | | | outcomes and retry | durable workflows, | | | | safety | outbox reconciliation, | | | | | payment status | | | | | inquiry. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 79] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 |E15 | 166-176 | Authority continuity | Agent SDKs and | | | | through agent context | runtimes with tool | | | | compaction | dispatch, memory and | | | | | handoff features. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E16 | 177-187 | Independent | CI/CD pipelines, | | | | verification of | artifact signing, | | | | autonomous software | provenance | | | | repairs | attestations, | | | | | protected branches. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E17 | 188-198 | Human delegation and | Service-desk, approval | | | | minimal-disclosure | and case-management | | | | authority | workflows with human | | | | | escalation. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E18 | 199-209 | Spoken intent and | Voice assistants, | | | | interruption-epoch | realtime voice agents, | | | | validation | in-car and smart-home | | | | | voice control. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E19 | 210-220 | Cross-source factual | Retrieval-augmented | | | | evidence consistency | systems; enterprise | | | | | search; temporal and | | | | | snapshot data stores. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E20 | 221-231 | Cross-protocol tool- | MCP, vendor agent | | | | semantic authority | APIs, agent-to-agent | | | | | protocols, tool | | | | | gateways. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E21 | 232-242 | Aggregate multi-agent | Multi-agent | | | | work-product finality | orchestration; | | | | | collaborative revision | | | | | and merge systems. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E22 | 243-253 | Document-field spatial | Document AI, invoice | | | | provenance | processing, accounts- | | | | | payable automation. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E23 | 254-264 | Visual-target and | Multimodal assistants, | | | | persistent referent | robotics, spatial | | | | continuity | computing, GUI- | | | | | automation agents. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E24 | 265-273* | Cross-channel | Enterprise messaging | | | | communication-origin | and collaboration | | | | authority | channels, business | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 80] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 | | | | messaging APIs. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E25 | 276-286 | Governance enforcement- | Agent-governance | | | | coverage reconciliation | platforms, API/ | | | | | credential | | | | | inventories, effect- | | | | | route test harnesses. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E26 | 287-297 | Late-bound ERP and | ERP and accounting | | | | accounting effects | systems, procure-to- | | | | | pay, financial close. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E27 | 298-308 | Customer commitments | Customer-service | | | | versus actual | agents, case- | | | | fulfillment | management and order- | | | | | fulfillment systems. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E28 | 309-319 | Live-topology IT | IT operations | | | | remediation | management, CMDB, | | | | | cloud change and | | | | | remediation tooling. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E29 | 320-330 | Analytical cohort | Data platforms with | | | | identity and activation | activation to | | | | | marketing, CRM and | | | | | account actions. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E30 | 331-341 | Cross-engine data- | Lakehouse and | | | | policy semantics | warehouse catalogs, | | | | | data-sharing and | | | | | multi-engine query | | | | | paths. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E31 | 342-352 | Transitive database | Relational databases | | | | stored-program effects | with stored programs, | | | | | triggers and external- | | | | | call features. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E32 | 353-363 | Source-commit-certified | Transactional outbox, | | | | downstream effects | change-data-capture, | | | | | brokers and event | | | | | buses. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E33 | 364-374 | Agentic payment | Tokenized agent | | | | exposure reservation | payments, issuer and | | | | | gateway limit | | | | | controls, PSP APIs. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 81] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 |E34 | 375-385 | Cross-border FX and | Cross-border payment | | | | beneficiary outcomes | messaging and | | | | | tracking; remittance | | | | | networks. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E35 | 386-396 | Offline digital cash | Offline digital- | | | | post-compromise fork | currency research and | | | | evidence | wallets with secure | | | | | elements. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E36 | 397-407 | Edge subrequest and | Edge and serverless | | | | outbound-effect | runtimes, queues, | | | | authority | service bindings, | | | | | egress gateways. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E37 | 408-418 | Causal radio-service | RAN automation and | | | | impairment control | rollout management, | | | | | canary and closed-loop | | | | | optimization. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ |E38 | 419-429 | 6G network-slice | Network-slice | | | | capacity lending and | orchestration and RAN | | | | reclamation | slice controllers. | +----+----------+-------------------------+------------------------+ Table 3: Embodiment and claim mapping (39 profiles) A.1. E1 (Claims 1-11): Protected cryptographic key-lifecycle finality Technical objective Gate key creation, activation, rotation, derivation, export, use and destruction on the effective key/partition transition, not on the requesting credential. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authorization of the originating request, or possession of administrative credentials, does not authorize a materially different or no-longer-authorized lifecycle transition. Effectuation boundary HSM/KMS command-admission point; key-state transition inside the cryptographic module. Primary failure modes Residual key-use authority after rotation or destruction; derived keys outliving a revoked parent; replayed administrative command; split-brain partition state. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 82] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Associated claim group Claims 1-11 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance HSM and KMS command admission; PKCS#11/KMIP-style management interfaces; key-state fencing. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.2. E2 (Claims 12-22): AI-native radio-network state authorization Technical objective Reconstruct the aggregate multi-cell, neighbor and slice state an AI-generated radio configuration would produce and authorize that effective state. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Acceptance of a controller instruction does not authorize a different effective network configuration or an aggregate resource effect exceeding the validated scope. Effectuation boundary Configuration-effect point on the management plane (SMO/Non-RT RIC to network element); not PHY/MAC loops. Primary failure modes Neighbor-cell side effects; slice footprint underestimated; stale policy epoch; optimizer request differs from installed parameters. Associated claim group Claims 12-22 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance O-RAN SMO/Non-RT RIC policy admission; O1/A1-style configuration paths; vendor automation platforms. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.3. E3 (Claims 23-33): Declarative reconciliation and non-resurrection Technical objective Bind reconciliation authority to a current generation so a controller cannot reinstall a revoked configuration. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 83] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Distinguishing enforcement predicate Persistence of a desired-state declaration, repetition of a reconciliation loop, or restoration of a controller does not recreate authority after the generation authority is retired. Effectuation boundary Reconciliation-admission step before the control-plane change is committed. Primary failure modes Obsolete desired-state snapshot reapplied after rollback; restored controller using retired generation; GitOps revision drift. Associated claim group Claims 23-33 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Kubernetes controllers, GitOps revision pinning, admission control, lease/epoch fencing. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.4. E4 (Claims 34-44): Causal downstream-effect closure Technical objective Materialize the causal tree of child effects (workflows, queues, APIs, stored programs) and require current operation-specific authority at each externally effective child. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authorization of the Root Candidate Act does not confer unrestricted authority on downstream operations generated by causal expansion. Effectuation boundary Each downstream sink that can make a derived effect externally effective. Primary failure modes Unmodelled child branch; confused-deputy child using broader credentials; child outliving revocation of root authority. Associated claim group Claims 34-44 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 84] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Event meshes, workflow engines, message brokers, saga orchestrators; ERP and CRM event consumers. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class C: this profile combines earlier mechanisms into an additional implementation arrangement. A.5. E5 (Claims 45-55): Accelerator execution-authority cutover Technical objective Separate checkpoint possession from authority to publish results during migration or failover; single effect-commit owner via source fence, destination admission and effect watermark. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Possession or restoration of computational state does not confer effect-commit authority; source and destination are prevented from committing conflicting effects. Effectuation boundary Protected output publish or model-state commit interface (not every tensor operation). Primary failure modes Zombie source worker publishing after failover; destination double-commit; stale checkpoint promoted; watermark regression. Associated claim group Claims 45-55 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Distributed training/inference fleets; GPU partitioning; checkpoint promotion; fencing-token style ownership epochs. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class C: this profile combines earlier mechanisms into an additional implementation arrangement. A.6. E6 (Claims 56-66): Trust-domain transition and prior-access closure Technical objective Prove old-domain DMA, interrupt, debug and queued-I/O paths are closed before successor authority for a resource is granted. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 85] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A declared ownership change, permission update or domain reassignment does not establish completion while a prior-authority path can still produce a prohibited effect. Effectuation boundary Resource-assignment controller and protected DMA-mapping/ transition interlock. Primary failure modes Residual IOMMU/SMMU translation; in-flight DMA; interrupt remap not retargeted; debug path left enabled; queued I/O completing in new domain. Associated claim group Claims 56-66 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Arm CCA/RME with SMMU, Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, SoC domain controllers. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.7. E7 (Claims 67-77): Cumulative connectivity trajectory authorization Technical objective Evaluate the history of access transitions (Wi-Fi, cellular, satellite) against a cumulative temporal envelope rather than each switch alone. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Independent authorization of individual connectivity operations does not authorize a sequence whose cumulative governed effects exceed the temporal envelope. Effectuation boundary Terminal connectivity policy controller, outside high-frequency radio loops. Primary failure modes Oscillating switches each individually permitted; history record tampered or reset; service-continuity obligation violated by sequence. Associated claim group Claims 67-77 of the consolidated claim section. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 86] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Interoperability relevance Device connectivity managers; multi-access steering policies; mobility hysteresis and dwell-time management. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class X: this profile appears to introduce additional technical subject matter requiring independent prior-art and priority-support examination. A.8. E8 (Claims 78-88): Consequence-specific numerical-error reliability Technical objective Compose quantization, rounding and accumulation error with the decision margin of a specific consequential decision; permit, request higher precision, or block. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Approval of a model, processor, precision or configuration does not authorize a consequential operation when the effective numerical result fails, or cannot be shown to satisfy, its consequence-specific conditions. Effectuation boundary Release of a numerical decision to a consequential downstream consumer. Primary failure modes Error bound underestimated; precision downgrade between approval and use; margin computed on a different model build. Associated claim group Claims 78-88 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Mixed-precision and quantized inference stacks; safety-relevant decision gates; accelerator runtimes. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class X: this profile appears to introduce additional technical subject matter requiring independent prior-art and priority-support examination. A.9. E9 (Claims 89-99): Remediation and current attestation correspondence Technical objective Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 87] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Match patch state, fresh attestation evidence, reference values and relying-party policy per consequence class, while allowing defined safe continuity. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Installation or reported activation of a remediation does not establish attestation correspondence; earlier attestation acceptance does not authorize an effect that requires a newer condition. Effectuation boundary Attested workload admission and effect-specific trust-state fence. Primary failure modes Stale appraisal after patch; reference values lag the patch; grace-period abuse; policy epoch change not reflected in cached verdict. Associated claim group Claims 89-99 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance RATS verifier/relying-party roles (RFC 9334); confidential- computing attestation services. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class C: this profile combines earlier mechanisms into an additional implementation arrangement. A.10. E10 (Claims 100-110): Software-to-hardware offload effect equivalence Technical objective Compare the effective installed hardware behavior (wildcards, priority, caches, state) with the effect permitted by the software decision; fence stale fast-path authority. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Installation of an accelerated rule, or software authorization of the corresponding operation, does not authorize repeated hardware effectuation when installed behavior exceeds the permitted scope or current authority. Effectuation boundary Offload rule install/readback and protected fast-path enablement barrier. Primary failure modes Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 88] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Wildcard rule broader than the authorized flow; rule precedence changes effect; cached rule surviving revocation; readback differs from installed state. Associated claim group Claims 100-110 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance SmartNIC/DPU/IPU offload; P4 pipelines; flow-rule tables; programmable switch fast paths. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class X: this profile appears to introduce additional technical subject matter requiring independent prior-art and priority-support examination. A.11. E11 (Claims 111-121): Multimodal audience and presentation exposure Technical objective Evaluate concurrent audience, modality and residual output routes before information becomes perceptible. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authorization to generate, access, transmit or present information through one route does not authorize exposure through another route with different audience, modality, privacy or residual- output conditions. Effectuation boundary Output routing and endpoint release (display, speaker, casting). Primary failure modes Cast/mirroring route added; bystander-visible surface; residual buffer on the old route. Associated claim group Claims 111-121 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Device output routers; casting and screen-sharing stacks; notification delivery. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 89] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A.12. E12A (Claims 122-132): Negative-observation and sensor-coverage evidence Technical objective Admit an absence-of-event inference only if sensing opportunity, health, coverage, buffering and time-gap conditions were met. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Absence of a received event is not sufficient authorization when a mandatory opportunity to observe, or evidence about that opportunity, has not been established. Effectuation boundary Protected evidence qualification before physical, access or notification actions. Primary failure modes Sensor offline treated as 'no event'; coverage hole; buffered events delayed past decision; single-source completeness assumption. Associated claim group Claims 122-132 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Home/building automation hubs; physical-security and ambient- sensing platforms. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.13. E12 (Claims 133-143): In-flight media release and route changes Technical objective Re-evaluate or fence already queued or streaming segments when audience or route changes. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authorization of an initial presentation segment does not authorize continued release of unreleased information after a material change in audience authorization or route. Effectuation boundary Queue/output sink with epoch-bound release. Primary failure modes Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 90] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Buffered audio or video reaching a newly unauthorized audience; notification queue flushed after privacy-state change. Associated claim group Claims 133-143 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Streaming and notification queues; casting revocation; secure audio/video output. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.14. E13 (Claims 144-154): Low-power intent escrow and wake-epoch continuity Technical objective Hold pending intent prepared by an always-on processor and revalidate it against current identity, policy and host state at wake. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Permission for low-power observation or computation does not confer authority to execute an escrowed operation after a power, boot, session or domain change. Effectuation boundary Wake boundary and protected intent queue. Primary failure modes Stale escrowed intent executed after user change or policy revocation; wake-epoch not advanced; escrow tampering. Associated claim group Claims 144-154 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Sensor hubs and always-on coprocessors; mobile and embedded SoC power domains. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 91] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A.15. E14 (Claims 155-165): Uncertain execution outcomes and retry safety Technical objective Separate logical-effect identity from attempt identity; quarantine unresolved completion; reconcile against authoritative endpoint evidence before retry or compensation. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Loss of an acknowledgment, timeout, worker failure or originator restart does not establish that an earlier operation failed or authorize an unrestricted duplicate attempt. Effectuation boundary Protected retry controller and effect ledger at the consequential endpoint interface. Primary failure modes Blind retry duplicating a committed effect; compensation under stale authority; conflicting replacement operation admitted during quarantine. Associated claim group Claims 155-165 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Idempotency keys, durable workflows, outbox reconciliation, payment status inquiry. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class X: this profile appears to introduce additional technical subject matter requiring independent prior-art and priority-support examination. A.16. E15 (Claims 166-176): Authority continuity through agent context compaction Technical objective Keep an authority record independent of the model-visible context so summarization or handoff cannot drop a prohibition. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Omission, modification or reinterpretation of authority information during model-context transformation does not remove an operative prohibition or expand authority. Effectuation boundary Tool dispatcher or credential-isolated tool proxy. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 92] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Primary failure modes Summary omits a 'do not' constraint; handoff widens scope; memory replacement rewrites the task; prompt-injected authority claim. Associated claim group Claims 166-176 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Agent SDKs and runtimes with tool dispatch, memory and handoff features. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.17. E16 (Claims 177-187): Independent verification of autonomous software repairs Technical objective Isolate acceptance criteria and verification oracle from the modifying agent; bind deployed bytes to the approved, verified artifact. Distinguishing enforcement predicate An agent's ability to modify code, generate tests or report success does not confer authority to redefine acceptance criteria or release an artifact lacking independent verification evidence. Effectuation boundary CI/CD artifact-promotion and deployment gate. Primary failure modes Agent edits its own tests; artifact swapped after verification; oracle shares agent credentials. Associated claim group Claims 177-187 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance CI/CD pipelines, artifact signing, provenance attestations, protected branches. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 93] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 A.18. E17 (Claims 188-198): Human delegation and minimal-disclosure authority Technical objective Send a bounded task capsule to a human and independently validate the returned work and continuing authority before any external effect. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Transfer of task information to a human does not transfer the agent's full context, stored credentials, general privileges or unrestricted authority. Effectuation boundary Human-in-the-loop handoff gateway and action gateway. Primary failure modes Over-disclosure to the human; returned artifact treated as authority; stale authority on re-entry. Associated claim group Claims 188-198 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Service-desk, approval and case-management workflows with human escalation. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.19. E18 (Claims 199-209): Spoken intent and interruption-epoch validation Technical objective Bind the final operative spoken intent, after corrections and barge-in, to the actual tool operation through a turn/interruption epoch. Distinguishing enforcement predicate A provisional transcript, incomplete instruction, outdated interpretation or superseded proposal does not confer authority for the corresponding effect. Effectuation boundary Speech-to-tool commit boundary. Primary failure modes Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 94] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Early partial transcript executed; interrupted command still dispatched; ASR correction not reflected. Associated claim group Claims 199-209 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Voice assistants, realtime voice agents, in-car and smart-home voice control. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.20. E19 (Claims 210-220): Cross-source factual evidence consistency Technical objective Identify material factual dependencies and reconcile source validity and snapshot coherence at effectuation. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authenticity of individual retrieved records, or production of a model synthesis, does not establish a coherent and current factual basis for the actual operation. Effectuation boundary Evidence-sensitive tool execution gate. Primary failure modes Mutually inconsistent authentic records; stale cache; two 'independent' sources sharing one origin. Associated claim group Claims 210-220 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Retrieval-augmented systems; enterprise search; temporal and snapshot data stores. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.21. E20 (Claims 221-231): Cross-protocol tool-semantic authority Technical objective Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 95] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Preserve instruction authority and tool restrictions across model- API conversion, MCP adapters and provider-hosted versus client- executed tools. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Syntactic acceptance of an adapted request does not establish preservation of instruction authority, confidentiality or tool restrictions across protocols. Effectuation boundary Protocol bridge plus independent tool/end-target control. Primary failure modes Instruction hierarchy dropped in translation; hosted tool bypasses gateway; unsupported feature silently ignored. Associated claim group Claims 221-231 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance MCP, vendor agent APIs, agent-to-agent protocols, tool gateways. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.22. E21 (Claims 232-242): Aggregate multi-agent work-product finality Technical objective Materialize the composition of agent work products and authorize the accepted aggregate or a validated subset. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Individual authorization or local validation of work products does not authorize the consequential state produced by their combination. Effectuation boundary Shared merge/commit boundary. Primary failure modes Cross-branch read/write conflict; cumulative limit exceeded by sum; negative constraint violated only after merge. Associated claim group Claims 232-242 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 96] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Multi-agent orchestration; collaborative revision and merge systems. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.23. E22 (Claims 243-253): Document-field spatial provenance Technical objective Bind an extracted value to its source row/cell, page geometry, payee and business-effect identity before payment or record change. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Recognition of correct strings or field values does not authorize an operation when values are not sufficiently associated with the corresponding labels, records or relationships. Effectuation boundary Extraction-to-ERP/payment finality point. Primary failure modes Amount bound to wrong invoice row; payee/IBAN mismatch; table geometry shift; duplicate-page confusion. Associated claim group Claims 243-253 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Document AI, invoice processing, accounts-payable automation. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.24. E23 (Claims 254-264): Visual-target and persistent referent continuity Technical objective Verify that the entity currently targeted is the one originally referred to ('this one') before physical, financial or access effects. Distinguishing enforcement predicate An earlier reference to a screen position, region, label, description or coordinate does not authorize execution against a different entity that later occupies it. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 97] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Effectuation boundary Perception-to-action target verification. Primary failure modes UI re-layout; moving or occluded object; coordinate reuse; ambiguous referent. Associated claim group Claims 254-264 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Multimodal assistants, robotics, spatial computing, GUI-automation agents. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.25. E24 (Claims 265-273*): Cross-channel communication-origin authority Technical objective Separate message transmission from authenticated original-speaker intent and check the current audience before sending protected content. (*Claim 273 truncated in the supplied file; claims 274-275 absent.) Distinguishing enforcement predicate Receipt, quotation, forwarding or summarization of a message does not confer an alleged earlier sender's authority; earlier authorization to disclose to a group does not authorize disclosure to a changed audience. Effectuation boundary Controlled send/recipient-release point. Primary failure modes Quoted instruction treated as command; account reassignment; group membership changed after approval. Associated claim group Claims 265-273* of the consolidated claim section. The supplied file has nine physically present claims (265-273); claim 273 ends mid-sentence. Interoperability relevance Enterprise messaging and collaboration channels, business messaging APIs. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 98] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.26. E25 (Claims 276-286): Governance enforcement-coverage reconciliation Technical objective Verify, route by route, that required governance controls are enforceable at actual effect paths; do not equate logging with prevention. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Registration of an agent, a nominal policy, or compliant sampled traces do not establish that the required control is enforceable across the covered execution routes. Effectuation boundary Assurance controller with proof of sink rejection per discovered route. Primary failure modes Undiscovered route; credential bypass; dashboard green while a path is uncontrolled; coverage probe unsafe to run. Associated claim group Claims 276-286 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Agent-governance platforms, API/credential inventories, effect- route test harnesses. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class X: this profile appears to introduce additional technical subject matter requiring independent prior-art and priority-support examination. A.27. E26 (Claims 287-297): Late-bound ERP and accounting effects Technical objective Recompute effective posting, tax, FX and approval consequences against live state immediately before posting. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authorization of an initial instruction, document or simulated transaction does not authorize a later commitment with a materially different financial or operational consequence. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 99] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Effectuation boundary ERP posting/release boundary. Primary failure modes Tax/FX/pricing change between approval and posting; allocation rule changed; simulated result differs from actual. Associated claim group Claims 287-297 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance ERP and accounting systems, procure-to-pay, financial close. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.28. E27 (Claims 298-308): Customer commitments versus actual fulfillment Technical objective Gate outward statements ('refunded', 'shipped') on independently qualified fulfillment evidence, separately from initiating the internal request. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authorization or submission of the underlying operation does not authorize a statement that it is completed or settled without supporting evidence; approval of the statement does not authorize the operation. Effectuation boundary Customer-communication dispatch with authoritative fulfillment check. Primary failure modes 'Done' claimed on request acceptance; refund pending but announced; stale case status. Associated claim group Claims 298-308 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Customer-service agents, case-management and order-fulfillment systems. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 100] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.29. E28 (Claims 309-319): Live-topology IT remediation Technical objective Reconstruct the live dependency topology at the remediation commit; stale remediation generations cannot resume. Distinguishing enforcement predicate A previously valid change request does not authorize the same nominal command when the current target, live dependencies or material impact differs from the approved scope. Effectuation boundary Protected change/repair controller at the commit point. Primary failure modes CMDB drift; new dependency edge; criticality changed; resumed stale plan. Associated claim group Claims 309-319 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance IT operations management, CMDB, cloud change and remediation tooling. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.30. E29 (Claims 320-330): Analytical cohort identity and activation Technical objective Reconcile the actual downstream target population, suppression and consent per target before fan-out. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Permission to run an analytical query or obtain a policy-filtered population does not authorize an operation against an expanded, duplicated, unsubscribed, suppressed or ineligible target population. Effectuation boundary Analytics-to-activation fan-out boundary. Primary failure modes Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 101] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Join or identity-resolution expansion; suppressed identity re- added; duplicate recipient; consent withdrawn after query. Associated claim group Claims 320-330 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Data platforms with activation to marketing, CRM and account actions. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.31. E30 (Claims 331-341): Cross-engine data-policy semantics Technical objective Test that mandatory row, column, masking, aggregation and recipient obligations survive the actual query route and result release. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Syntactic compatibility, execution by an alternative engine, or storage-level credentials do not establish preservation of governance semantics. Effectuation boundary Query route and effective result-release validation. Primary failure modes Zero-copy share bypassing masking; engine-specific semantic difference; storage-layer credential used directly. Associated claim group Claims 331-341 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Lakehouse and warehouse catalogs, data-sharing and multi-engine query paths. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class X: this profile appears to introduce additional technical subject matter requiring independent prior-art and priority-support examination. A.32. E31 (Claims 342-352): Transitive database stored-program effects Technical objective Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 102] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Reconstruct the closure of material effects reachable through triggers, definer-rights code, autonomous transactions and external functions. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Permission to invoke an entry-point operation or stored program does not confer authority for every material effect transitively reachable through it. Effectuation boundary Supported database/transaction enforcement point before privileged mutation. Primary failure modes Trigger chain; definer-rights escalation; autonomous transaction side effect; external function call. Associated claim group Claims 342-352 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Relational databases with stored programs, triggers and external- call features. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class C: this profile combines earlier mechanisms into an additional implementation arrangement. A.33. E32 (Claims 353-363): Source-commit-certified downstream effects Technical objective Bind downstream release to an authoritative source commit and current policy/effect state; reconcile after uncertain acknowledgments. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Commitment of the source transaction, or presence of a derived event, does not authorize an external operation produced by a downstream consumer or transformed event. Effectuation boundary Transactional outbox/CDC and consumer effect boundary. Primary failure modes Uncommitted intent consumed; stale outbox row; unrelated transaction event; duplicate delivery. Associated claim group Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 103] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Claims 353-363 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Transactional outbox, change-data-capture, brokers and event buses. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class C: this profile combines earlier mechanisms into an additional implementation arrangement. A.34. E33 (Claims 364-374): Agentic payment exposure reservation Technical objective Conserve aggregate reserved, authorized and captured exposure against the mandate from authorization through capture. Distinguishing enforcement predicate A payment request cannot consume authority already reserved or committed for another incompatible obligation; unresolved exposure is classified conservatively. Effectuation boundary Authorization-to-capture and exposure-reservation boundary. Primary failure modes Concurrent agents exceeding mandate; double-counted representations of one obligation; unresolved exposure treated as released. Associated claim group Claims 364-374 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Tokenized agent payments, issuer and gateway limit controls, PSP APIs. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.35. E34 (Claims 375-385): Cross-border FX and beneficiary outcomes Technical objective Distinguish instruction acceptance, settlement stages and independently evidenced beneficiary-net outcome. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 104] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Authorization of a nominal originating amount does not authorize an intermediary transformation or final beneficiary-side consequence violating the mandate; a message acknowledgment does not establish beneficiary credit. Effectuation boundary Beneficiary-outcome and exception/reconciliation boundary. Primary failure modes FX or fee drift; intermediary deductions; ack mistaken for credit; routing change. Associated claim group Claims 375-385 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Cross-border payment messaging and tracking; remittance networks. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.36. E35 (Claims 386-396): Offline digital cash post-compromise fork evidence Technical objective Preserve delegated spending-authority continuity and reconcile conflicting transfer evidence after protection assumptions fail. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Prevention of unauthorized transfers under intact hardware does not establish that cloning remains impossible after compromise; detection of conflicting evidence does not establish the full amount of undiscovered conflicting transfers. Effectuation boundary Offline wallet effectuation point plus later reconciliation. Primary failure modes Secure-element compromise; cloned state; incomplete fork discovery; privacy loss in reconciliation. Associated claim group Claims 386-396 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Offline digital-currency research and wallets with secure elements. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 105] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class X: this profile appears to introduce additional technical subject matter requiring independent prior-art and priority-support examination. A.37. E36 (Claims 397-407): Edge subrequest and outbound-effect authority Technical objective Preserve parent source/purpose restrictions across subrequests, queues, retries and background workers; enforce at outbound effect paths. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Authentication or authorization of an originating edge request does not authorize each transitive, deferred, cached or independently executed effect the workload generates. Effectuation boundary Edge runtime egress and credential-isolated service connector. Primary failure modes Background worker using broader credentials; queued task outliving revocation; cached result reused. Associated claim group Claims 397-407 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Edge and serverless runtimes, queues, service bindings, egress gateways. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class N: this profile narrows an earlier architectural principle. A.38. E37 (Claims 408-418): Causal radio-service impairment control Technical objective Correlate attributable impact evidence of a limited real RAN change and expand only within bounded impairment. Distinguishing enforcement predicate An individually authorized radio-control action is not automatically granted unrestricted continued or expanded deployment because its parameters were valid or telemetry has not yet shown degradation. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 106] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Effectuation boundary Non-real-time RAN rollout gate with bounded canary feedback. Primary failure modes Local metrics miss neighbor-cell harm; confounded attribution; premature expansion. Associated claim group Claims 408-418 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance RAN automation and rollout management, canary and closed-loop optimization. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class C: this profile combines earlier mechanisms into an additional implementation arrangement. A.39. E38 (Claims 419-429): 6G network-slice capacity lending and reclamation Technical objective Account for loaned resources, continuity and enforceable reclaim before activation and further borrowing. Distinguishing enforcement predicate Temporary non-utilization of a first slice's resource does not establish that it may be lent unless entitlement, conservation and deadline-bounded reclamation remain satisfiable. Effectuation boundary Slice orchestration and capacity-admission controls; protected scheduler lease state. Primary failure modes Unreclaimable loan after mobility or reroute; entitlement floor violated; capacity created by lending. Associated claim group Claims 419-429 of the consolidated claim section. Interoperability relevance Network-slice orchestration and RAN slice controllers. Relation to the June mothership (unverified) Editorial class C: this profile combines earlier mechanisms into an additional implementation arrangement. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 107] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 Appendix B. Technical Terminology, Synonym Mapping, and Patent Examiner Search-Phrase Index This appendix is non-normative. It lists the inventor's terminology and conventional industry equivalents, keyword clusters mapped to sections and embodiments, substantive search phrases and Boolean strings. The index does not imply that any search result anticipates, or is infringed by, any patent claim, and index terms are not claims or verified classification codes. B.1. Terminology and Synonym Mapping +=====================+===========================+================+ |Inventor terminology | Industry search |Embodiments | | | terminology | | +=====================+===========================+================+ |Candidate Act | Proposed operation; |1-38 | | | deferred operation; | | | | staged transaction; | | | | pending request | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Non-Effective State | Pending non-committed |1-38 | | | state; staged/uncommitted | | | | state | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Actual Pending | Reconstructed effective |1-38 | |Operation | operation; resolved | | | | operation; effective- | | | | operation derivation | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Operation | Effective-operation |1,2,4,10,31 | |Reconstruction | reconstruction; action | | | | canonicalization; effect | | | | derivation | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Finality Sink | Protected effectuation |1-38 | | | boundary; execution | | | | enforcement point; policy | | | | enforcement point at the | | | | effect | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Finality Gate | Commit gate; release |1-38 | | | gate; admission gate | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Source-Authority | Originating authorization |4,15,17,20,24,36| |Envelope | context; delegated | | | | authority envelope | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 108] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 |Protected Enforcement| Trusted enforcement |1-38 | |Domain | environment; protected | | | | policy domain | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Independent Validator| Runtime policy |1-38 | | | revalidation service; | | | | out-of-band authorization | | | | verifier | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Scoped Execution | Operation-bound execution |1-38 | |Capability | authorization; non-bearer | | | | capability; sender- | | | | constrained, act-bound | | | | token | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Consequence-Bound | Effect-aware |1-38 | |Authorization | authorization; | | | | consequence-specific | | | | authorization | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Authority Continuity | Delegated authority |4,15,17,20,36 | | | preservation; authority | | | | propagation integrity | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Protected Policy | Policy version fence; |3,10,25 | |Epoch | policy generation counter | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Revocation Epoch | Revocation generation; |1,3,9 | | | revocation freshness | | | | marker | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Evidence-Carrying | Authenticated effect |14,27,32,34 | |Receipt | evidence; signed | | | | execution receipt | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Effect Confirmation | Authenticated destination |14,27,34 | |Receipt | effect evidence; | | | | destination-origin | | | | confirmation | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Interim Effectuation | Receipt-gated |14,33 | |Validation (IEV) | continuation validation; | | | | staged-effect checkpoint | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Ledger-Anchored | Commit-log-anchored |32,35 | |Validation Receipt | attestation record; | | | | transparency-log-anchored | | | | receipt | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 109] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Effective Operation | Installed rule semantics; |10 | |Descriptor / | match-action effective | | |Effective Hardware | behavior | | |Action Descriptor | | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Material Dependency | Live dependency topology; |4,28,31 | |Graph | causal effect graph; | | | | transitive effect closure | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Protected State | Sealed state digest; |5,9,14 | |Commitment | authenticated state | | | | commitment | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Authoritative Outcome| Destination-of-record |14,27,34 | |Evidence | confirmation; system-of- | | | | record outcome | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Stale Authority | Expired/superseded |3,5,13,28 | | | authority; time-of-check/ | | | | time-of-use gap | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Transitive Effect | Indirect side effect; |4,31,36 | | | derived effect; second- | | | | order effect | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Aggregate Consequence| Cross-agent combined- |7,21,33 | | | state effect; cumulative | | | | effect | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Bounded Real Effect | Canary effect; limited |37,Receipt-gated| | | trial effect; staged |IEV | | | partial effectuation | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Effectuation-Boundary| Enforcement at the point |1-38 | |Enforcement | of effect; last-mile | | | | enforcement | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Control-to-Effect | Verified enforcement-path |25 | |Route Coverage | completeness; governance | | | | coverage | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Protected Offload | Software-to-hardware |10 | |Equivalence | policy correspondence; | | | | fast-path equivalence | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Aggregate Effect | Cross-agent combined- |21 | |Validation | state authorization; | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 110] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 | | merge-time policy | | | | validation | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ |Execution Finality | Protected consequential |1-38 | | | operation commitment; | | | | point-of-no-return | | | | control | | +---------------------+---------------------------+----------------+ Table 4: Terminology mapping B.2. Keyword Clusters 140 cluster keywords plus 40 additional keywords and 31 inventor terms listed in the synonym table. B.2.1. AI-agent security Relevant sections and embodiments: Sections 4, 6 (REQ-02, REQ-14, REQ-15), 8.3; Embodiments E15-E21, E24, E36. * agentic AI * autonomous execution * tool-call authorization * MCP security * agent delegation * prompt injection * instruction hierarchy * memory compaction * context summarization * cross-model protocol translation * provider-hosted tools * client-executed tools * AI coding agents * agent handoff Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 111] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * confused deputy * credential isolation * tool dispatcher * agent governance * human-in-the-loop * verification oracle B.2.2. Cryptographic and trusted computing Relevant sections and embodiments: Sections 6 (REQ-04 to REQ-06, REQ- 10), 8.4; E1, E5, E6, E9. * hardware-rooted authorization * non-bearer capability * sender-constrained token * secure execution environment * trusted execution environment * runtime attestation * secure element * hardware security module * key lifecycle * anti-replay * freshness * protected epoch * confidential computing * remote attestation * fencing token * generation counter Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 112] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * key derivation * key destruction * partition state * attestation verifier B.2.3. Network and telecommunications Relevant sections and embodiments: Section 8.7; E2, E7, E37, E38. * AI-RAN * O-RAN * RAN Intelligent Controller * rApp * Service Management and Orchestration * 6G network slicing * radio impairment * cumulative connectivity transition * slice entitlement * temporary capacity lending * slice reclamation * spectrum consequence * canary rollout * neighbor-cell impact * access steering * multi-access transition * non-real-time control * network-impact policy Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 113] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * configuration drift * service continuity B.2.4. Enterprise and database Relevant sections and embodiments: Sections 8.5, 8.6; E4, E22, E26, E28, E31, E32. * transitive database effects * trigger execution * stored-program authorization * definer rights * autonomous transaction * event provenance * transactional outbox * source-commit validation * change data capture * ERP configuration drift * account effect vector * posting reconciliation * purchase-order approval * tax and FX recomputation * document field provenance * configuration management database * live dependency topology * change control * remediation generation * event consumer authorization Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 114] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 B.2.5. Data governance Relevant sections and embodiments: Appendix A (E29, E30). * row-level security * column masking * heterogeneous query engines * policy semantic equivalence * effective cohort membership * identity resolution * data egress * population activation * suppression list * consent state * zero-copy sharing * catalog policy * aggregation threshold * result-release validation * recipient obligation * data clean room * lineage * policy pushdown * fan-out authorization * opt-out propagation B.2.6. Finance Relevant sections and embodiments: Section 8.8; E14, E33, E34, E35. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 115] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * agentic payments * cumulative authorization exposure * payment reservation * authorization-to-capture * FX beneficiary finality * beneficiary-net amount * offline digital money * offline digital cash * token fork * post-compromise recovery * financial loss reconciliation * double-spend * exposure ledger * payment mandate * settlement evidence * tokenized settlement * payment status inquiry * idempotency key * ISO 20022 tracking * delegated spending authority B.2.7. Industrial and semiconductor Relevant sections and embodiments: Sections 8.4, 18, 19; E5, E6, E8, E10, E13. * DMA * SMMU Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 116] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * IOMMU * trust-domain reassignment * accelerator failover * computational effect commitment * numerical uncertainty * mixed precision * quantization error * programmable hardware * DPU forwarding * SmartNIC offload * installed hardware rule * TCAM rule * P4 fast path * interrupt remapping * checkpoint restoration * always-on coprocessor * wake epoch * decision margin B.2.8. Additional keywords * consequential operation * externally effective operation * point of no return * effect boundary * protected execution finality Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 117] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * non-bypassable enforcement * fail-closed * single-use capability * act-bound authorization * destination binding * effective principal * effective target identity * operation canonicalization * canonical operation digest * stable act identity * delegation depth * authority narrowing * scope attenuation * capability consumption record * crash-consistent consumption * checkpoint restoration * stale worker * split brain * lease epoch * reconciliation loop * non-resurrection * effect watermark * effect ledger * indeterminate outcome Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 118] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * quarantine state * safe state * compensation action * authoritative outcome criterion * outcome reconciliation * receipt-gated continuation * staged effectuation * canary effect * blast-radius bound * aggregate limit * cumulative effect envelope B.3. Search Phrases 72 phrases, each usable as an exact-phrase or proximity query. 1. execution finality for autonomous agents 2. effectuation boundary enforcement 3. operation reconstruction before authorization 4. actual pending operation versus requested operation 5. candidate act held in a non-effective state 6. authorization to compute is not authorization to effect 7. consequence-bound authorization of tool calls 8. independent validator re-derives the effective operation 9. scoped non-bearer execution capability bound to the act 10. finality sink verifies capability against the actual operation 11. time-of-check to time-of-use gap between approval and execution Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 119] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 12. stale policy epoch rejected at the effect point 13. revocation epoch checked at the sink 14. consumed capability atomic replay protection at the sink 15. destination-origin effect confirmation receipt 16. self-reported completion is not effect evidence 17. bounded real effect before continuation authority 18. interim effectuation validation of earlier effect evidence 19. timeout is not evidence of non-effect 20. retry quarantine for unresolved commit outcome 21. logical effect identity distinct from attempt identity 22. authority record independent of model context 23. authority preserved across context compaction 24. agent handoff must not widen authority 25. instruction hierarchy preserved across protocol translation 26. provider-hosted tool execution cannot be intercepted by application gateway 27. canonical authority contract for MCP tool semantics 28. verification oracle isolated from the modifying agent 29. deployed artifact bound to approved tested artifact 30. minimal-disclosure task capsule for human assistance 31. spoken intent interruption epoch 32. cross-source factual coherence at effectuation 33. aggregate effect of composed multi-agent work products 34. materialized composition snapshot validation 35. document field bound to source row and coordinates Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 120] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 36. visual referent continuity before physical action 37. quoted or forwarded message not operative authority 38. current group audience epoch before disclosure 39. governance enforcement coverage per execution route 40. logging is not prevention at the effect boundary 41. sink rejection as coverage evidence 42. late-bound ERP posting effect reconstruction 43. customer commitment gated on fulfillment evidence 44. live dependency graph revalidated at remediation commit 45. analytical cohort identity through activation fan-out 46. cross-engine policy semantic equivalence for governed data 47. transitive stored-program effect closure 48. source-commit-certified downstream effect 49. outbox event is not authority without source commit 50. agentic payment exposure reservation before authorization 51. authorization-to-capture exposure continuity 52. beneficiary-net outcome versus nominal payment instruction 53. offline digital cash post-compromise fork evidence 54. edge subrequest authority conservation 55. causal radio-service impairment before rollout expansion 56. network slice capacity lending with enforceable reclamation 57. cumulative connectivity trajectory envelope 58. consequence-specific numerical error composition with decision margin 59. remediation attested state correspondence to consequence class Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 121] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 60. software-to-hardware offload effect equivalence 61. installed fast-path rule readback versus authorized effect 62. trust-domain reassignment with prior-access path closure 63. accelerator worker single-writer effect cutover 64. negative observation requires sensing opportunity evidence 65. low-power intent escrow revalidated at wake 66. in-flight media segment fencing on audience change 67. key lifecycle transition authorized by effective key state 68. desired-state controller non-resurrection of revoked generation 69. causal child-effect graph with per-child authorization 70. control-to-effect route coverage verification 71. alternate credential path bypass analysis 72. fail-closed behavior when validator is unavailable B.4. Boolean Search Strings * "execution finality" AND "autonomous agent" AND "effectuation" * "operation reconstruction" AND "authorization" AND "actual effect" * "AI agent" AND "tool invocation" AND "trusted enforcement" * "MCP" AND "semantic equivalence" AND "tool authorization" * "database trigger" AND "transitive effects" AND "authorization" * "SmartNIC" AND "installed rule" AND "policy equivalence" * "offline digital cash" AND "post-compromise" AND "fork" * "network slicing" AND "capacity lending" AND "reclamation" * "source authority" AND "delegation" AND "final effect" * "attestation" AND "remediation" AND "policy epoch" Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 122] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 * ("candidate act" OR "proposed operation") AND ("non-effective" OR "uncommitted") AND "finality sink" * ("context compaction" OR "context summarization") AND "authority" AND ("prohibition" OR "constraint") * ("outbox" OR "change data capture") AND "committed transaction" AND "consumer" AND "authorization" * ("GPU" OR "accelerator") AND ("failover" OR "migration") AND ("fencing token" OR "single writer") AND "effect" * ("DMA" OR "SMMU") AND "domain reassignment" AND ("quiescence" OR "drain") * ("payment" AND "agent") AND ("exposure ledger" OR "reservation") AND "capture" * ("route coverage" OR "enforcement coverage") AND "governance" AND ("agent" OR "autonomous") * ("negative observation" OR "absence of event") AND "sensor coverage" AND "authorization" Appendix C. Patent Lineage and Claim-Integrity Note This appendix is non-normative. Foundational application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026, international publication WO 2026/150382 A2 on 16 July 2026. The inventor describes it as approximately 8,598 pages and more than 300 distinct embodiments; these figures are inventor-reported and unverified. Later application Indian provisional 202631136555, dated 15 November 2026; approximately 2,405 pages; 39 embodiments (1-38 plus 12A); consolidated claim section. Number and date are from the applicant's filing acknowledgment. Filing, publication and priority are different Publication on 16 July 2026 (not 16 June) does not by itself establish an earlier priority date for every feature of a later filing. Entitlement requires comparison with the as-filed earlier text. Claim integrity Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 123] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 The supplied merged PDF has 427 physically present numbered claims (1-273, 276-429); 274 and 275 absent; claim 273 ends mid-sentence. The text is neither reconstructed nor supplied here. Source status The mothership JSON (Technical_Disclosure_1.json) was not available to the editor; its identity with the as-filed text is uncertified. +===================+=============+================+=============+ | PCT application | Filed | WO publication | Published | +===================+=============+================+=============+ | PCT/IB2026/053385 | 7 Apr 2026 | WO 2026/115520 | 4 Jun 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ | PCT/IB2026/054453 | 5 May 2026 | WO 2026/150381 | 16 Jul 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ | PCT/IB2026/055615 | 4 Jun 2026 | WO 2026/150382 | 16 Jul 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ | PCT/IB2026/055760 | 7 Jun 2026 | WO 2026/150383 | 16 Jul 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ | PCT/IB2026/055870 | 10 Jun 2026 | WO 2026/150384 | 16 Jul 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ | PCT/IB2026/056058 | 13 Jun 2026 | WO 2026/154461 | 23 Jul 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ | PCT/IB2026/056809 | 1 Jul 2026 | WO 2026/172334 | 20 Aug 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ | PCT/IB2026/056941 | 6 Jul 2026 | WO 2026/172336 | 20 Aug 2026 | +-------------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+ Table 5: PCT records listed in the applicant's examiner index The list above is non-exhaustive and is drawn from the applicant's index; it is not a declaration that all listed applications share a valid priority claim. Verify each in WIPO PATENTSCOPE. Appendix D. Examiner-Oriented Considerations This appendix is non-normative and holds patentability-oriented considerations that are deliberately kept out of the architecture. It does not assert novelty or inventive step. Three separate tests Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 124] Internet-Draft Consequence-Bound Execution Authority November 2026 (1) Written description and effective date: where is each limitation supported in the as-filed June PCT or in the later filing. (2) Novelty: does one earlier source disclose the combination as properly construed. (3) Inventive step: which closest references, what objective technical problem, whether the skilled person would (not merely could) combine them, and with what reasonable expectation of success. Motivation to combine For each candidate distinction the examiner should ask what problem the combination solves that its constituents do not. Examples: for E10, why combine software authorization with installed-rule readback; for E32, why bind consumer authority to a source-commit certificate rather than to message authenticity; for E35, why add fork evidence to secure-element prevention. Reasonable expectation of success The profiles that depend on device or database interfaces (E6, E10, E31) depend on supported readback or hook interfaces. Whether such interfaces exist for a given product is a factual question. Technical interdependence Each profile claims that its elements cooperate (see Section 17). An examiner should test whether the elements are a mere aggregation or produce a combined technical effect (for example a single effect-commit owner, or a bounded exposure). Closest art categories Fencing tokens and lease epochs (E3, E5); transactional outbox and CDC (E32); P4/match-action verification (E10); 3GPP ATSSS and slicing (E7, E38); secure-element offline cash (E35); policy pushdown and row/column security (E30); agent guardrails and MCP gateways (E15, E20, E25). Limit Stronger detail alone does not establish a new priority date, independent novelty or inventive step. Author's Address Sangam Kumar Das Independent Inventor Balasore 756001 Odisha India Phone: +91 98613 63532 Email: info@sangamdas.com Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 125]