---
layout: global
title: "ML Model Security"
displayTitle: "Spark ML Model Security"
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# Overview

In Apache Spark, loading a machine learning (ML) model is fundamentally equivalent to loading and executing code.
Spark ML models often contain serialized objects, transformation logic, and execution graphs that are evaluated by the Spark runtime
during model loading and inference.
The principle is not unique to Spark, it applies equally to scikit-learn, PyTorch, TensorFlow, and other modern ML ecosystems.
As a result, loading a model from an untrusted source introduces the same security risks as executing untrusted software.

# Why Loading an ML Model Is Equivalent to Loading Code?

Spark ML frameworks serialize not only data (such as weights and parameters) but also executable structures and behaviors.
Because of this, model loading is not merely data parsing. It involves interpreting and executing instructions, which means a malicious model can:

* Execute arbitrary commands
* Access or exfiltrate data
* Modify system state
* Install backdoors or malware

In practice, loading a model from an untrusted source is equivalent to running a program downloaded from the internet.

# Security Implications

Because Spark ML models can embed executable logic, loading untrusted models can lead to:

* Remote code execution (RCE)
* Data exfiltration from Spark jobs
* Compromise of cluster nodes
* Privilege escalation within Spark environments
* Supply-chain attacks through model distribution

These risks are amplified in distributed environments, where a malicious model may execute across multiple cluster nodes.

# Responsibility of End Users

Because loading ML models is equivalent to loading executable code, the responsibility for security ultimately lies with the end user or deploying organization.
End users are responsible for ensuring that ML models are subject to the same security assessment, validation, and operational controls as any third-party software.
This includes:

* Verifying the source and authenticity of the model
* Ensuring integrity and provenance
* Applying organizational security policies
* Performing risk assessments before deployment

Frameworks and libraries can provide safeguards, but they cannot guarantee security when loading arbitrary third-party models.

# Best Practices

* Load models only from trusted and verified sources
* Validate cryptographic hashes or digital signatures
* Execute models in isolated environments
* Restrict filesystem, network, and credential access
* Keep Spark, ML libraries, and dependencies fully patched

